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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2] fw_lockdown: new micro LSM module to prevent
 loading unsigned firmware
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
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Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2017 06:55:36 -0500
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On Wed, 2017-11-22 at 19:58 +0100, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:

> I've frankly have grown tired of pushing firmware signing just for the sake of
> the fact that I needed it for cfg80211, but now that its out of the way and
> we open coded it, its no longer a requirement on my part. 

As the keys CFG80211_REQUIRE_SIGNED_REGDB are built into the kernel
image, they would be included in the kernel image signature.

As I previously asked https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/679, how are
the keys located in the CFG80211_EXTRA_REGDB_KEYDIR keyring trusted?
 The keyring does not validate the certificate signatures, before
loading the keys on the firmware keyring.  It explicitly bypasses the
certificate signature validation.

Mimi