From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3CB8DC6778A for ; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 13:08:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0034A20874 for ; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 13:08:43 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 0034A20874 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=suse.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388436AbeGXOPG (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Jul 2018 10:15:06 -0400 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:55048 "EHLO mx1.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2388364AbeGXOPG (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Jul 2018 10:15:06 -0400 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay1.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.254]) by mx1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB8ECB035; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 13:08:39 +0000 (UTC) Message-ID: <1532437261.17797.22.camel@suse.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption From: Oliver Neukum To: Pavel Machek Cc: Yu Chen , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Eric Biggers , "Lee, Chun-Yi" , Theodore Ts o , Stephan Mueller , Denis Kenzior , linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gu, Kookoo" , "Zhang, Rui" Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 15:01:01 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20180724130110.GA29006@amd> References: <20180718202235.GA4132@amd> <20180718235851.GA22170@sandybridge-desktop> <20180719110149.GA4679@amd> <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> <20180720102532.GA20284@amd> <1532346156.3057.11.camel@suse.com> <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> <20180724120133.GD26036@amd> <1532436474.17797.20.camel@suse.com> <20180724130110.GA29006@amd> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.26.6 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Di, 2018-07-24 at 15:03 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > On Tue 2018-07-24 14:47:54, Oliver Neukum wrote: > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 14:01 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: Hi, > > > Safe against what kind of attack? Please describe what kind of > > > security you are trying to provide. > > > > Unsigned code must not take over the priviledge level of signed code. > > Hence: > > > > 1. Unsigned code must not allowed to read sensitive parts of signed > > code's memory space > > > > 2. Unsigned code must not be able to alter the memory space of > > signed code -> snapshots that are changed must not be able to be > > resumed > > Ok. > > > > I don't think generating key in userspace is good enough for providing > > > guarantees for secure-boot. > > > > Why? > > Because then, userpace has both key (now) and encrypted image (after > reboot), so it can decrypt, modify, re-encrypt...? Right. I was dense. But if the key is generated in kernel space, the method works, doesn't it? Regards Oliver