From: "Christian König" <ckoenig.leichtzumerken@gmail.com>
To: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke@google.com>,
Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Cc: Pekka Paalanen <ppaalanen@gmail.com>,
Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>,
Yong Wu <yong.wu@mediatek.com>, Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>,
Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>,
christian.koenig@amd.com,
Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>,
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski+dt@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@collabora.com>,
Vijayanand Jitta <quic_vjitta@quicinc.com>,
Nicolas Dufresne <nicolas@ndufresne.ca>,
jianjiao.zeng@mediatek.com, linux-media@vger.kernel.org,
devicetree@vger.kernel.org, Conor Dooley <conor+dt@kernel.org>,
linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org,
linux-mediatek@lists.infradead.org, tjmercier@google.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
AngeloGioacchino Del Regno
<angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>,
kuohong.wang@mediatek.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] dma-buf: heaps: Add secure heap
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 10:35:04 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <160df81d-e5fa-4798-96d4-5ab1809a9680@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+ddPcOew7Wtb1-Cakq_LPN1VwtG+4vpjpLFvXdsjBunpefT1A@mail.gmail.com>
Am 04.01.24 um 20:50 schrieb Jeffrey Kardatzke:
> Any feedback from maintainers on what their preference is? I'm fine
> with 'restricted' as well, but the main reason we chose secure was
> because of its use in ARM nomenclature and this is more for ARM usage
> than x86.
Well AMD calls this "trusted", but I think that's just slightly better
than "secure".
+1 for using "restricted" cause that seems to match the technical
consequences.
Regards,
Christian.
>
> The main difference with similar buffers on AMD/Intel is that with
> AMD/Intel the buffers are mappable and readable by the CPU in the
> kernel. The problem is their contents are encrypted so you get junk
> back if you do that. On ARM, the buffers are completely inaccessible
> by the kernel and the memory controller prevents access to them
> completely from the kernel.
>
> There are also other use cases for this where the hypervisor is what
> is controlling access (second stage in the MMU is providing
> isolation)....and in that case I do agree that 'secure' would not be
> the right terminology for those types of buffers. So I do agree
> something other than 'secure' is probably a better option overall.
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 22, 2023 at 1:40 AM Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 13th, 2023 at 15:16, Pekka Paalanen <ppaalanen@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>>> It is protected/shielded/fortified from all the kernel and userspace,
>>>>> but a more familiar word to describe that is inaccessible.
>>>>> "Inaccessible buffer" per se OTOH sounds like a useless concept.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is not secure, because it does not involve security in any way. In
>>>>> fact, given it's so fragile, I'd classify it as mildly opposite of
>>>>> secure, as e.g. clients of a Wayland compositor can potentially DoS the
>>>>> compositor with it by simply sending such a dmabuf. Or DoS the whole
>>>>> system.
>>>> I hear what you are saying and DoS is a known problem and attack vector,
>>>> but regardless, we have use cases where we don't want to expose
>>>> information in the clear and where we also would like to have some
>>>> guarantees about correctness. That is where various secure elements and
>>>> more generally security is needed.
>>>>
>>>> So, it sounds like we have two things here, the first is the naming and
>>>> the meaning behind it. I'm pretty sure the people following and
>>>> contributing to this thread can agree on a name that makes sense. Would
>>>> you personally be OK with "restricted" as the name? It sounds like that.
>>> I would. I'm also just a by-stander, not a maintainer of kernel
>>> anything. I have no power to accept nor reject anything here.
>> I'd also personally be OK with "restricted", I think it's a lot better
>> than "secure".
>>
>> In general I agree with everything Pekka said.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-05 9:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-12 2:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] dma-buf: heaps: Add secure heap Yong Wu
2023-12-12 2:46 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] dt-bindings: reserved-memory: Add mediatek,dynamic-secure-region Yong Wu
2023-12-12 2:46 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] dma-buf: heaps: Initialize a secure heap Yong Wu
2023-12-12 2:46 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] dma-buf: heaps: secure_heap: Add private heap ops Yong Wu
2023-12-12 2:46 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] dma-buf: heaps: secure_heap: Add dma_ops Yong Wu
2023-12-12 2:46 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] dma-buf: heaps: secure_heap: Add MediaTek secure heap and heap_init Yong Wu
2023-12-12 2:46 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] dma-buf: heaps: secure_heap_mtk: Add tee memory service call Yong Wu
2023-12-12 2:46 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] dma_buf: heaps: secure_heap_mtk: Add a new CMA heap Yong Wu
2023-12-12 16:36 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] dma-buf: heaps: Add secure heap Simon Ser
2023-12-13 9:05 ` Pekka Paalanen
2023-12-13 10:15 ` Joakim Bech
2023-12-13 11:38 ` Pekka Paalanen
2023-12-13 13:22 ` Joakim Bech
2023-12-13 13:59 ` Christian König
2023-12-13 14:16 ` Pekka Paalanen
2023-12-22 9:40 ` Simon Ser
2024-01-04 19:50 ` Jeffrey Kardatzke
2024-01-05 9:35 ` Christian König [this message]
2024-01-09 3:07 ` Yong Wu (吴勇)
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