From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 257EDC43381 for ; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 13:28:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F0540206BA for ; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 13:27:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728004AbfCKN1v (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Mar 2019 09:27:51 -0400 Received: from mout.kundenserver.de ([212.227.17.24]:33831 "EHLO mout.kundenserver.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727571AbfCKNTg (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Mar 2019 09:19:36 -0400 Received: from orion.localdomain ([95.115.159.19]) by mrelayeu.kundenserver.de (mreue109 [212.227.15.183]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1M9Frd-1h6Nub0KRz-006Mns for ; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 14:19:34 +0100 From: "Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 049/114] security: Kconfig: pedantic formatting Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 14:18:01 +0100 Message-Id: <1552310346-7629-50-git-send-email-info@metux.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 In-Reply-To: <1552310346-7629-1-git-send-email-info@metux.net> References: <1552310346-7629-1-git-send-email-info@metux.net> X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:5UVKGaTxSvBPk3XUR+umg1lwCuSiTVWsb9KFTlbWEV745MamKyO 9TB4UPiAlFkPcLaVWLJYZuL/NV9bxQKcKW35qQmSgrRADdXPJAgVP9A0wDeH7+tqfkT8Atx hhCct1HbazfO/c/zJ4672H2R9Mo0nBwnt4PyorOaM9hi2js0VIPpJ/Qg6SFuGvGT22HzHQb 5vUdoTx66Lopo8hdLdSmw== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:qpourU3eU08=:k2r7y49m5UnI1xz7coR/9v 058sOugi2wO/zvnKTIvIZnwFYlyjViYx5BU6noPZ8UMbQMQW5VBFAEUud1KRchOZlHt9/Mvoo llEzPaWKsoFNeK/z11IrVUWea4uslWhIUW9jiYtflb6UI8E1Dc2Rcqa6qClLSDjZwQ50twXz1 oFTUASaATUqvFoTtByucMTRC5goUr/SZEZJsp59DI1FkFPefnC9MsWQOvzc5zn7rmGJQbu89L dyUpFo8O1BkUnszfu/3ruUjRnnJLgN6EBgwNc8lCkuz/TOd0w38QtGV2DXRAMalkzZJs15Jda sIGgoY2bNA+R1YTbj87QtQdppb0ne47kq26W570DJJ/Yo/QxNoEjl+yUlFUFA5PxBuMSYrUJg 6hHwMV+ZkLcxn+5g9UAwAxz1O17JZa0mUE0SSIgIlnSVgqYDMKeMjojjc+CvkGi8ID3x8ZneV AzjiwYEVKVEM/1c2ZD63gvoUpasanvr7vAh3dROzmKIOgpX7Fashdx8NbZqdHJjEoYbLJUJwI Bb76TLWU+jMdmwrAkGsoHMBXpGw5G00/BcfGgU8PzB+2UM3ekVb/5qSN/M2RqJ49LIUEBO0WG pjdlJ5xsz1CgrRL0ZlfTyzM1xfa9hpsfUp8z6Bvm9udfpmT7Co7ccPUNDBRs2iDCfB6/zMpsp Bh3u+1U/W9NeThGnav6Tcx4WZTISTJmB3A6zZDqg/dBs/ZiNpip8+RSSYJR1W1+g5aljxU0qg KbA1wTZzcAbtWBfTqJ8/z3IeiVP6d7l+2IDyjw== Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Formatting of Kconfig files doesn't look so pretty, so let the Great White Handkerchief come around and clean it up. Signed-off-by: Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult --- security/apparmor/Kconfig | 22 +++++++++++----------- security/integrity/Kconfig | 32 ++++++++++++++++---------------- security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 10 +++++----- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig index 3de21f4..d93810d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig @@ -25,17 +25,17 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem. config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT - bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default" - depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH - default y - help - This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy - is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for - loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way - to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected, - however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In - these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and - enabled only if needed. + bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default" + depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH + default y + help + This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy + is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for + loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way + to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected, + however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In + these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and + enabled only if needed. config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG bool "Build AppArmor with debug code" diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 2ea4ec9..690bc1d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS bool "Enable asymmetric keys support" depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE default n - select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE - select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE - select CRYPTO_RSA - select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER + select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE + select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + select CRYPTO_RSA + select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER help This option enables digital signature verification using asymmetric keys. @@ -47,20 +47,20 @@ config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS default y help - This option requires that all keys added to the .ima and - .evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted - keyring. + This option requires that all keys added to the .ima and + .evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted + keyring. config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING - bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys" - depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING - depends on EFI - help - Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which - the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values - provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image - and, possibly, the initramfs signature. + bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys" + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + depends on EFI + help + Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which + the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values + provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image + and, possibly, the initramfs signature. config INTEGRITY_AUDIT bool "Enables integrity auditing support " diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index 6022185..ab5d9ae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -59,15 +59,15 @@ config EVM_LOAD_X509 depends on EVM && INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING default n help - Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring. + Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring. - This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel - onto the '.evm' trusted keyring. A public key can be used to - verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process. + This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel + onto the '.evm' trusted keyring. A public key can be used to + verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process. config EVM_X509_PATH string "EVM X509 certificate path" depends on EVM_LOAD_X509 default "/etc/keys/x509_evm.der" help - This option defines X509 certificate path. + This option defines X509 certificate path. -- 1.9.1