[PATCH 01/11] Fix coding style of driver/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c ERROR: space required after that

Jhih-Ming Huang
2017-06-20T05:20:01Z

In this series patches, I fix all of the coding style error in
driver/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c from 54 errors to 0 error.

The first patch fixed 'ERROR: space required after that'.

Signed-off-by: Jhih-Ming Hunag <fbihjmeric@gmail.com>
---
drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
index e8936a3..5bc3a53 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
ctx->auth_mode = ssi_alg->auth_mode;
ctx->drvdata = ssi_alg->drvdata;
dev = &ctx->drvdata->plat_dev->dev;
- crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm,sizeof(struct aead_req_ctx));
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct aead_req_ctx));

/* Allocate key buffer, cache line aligned */
ctx->enckey = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
@@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@ static int config_ccm_adata(struct aead_request *req) {
/* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
/* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
if (2 > l || l > 8) {
- SSI_LOG_ERR("illegal iv value %X\n",req->iv[0]);
+ SSI_LOG_ERR("illegal iv value %X\n", req->iv[0]);
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(b0, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
@@ -1862,27 +1862,27 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_dump_gcm(
ctx->cipher_mode, ctx->authsize, ctx->enc_keylen, req->assoclen, req_ctx->cryptlen );

if ( ctx->enckey != NULL ) {
- dump_byte_array("mac key",ctx->enckey, 16);
+ dump_byte_array("mac key", ctx->enckey, 16);
}

- dump_byte_array("req->iv",req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ dump_byte_array("req->iv", req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);

- dump_byte_array("gcm_iv_inc1",req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ dump_byte_array("gcm_iv_inc1", req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);

- dump_byte_array("gcm_iv_inc2",req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ dump_byte_array("gcm_iv_inc2", req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);

- dump_byte_array("hkey",req_ctx->hkey, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ dump_byte_array("hkey", req_ctx->hkey, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);

- dump_byte_array("mac_buf",req_ctx->mac_buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ dump_byte_array("mac_buf", req_ctx->mac_buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);

- dump_byte_array("gcm_len_block",req_ctx->gcm_len_block.lenA, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ dump_byte_array("gcm_len_block", req_ctx->gcm_len_block.lenA, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);

if (req->src!=NULL && req->cryptlen) {
- dump_byte_array("req->src",sg_virt(req->src), req->cryptlen+req->assoclen);
+ dump_byte_array("req->src", sg_virt(req->src), req->cryptlen+req->assoclen);
}

if (req->dst!=NULL) {
- dump_byte_array("req->dst",sg_virt(req->dst), req->cryptlen+ctx->authsize+req->assoclen);
+ dump_byte_array("req->dst", sg_virt(req->dst), req->cryptlen+ctx->authsize+req->assoclen);
}
}
#endif
--
2.7.4