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Message-ID: <1470228801.19955.38.camel@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow
 further restriction of perf_event_open
From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
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        "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2016 08:53:21 -0400
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Having this in Yama would also make it probable that there would be a
security-centric default. It would end up wiping out unprivileged perf
events access on distributions using Yama for ptrace_scope unless they
make the explicit decision to disable it. Having the perf subsystem
extend the existing perf_event_paranoid sysctl leaves the control over
the upstream default in the hands of the perf subsystem, not LSMs.
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