Modprobe local root exploit

[Torsten Duwe <duwe@caldera.de>]

>>>>> "Gregory" == Gregory Maxwell <greg@linuxpower.cx> writes:

    Gregory> After seeing the modprobe local root exploit today, I asked
    Gregory> myself why kmod executes modprobe with full root and doesn't
    Gregory> drop some capabilities first.

    Gregory> Why? It wouldn't close the hole, but it would narrow it down.

This might also be a good idea; but my suggestion is to not allow arbitrary
strings as module names in the first place. As far as I can see, all valid
strings for KMOD requests consist of alphanumeric chars plus dash and
underscore. Anybody with autoloaded modules that don't fit this pattern even
after /etc/modules.conf translation please object !

Here's the patch...

	Torsten

--- linux/kernel/kmod.c.orig	Tue Sep 26 01:18:55 2000
+++ linux/kernel/kmod.c	Mon Nov 13 16:57:02 2000
@@ -168,6 +168,22 @@
 	static atomic_t kmod_concurrent = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50	/* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
 	static int kmod_loop_msg;
+	const char * p;
+
+	/* For security reasons ensure the requested name consists
+	 * only of allowed characters. Especially whitespace and
+	 * shell metacharacters might confuse modprobe.
+	 */
+	for (p = module_name; *p; p++)
+	{
+	  if ((*p & 0xdf) >= 'a' && (*p & 0xdf) <= 'z')
+	    continue;
+	  if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '9')
+	    continue;
+	  if (*p == '_' || *p == '-')
+	    continue;
+	  return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	/* Don't allow request_module() before the root fs is mounted!  */
 	if ( ! current->fs->root ) {

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