From: "tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/core] objtool: Validate kCFI calls
Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2025 09:39:03 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <175568274311.1420.7251101635125319598.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250714103441.496787279@infradead.org>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/core branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 894af4a1cde61c3401f237184fb770f72ff12df8
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/894af4a1cde61c3401f237184fb770f72ff12df8
Author: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
AuthorDate: Sat, 12 Apr 2025 13:56:01 +02:00
Committer: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CommitterDate: Mon, 18 Aug 2025 14:23:09 +02:00
objtool: Validate kCFI calls
Validate that all indirect calls adhere to kCFI rules. Notably doing
nocfi indirect call to a cfi function is broken.
Apparently some Rust 'core' code violates this and explodes when ran
with FineIBT.
All the ANNOTATE_NOCFI_SYM sites are prime targets for attackers.
- runtime EFI is especially henous because it also needs to disable
IBT. Basically calling unknown code without CFI protection at
runtime is a massice security issue.
- Kexec image handover; if you can exploit this, you get to keep it :-)
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250714103441.496787279@infradead.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 4 +++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 4 +++-
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S | 4 +++-
drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c | 5 +++-
include/linux/objtool.h | 10 +++++++-
include/linux/objtool_types.h | 1 +-
tools/include/linux/objtool_types.h | 1 +-
tools/objtool/check.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h | 1 +-
9 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 697fb99..8593760 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -453,6 +453,10 @@ void __nocfi machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
__ftrace_enabled_restore(save_ftrace_enabled);
}
+/*
+ * Handover to the next kernel, no CFI concern.
+ */
+ANNOTATE_NOCFI_SYM(machine_kexec);
/* arch-dependent functionality related to kexec file-based syscall */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index 0a6cf5b..bc255d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -361,6 +361,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(vmread_error_trampoline)
.section .text, "ax"
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_FRED
+
SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff)
VMX_DO_EVENT_IRQOFF CALL_NOSPEC _ASM_ARG1
SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S
index 2206b8b..f0a5fba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_stub_64.S
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
SYM_FUNC_START(__efi_call)
+ /*
+ * The EFI code doesn't have any CFI, annotate away the CFI violation.
+ */
+ ANNOTATE_NOCFI_SYM
pushq %rbp
movq %rsp, %rbp
and $~0xf, %rsp
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c
index 6c24426..e1f5e9a 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/perms.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/objtool.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
@@ -86,6 +87,10 @@ static noinline __nocfi void execute_location(void *dst, bool write)
func();
pr_err("FAIL: func returned\n");
}
+/*
+ * Explicitly doing the wrong thing for testing.
+ */
+ANNOTATE_NOCFI_SYM(execute_location);
static void execute_user_location(void *dst)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h
index 366ad00..46ebaa4 100644
--- a/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -184,6 +184,15 @@
* WARN using UD2.
*/
#define ANNOTATE_REACHABLE(label) __ASM_ANNOTATE(label, ANNOTYPE_REACHABLE)
+/*
+ * This should not be used; it annotates away CFI violations. There are a few
+ * valid use cases like kexec handover to the next kernel image, and there is
+ * no security concern there.
+ *
+ * There are also a few real issues annotated away, like EFI because we can't
+ * control the EFI code.
