From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] firmware: permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback loading
Date: Thu, 03 May 2018 20:36:38 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1525394198.3539.143.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180504000258.GP27853@wotan.suse.de>
On Fri, 2018-05-04 at 00:02 +0000, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> If you can add Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>, and Greg to your Cc list
> in the future patches that'd be appreciated.
>
> On Tue, May 01, 2018 at 09:48:18AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Add an LSM hook prior to allowing firmware sysfs fallback loading.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
> > Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> > ---
> > drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c | 7 +++++++
> > include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
> > 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
> > index 31b5015b59fe..23d2af30474e 100644
> > --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
> > +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
> > @@ -651,6 +651,8 @@ static bool fw_force_sysfs_fallback(unsigned int opt_flags)
> >
> > static bool fw_run_sysfs_fallback(unsigned int opt_flags)
> > {
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > if (fw_fallback_config.ignore_sysfs_fallback) {
> > pr_info_once("Ignoring firmware sysfs fallback due to sysctl knob\n");
> > return false;
> > @@ -659,6 +661,11 @@ static bool fw_run_sysfs_fallback(unsigned int opt_flags)
> > if ((opt_flags & FW_OPT_NOFALLBACK))
> > return false;
> >
> > + /* Also permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback */
> > + ret = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_FIRMWARE_FALLBACK);
> > + if (ret < 0)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > return fw_force_sysfs_fallback(opt_flags);
> > }
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> > index 760d8da1b6c7..dc16a73c3d38 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> > @@ -2810,6 +2810,7 @@ extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
> > id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
> > id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
> > id(FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER, firmware) \
> > + id(FIRMWARE_FALLBACK, firmware) \
>
> If you're going to add this perhaps FIRMWARE_FALLBACK_SYSFS as we may later
> get FIRMWARE_FALLBACK_EFI.
>From an IMA signature verification perspective, both are buffer based.
The file signature is stored as a security xattr. Without a file
descriptor, the kernel cannot verify the firmware signature.
I don't have a problem with defining another enumeration. Perhaps
other LSMs will want to be able to differentiate between sysfs and EFI
fallback methods.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-04 0:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-01 13:48 [PATCH 0/6] firmware: kernel signature verification Mimi Zohar
2018-05-01 13:48 ` [PATCH 1/6] firmware: permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback loading Mimi Zohar
2018-05-04 0:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-04 0:36 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-05-01 13:48 ` [PATCH 2/6] ima: prevent sysfs fallback firmware loading Mimi Zohar
2018-05-04 0:06 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-01 13:48 ` [PATCH 3/6] firmware: differentiate between signed regulatory.db and other firmware Mimi Zohar
2018-05-04 0:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-04 0:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-08 17:34 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-09 11:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-09 19:15 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-09 19:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-09 21:22 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-09 22:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-09 23:48 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-10 2:00 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-10 23:26 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-11 5:00 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-11 21:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-14 12:58 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-14 19:28 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-15 2:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-15 3:26 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-15 12:32 ` Josh Boyer
2018-05-15 12:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-01 13:48 ` [PATCH 4/6] ima: coordinate with signed regulatory.db Mimi Zohar
2018-05-01 13:48 ` [PATCH 5/6] ima: verify kernel firmware signatures when using a preallocated buffer Mimi Zohar
2018-05-01 13:48 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] ima: prevent loading firmware into a pre-allocated buffer Mimi Zohar
2018-05-04 0:10 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
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