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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/14] Add TSEM specific documentation.
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 10:10:30 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1630b5cd-c1ef-4afd-9767-7ebf3c0cc7ae@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250117044731.GA31221@wind.enjellic.com>

On 1/16/2025 8:47 PM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 08:29:47PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
>
...

>> Please define the CELL acronym here as I believe it is the first use of
>> "CELL" in this document.
> FWIW, CELL isn't an acronym, it is a metaphor.
>
> TSEM was conceptually inspired by and derived from the Turing Abstract
> Machine Model (TAMM), as applied to the problem of modeling the
> security state of an execution domain.
>
> As everyone reading this knows, a TAMM, in practice, consists of a
> head traversing an infinite paper tape divided into cells that direct
> the next state of the machine.
>
> In TSEM, the model consists of a Context Of Execution (COE) with
> security definining characteristics, traversing a finite set of
> measurement points of infinite length, with defining characteristics
> at each point.
>
> We refer to a measurement point and its characteristics as a CELL in
> deference to the inspiration for all of this.
>
> We will add this explanation to the documentation.

Communication within a community as culturally diverse as the Linux
kernel developers* requires that you do not assume that "everyone reading
this" knows much of anything beyond how to type "make". Let's face it,
there are kernel developers today who would look at the Turing test and
say "is that even a thing?" There are others who don't have an education
that includes mid-twentieth century technological history.

[* Yes, an awful lot of Linux kernel developers are western males. ] 

...

> We believe there is a technical solution to this problem as well but
> our work on that front, at this point, is too technically immature to
> go into.

Didn't Pierre de Fermat say something like that about some theorem
or another? 

...

... Sorry, all I have time for today.


  reply	other threads:[~2025-01-17 18:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-26 10:37 [PATCH v4 00/14] Implement Trusted Security Event Modeling Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] Update MAINTAINERS file Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] Add TSEM specific documentation Greg Wettstein
2025-01-14  1:29   ` [PATCH v4 2/14] " Paul Moore
2025-01-17  4:47     ` Dr. Greg
2025-01-17 18:10       ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2025-01-18 19:03         ` Dr. Greg
2025-01-21 18:09           ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-26 18:40             ` Dr. Greg
2025-01-28 22:23       ` Paul Moore
2025-01-31 17:11         ` Dr. Greg
2025-02-25 12:01         ` Dr. Greg
2025-02-25 15:48           ` Casey Schaufler
2025-02-27 12:12             ` Dr. Greg
2025-02-27 16:47               ` Casey Schaufler
2025-03-03 10:14                 ` Dr. Greg
2025-03-03 16:23                   ` Casey Schaufler
2025-02-05 12:00     ` Dr. Greg
2025-02-05 19:58       ` Casey Schaufler
2025-02-06 12:45         ` Dr. Greg
2025-02-06 15:48       ` Paul Moore
2025-02-07 10:20         ` Dr. Greg
2025-02-07 17:42           ` Casey Schaufler
2025-02-08  0:29           ` Paul Moore
2025-02-17 12:53             ` Dr. Greg
2025-02-17 23:09               ` Paul Moore
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] TSEM global declarations Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] Add primary TSEM implementation file Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 15:53   ` Casey Schaufler
2024-08-27 10:52     ` Dr. Greg
2024-08-27 17:51       ` Casey Schaufler
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] Add root domain trust implementation Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] Implement TSEM control plane Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] Add namespace implementation Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] Add security event description export facility Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] Add event processing implementation Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] Implement security event mapping Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] Implement the internal Trusted Modeling Agent Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] Implement configuration and methods for default model Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] Implement infrastructure for loadable security models Greg Wettstein
2024-08-26 10:37 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] Activate the configuration and build of the TSEM LSM Greg Wettstein

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