From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: libseccomp-discuss@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: ANN: libseccomp
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2012 17:32:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1580647.pAHyaBF6MS@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jL5nAY4=5OKhA6VPdrzkUjVuBTcLQuMxUSEv_=N=ohbzQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Monday, April 09, 2012 12:16:30 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > With the seccomp patches finally stabilizing a bit, it seems like now is a
> > good time to announce libseccomp: a library designed to make it easier to
> > create complex, architecture independent seccomp filters.
> >
> > * http://sourceforge.net/projects/libseccomp/
> > * git clone git://git.code.sf.net/p/libseccomp/libseccomp
>
> This looks really great; nice work!
Thanks.
> I see that the arch check happens during _gen_bpf_build_bpf(), which
> is excellent. Do you have any thoughts about including a call to
> prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) by default as well?
That is a good question, and I guess it comes down to another question of if
anyone would want to use seccomp without NO_NEW_PRIVS. If the answer is no
then I'm comfortable adding it into the seccomp_load() function; however, if
the answer is yes we might want to do something different.
I haven't given much thought to this yet, so if you or anyone else feels
strongly about the issue - either pro or con - I'd appreciate hearing the
argument.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-04-09 21:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-04-09 18:58 ANN: libseccomp Paul Moore
2012-04-09 19:16 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-09 21:32 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2012-04-09 21:51 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 22:46 ` Paul Moore
2012-04-13 20:14 ` Paul Moore
2012-04-14 2:47 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2012-04-16 14:15 ` [libseccomp-discuss] " Paul Moore
2012-04-09 22:56 ` Serge Hallyn
2012-04-09 19:25 ` Josh Boyer
2012-04-09 20:02 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-09 20:14 ` Josh Boyer
2012-04-09 21:28 ` Paul Moore
2012-04-10 20:29 ` Paul Moore
2012-04-11 0:27 ` Josh Boyer
[not found] ` <CAEXv5_jiZsd6t=H1KWMNhUdgMez0B-WdC5XAHzdHffjOQh_J4A@mail.gmail.com>
2012-04-15 16:20 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-16 14:09 ` [libseccomp-discuss] " Paul Moore
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