From: "Jürg Billeter" <j@bitron.ch>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@google.com>,
David Wilcox <davidvsthegiant@gmail.com>,
hansecke@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH] prctl: add PR_[GS]ET_PDEATHSIG_PROC
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2017 19:47:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1507052834.19102.53.camel@bitron.ch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8760bwb04k.fsf@xmission.com>
On Tue, 2017-10-03 at 12:40 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Jürg Billeter <j@bitron.ch> writes:
> > What's actually the reason that CLONE_NEWPID requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN?
> > Does CLONE_NEWPID pose any risks that don't exist for
> > CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWPID? Assuming we can't simply drop the
> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, do you see a better solution for this use
> > case?
>
> CLONE_NEWPID without a permission check would allow runing a setuid root
> application in a pid namespace. Off the top of my head I can't think of
> a really good exploit. But when you mess up pid files, and hide
> information from a privileged application I can completely imagine
> forcing that application to misbehave in ways the attacker can control.
> Leading to bad things.
Could we allow unprivileged CLONE_NEWPID if the no_new_privs bit is
set?
Jürg
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-03 17:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-09 9:40 [PATCH] prctl: add PR_[GS]ET_PDEATHSIG_PROC Jürg Billeter
2017-09-12 17:05 ` Oleg Nesterov
2017-09-12 18:54 ` Jürg Billeter
2017-09-13 17:11 ` Oleg Nesterov
2017-09-13 17:26 ` Jürg Billeter
2017-09-13 17:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2017-09-29 12:30 ` [RESEND PATCH] " Jürg Billeter
2017-10-02 23:20 ` Andrew Morton
2017-10-03 3:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-10-03 6:45 ` Jürg Billeter
2017-10-03 14:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-10-03 16:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-03 16:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-10-03 17:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-03 19:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-10-03 20:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-03 20:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-10-03 17:00 ` Jürg Billeter
2017-10-03 17:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-10-03 17:47 ` Jürg Billeter [this message]
2017-10-03 19:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-10-05 16:27 ` Oleg Nesterov
2017-10-08 17:47 ` Jürg Billeter
2017-10-09 16:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
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