Re: [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures

[Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>]

On Tue, 2018-05-29 at 14:01 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Instead of adding the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook - or defining a
> wrapper for security_kernel_read_file LSM hook and adding it, or
> renaming the existing hook to security_kernel_read_data() and adding it
> - in places where the kernel isn't reading a file, this version of the
> patch set defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data().
> 
> The new LSM hook does not replace the existing security_kernel_read_file
> LSM hook, which is still needed, but defines a new LSM hook allowing
> LSMs and IMA-appraisal the opportunity to fail loading userspace
> provided file/data.
> 
> The only difference between the two LSM hooks is the LSM hook name and a
> file descriptor.  Whether this is cause enough for requiring a new LSM
> hook, is left to the security community.

Paul does not have a preference as to adding a new LSM hook or calling
the existing hook.  Either way is fine, as long as both the new and
existing hooks call the existing function.

Casey didn't like the idea of a wrapper.
James suggested renaming the LSM hook.

The maintainers for the callers of the LSM hook prefer a meaningful
LSM hook name.  The "null" argument is not as much of a concern.  Only
Eric seems to be asking for a separate, new LSM hook, without the
"null" argument.

Unless someone really objects, to accommodate Eric we'll define a new
LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data.  Eric, are you planning on
Ack'ing patches 1 & 2?

Mimi