From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, bauerman@linux.ibm.com,
ebiggers@google.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, dyoung@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] KEYS, integrity: Link .platform keyring to .secondary_trusted_keys
Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 09:31:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1546957909.19931.101.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190108081247.2266-1-kasong@redhat.com>
On Tue, 2019-01-08 at 16:12 +0800, Kairui Song wrote:
> Hi, as the subject, this is a patch that links the new introduced
> .platform keyring into .secondary_trusted_keys keyring. This is
> mainly for the kexec_file_load, make kexec_file_load be able to verify
> the kernel image agains keys provided by platform or firmware.
> kexec_file_load already could verify the image agains secondary_trusted_keys
> if secondary_trusted_keys exits, so this will make kexec_file_load be ware
> of platform keys as well.
The builtin and secondary keyrings have a signature change of trust
rooted in the signed kernel image. Adding the pre-boot keys to the
secondary keyring breaks that signature chain of trust.
Mimi
>
> This may also useful for things like module sign verify that are using
> secondary_trusted_keys. I'm not sure if it will be better to move the
> INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING to certs/ and let integrity subsystem use
> the keyring there, so just linked the .platform keyring into kernel's
> .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
>
> It workd for my case, tested in a VM, I signed the kernel image locally
> with pesign and imported the cert to EFI's MokList variable.
>
> Kairui Song (1):
> KEYS, integrity: Link .platform keyring to .secondary_trusted_keys
>
> certs/system_keyring.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/keys/platform_keyring.h | 12 ++++++++++++
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 7 +++++++
> 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 include/keys/platform_keyring.h
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-08 14:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-08 8:12 [RFC PATCH 0/1] KEYS, integrity: Link .platform keyring to .secondary_trusted_keys Kairui Song
2019-01-08 8:12 ` [RFC PATCH 1/1] " Kairui Song
2019-01-08 15:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-09 1:33 ` Dave Young
2019-01-09 2:02 ` Kairui Song
2019-01-09 14:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-17 15:04 ` David Howells
2019-01-17 16:15 ` Kairui Song
2019-01-08 14:31 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
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