From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CBEF6C46470 for ; Tue, 7 Aug 2018 10:04:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8D29821774 for ; Tue, 7 Aug 2018 10:04:24 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 8D29821774 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=suse.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388650AbeHGMR4 (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Aug 2018 08:17:56 -0400 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:35394 "EHLO mx1.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727194AbeHGMR4 (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Aug 2018 08:17:56 -0400 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay1.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.254]) by mx1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 70EAFADC8; Tue, 7 Aug 2018 10:04:20 +0000 (UTC) Message-ID: <1533636259.7912.2.camel@suse.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption From: Oliver Neukum To: Yu Chen Cc: Pavel Machek , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Eric Biggers , "Lee, Chun-Yi" , Theodore Ts o , Stephan Mueller , Denis Kenzior , linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gu, Kookoo" , "Zhang, Rui" Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2018 12:04:19 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20180807073840.GA17894@chenyu-desktop> References: <20180718202235.GA4132@amd> <20180718235851.GA22170@sandybridge-desktop> <20180719110149.GA4679@amd> <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> <20180720102532.GA20284@amd> <1532346156.3057.11.camel@suse.com> <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> <1532590246.7411.3.camel@suse.com> <20180806075754.GA12124@chenyu-desktop> <1533550820.15815.14.camel@suse.com> <20180807073840.GA17894@chenyu-desktop> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.26.6 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Di, 2018-08-07 at 15:38 +0800, Yu Chen wrote: > > As STD affects the whole machine it must require root rights. > > So I cannot see how you can talk about a session belonging > > to a user. Please explain. > > > > The case is for physical access, not the 'user' in OS. Well, yes, but Secure Boot does not guard against anybody booting or halting the machine. It limits what you can boot by a chain of trust. I think you are trying to add a feature to Secure Boot. Regards Oliver