+ */
+#define ANNOTATE_NOCFI_SYM(sym) asm(__ASM_ANNOTATE(sym, ANNOTYPE_NOCFI))
#else
#define ANNOTATE_NOENDBR ANNOTATE type=ANNOTYPE_NOENDBR
@@ -194,6 +203,7 @@
#define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL ANNOTATE type=ANNOTYPE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
#define ANNOTATE_UNRET_BEGIN ANNOTATE type=ANNOTYPE_UNRET_BEGIN
#define ANNOTATE_REACHABLE ANNOTATE type=ANNOTYPE_REACHABLE
+#define ANNOTATE_NOCFI_SYM ANNOTATE type=ANNOTYPE_NOCFI
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
diff --git a/include/linux/objtool_types.h b/include/linux/objtool_types.h
index df5d9fa..aceac94 100644
--- a/include/linux/objtool_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool_types.h
@@ -65,5 +65,6 @@ struct unwind_hint {
#define ANNOTYPE_IGNORE_ALTS 6
#define ANNOTYPE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL 7
#define ANNOTYPE_REACHABLE 8
+#define ANNOTYPE_NOCFI 9
#endif /* _LINUX_OBJTOOL_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/tools/include/linux/objtool_types.h b/tools/include/linux/objtool_types.h
index df5d9fa..aceac94 100644
--- a/tools/include/linux/objtool_types.h
+++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool_types.h
@@ -65,5 +65,6 @@ struct unwind_hint {
#define ANNOTYPE_IGNORE_ALTS 6
#define ANNOTYPE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL 7
#define ANNOTYPE_REACHABLE 8
+#define ANNOTYPE_NOCFI 9
#endif /* _LINUX_OBJTOOL_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index d14f20e..79eab61 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -2392,6 +2392,8 @@ static int __annotate_ifc(struct objtool_file *file, int type, struct instructio
static int __annotate_late(struct objtool_file *file, int type, struct instruction *insn)
{
+ struct symbol *sym;
+
switch (type) {
case ANNOTYPE_NOENDBR:
/* early */
@@ -2433,6 +2435,15 @@ static int __annotate_late(struct objtool_file *file, int type, struct instructi
insn->dead_end = false;
break;
+ case ANNOTYPE_NOCFI:
+ sym = insn->sym;
+ if (!sym) {
+ ERROR_INSN(insn, "dodgy NOCFI annotation");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ insn->sym->nocfi = 1;
+ break;
+
default:
ERROR_INSN(insn, "Unknown annotation type: %d", type);
return -1;
@@ -4002,6 +4013,37 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file)
warnings++;
}
+ if (!opts.cfi)
+ return warnings;
+
+ /*
+ * kCFI call sites look like:
+ *
+ * movl $(-0x12345678), %r10d
+ * addl -4(%r11), %r10d
+ * jz 1f
+ * ud2
+ * 1: cs call __x86_indirect_thunk_r11
+ *
+ * Verify all indirect calls are kCFI adorned by checking for the
+ * UD2. Notably, doing __nocfi calls to regular (cfi) functions is
+ * broken.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->retpoline_call_list, call_node) {
+ struct symbol *sym = insn->sym;
+
+ if (sym && (sym->type == STT_NOTYPE ||
+ sym->type == STT_FUNC) && !sym->nocfi) {
+ struct instruction *prev =
+ prev_insn_same_sym(file, insn);
+
+ if (!prev || prev->type != INSN_BUG) {
+ WARN_INSN(insn, "no-cfi indirect call!");
+ warnings++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
return warnings;
}
diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h
index 0a2fa3a..df8434d 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct symbol {
u8 local_label : 1;
u8 frame_pointer : 1;
u8 ignore : 1;
+ u8 nocfi : 1;
struct list_head pv_target;
struct reloc *relocs;
struct section *group_sec;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-20 9:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-14 10:20 [PATCH v3 00/16] objtool: Detect and warn about indirect calls in __nocfi functions Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 01/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Implement test_cc() in C Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 02/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Introduce EM_ASM_1 Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 03/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Introduce EM_ASM_2 Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 04/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Introduce EM_ASM_2R Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 05/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Introduce EM_ASM_2W Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 06/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Introduce EM_ASM_2CL Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 07/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Introduce EM_ASM_1SRC2 Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-24 0:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-18 10:37 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 08/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Introduce EM_ASM_3WCL Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 09/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Convert em_salc() to C Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 10/16] x86/kvm/emulate: Remove fastops Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] KVM: x86: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 11/16] x86,hyperv: Clean up hv_do_hypercall() Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-15 4:54 ` Wei Liu
2025-07-15 14:51 ` Michael Kelley
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] x86/hyperv: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 12/16] x86_64,hyperv: Use direct call to hypercall-page Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-15 4:58 ` Wei Liu
2025-07-15 14:52 ` Michael Kelley
2025-08-18 10:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] x86/hyperv: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 13/16] x86/fred: Install system vector handlers even if FRED isnt fully enabled Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] x86/fred: Install system vector handlers even if FRED isn't " tip-bot2 for Sean Christopherson
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 14/16] x86/fred: Play nice with invoking asm_fred_entry_from_kvm() on non-FRED hardware Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-26 4:54 ` Xin Li
2025-08-18 12:09 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 15/16] x86/fred: KVM: VMX: Always use FRED for IRQs when CONFIG_X86_FRED=y Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-20 9:39 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Sean Christopherson
2025-07-14 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 16/16] objtool: Validate kCFI calls Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 10:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 11:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-14 16:30 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-07-15 8:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-07-16 21:03 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-07-24 20:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-25 17:57 ` Xin Li
2025-07-25 19:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-26 0:33 ` Xin Li
2025-08-20 9:39 ` tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2025-07-24 20:31 ` [PATCH v3 00/16] objtool: Detect and warn about indirect calls in __nocfi functions Sean Christopherson
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