* [PATCH RFC] core not owned by euid, mm->dumpable
@ 2004-04-05 8:27 Peter Waechtler
2004-04-05 11:51 ` Peter Waechtler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Peter Waechtler @ 2004-04-05 8:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: peter
With the current behavior typical server programs that switch euid
don't dump core. This is done "for security".
If the core file pattern exists the dump is written to but readable
for the file owner (not necessarily root - don't argue: only chdir into
dirs that only root can write to: think of file servers like samba)
The patch below addresses this (but still not perfect).
What I would like to see: instead of mm->dumpable=0 when calling seteuid()
something like mm->dumpAs=root and making sure that the core is owned by root
mode 600
I could install a sighandler that calls prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE,1,0,0,0),
switch euid to root, but still the formerly placed core is owned by evil
user :(
Then I could read the core pattern and unlink such a file - and all this
just for the Linux platform...
--- fs/exec.c.orig 2004-04-05 09:41:31.134456912 +0200
+++ fs/exec.c 2004-04-05 09:29:55.614192064 +0200
@@ -1398,6 +1398,8 @@
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
goto close_fail;
+ if (chown_common(file->f_dentry, current->euid, current->egid))
+ goto close_fail;
if (!file->f_op)
goto close_fail;
if (!file->f_op->write)
--- fs/open.c.orig 2004-04-05 09:43:39.229983432 +0200
+++ fs/open.c 2004-04-05 09:30:04.357862824 +0200
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@
return error;
}
-extern int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
+int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
{
struct inode * inode;
int error;
--- include/linux/fs.h.orig 2004-04-05 09:42:52.205132296 +0200
+++ include/linux/fs.h 2004-04-05 09:28:08.215519144 +0200
@@ -1139,6 +1139,7 @@
extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int);
extern int filp_close(struct file *, fl_owner_t id);
extern char * getname(const char __user *);
+extern int chown_common(struct dentry *, uid_t, gid_t);
/* fs/dcache.c */
extern void vfs_caches_init(unsigned long);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH RFC] core not owned by euid, mm->dumpable
2004-04-05 8:27 [PATCH RFC] core not owned by euid, mm->dumpable Peter Waechtler
@ 2004-04-05 11:51 ` Peter Waechtler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Peter Waechtler @ 2004-04-05 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Waechtler, linux-kernel
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1132 bytes --]
Am Montag, 5. April 2004 10:27 schrieb Peter Waechtler:
> With the current behavior typical server programs that switch euid
> don't dump core. This is done "for security".
> If the core file pattern exists the dump is written to but readable
> for the file owner (not necessarily root - don't argue: only chdir into
> dirs that only root can write to: think of file servers like samba)
>
> The patch below addresses this (but still not perfect).
> What I would like to see: instead of mm->dumpable=0 when calling seteuid()
> something like mm->dumpAs=root and making sure that the core is owned by
> root mode 600
>
> I could install a sighandler that calls prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE,1,0,0,0),
> switch euid to root, but still the formerly placed core is owned by evil
> user :(
> Then I could read the core pattern and unlink such a file - and all this
> just for the Linux platform...
>
Unlink a previously existing core.
I tried on solaris - I find the behavior (tunable with coreadm) perfect:
Switched uid? -> create as root (unlink a previously and potentially opened
core first: yes it got a new inode) then creat(O_EXCL,0600)
[-- Attachment #2: linux-core.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-diff, Size: 2723 bytes --]
--- fs/namei.c.orig 2004-04-05 13:44:30.317084264 +0200
+++ fs/namei.c 2004-04-05 13:45:40.668389240 +0200
@@ -1694,24 +1694,13 @@
return error;
}
-/*
- * Make sure that the actual truncation of the file will occur outside its
- * directory's i_sem. Truncate can take a long time if there is a lot of
- * writeout happening, and we don't want to prevent access to the directory
- * while waiting on the I/O.
- */
-asmlinkage long sys_unlink(const char __user * pathname)
+int do_unlink(char *name)
{
int error = 0;
- char * name;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct nameidata nd;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
- name = getname(pathname);
- if(IS_ERR(name))
- return PTR_ERR(name);
-
error = path_lookup(name, LOOKUP_PARENT, &nd);
if (error)
goto exit;
@@ -1736,8 +1725,6 @@
exit1:
path_release(&nd);
exit:
- putname(name);
-
if (inode)
iput(inode); /* truncate the inode here */
return error;
@@ -1748,6 +1735,25 @@
goto exit2;
}
+/*
+ * Make sure that the actual truncation of the file will occur outside its
+ * directory's i_sem. Truncate can take a long time if there is a lot of
+ * writeout happening, and we don't want to prevent access to the directory
+ * while waiting on the I/O.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_unlink(const char __user * pathname)
+{
+ char * name;
+
+ name = getname(pathname);
+ if(IS_ERR(name))
+ return PTR_ERR(name);
+
+ error = do_unlink(name);
+ putname(name);
+ return error;
+}
+
int vfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *oldname)
{
int error = may_create(dir, dentry, NULL);
--- fs/exec.c.orig 2004-04-05 09:41:31.134456912 +0200
+++ fs/exec.c 2004-04-05 13:50:17.093366256 +0200
@@ -1387,9 +1387,14 @@
goto fail_unlock;
format_corename(corename, core_pattern, signr);
- file = filp_open(corename, O_CREAT | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE, 0600);
- if (IS_ERR(file))
- goto fail_unlock;
+ file = filp_open(corename, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE, 0600);
+ if (IS_ERR(file)){
+ if (do_unlink(corename))
+ goto fail_unlock;
+ file = filp_open(corename, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE, 0600);
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ goto fail_unlock;
+ }
inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
if (inode->i_nlink > 1)
goto close_fail; /* multiple links - don't dump */
--- include/linux/fs.h.orig 2004-04-05 09:42:52.205132296 +0200
+++ include/linux/fs.h 2004-04-05 13:50:46.119953544 +0200
@@ -1253,6 +1253,7 @@
extern int open_namei(const char *, int, int, struct nameidata *);
extern int may_open(struct nameidata *, int, int);
+extern int do_unlink(char *);
extern int kernel_read(struct file *, unsigned long, char *, unsigned long);
extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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