From: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jwboyer@redhat.com,
keescook@chromium.org, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 14:14:55 -0400 (EDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1776247498.9768326.1377800095494.JavaMail.root@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <410604531.9664777.1377791856786.JavaMail.root@redhat.com>
----- Original Message -----
> From: "Lenny Szubowicz" <lszubowi@redhat.com>
> To: "Matthew Garrett" <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jwboyer@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org
> Sent: Thursday, August 29, 2013 11:57:36 AM
> Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Matthew Garrett" <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
> > To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jwboyer@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org,
> > "Matthew Garrett"
> > <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
> > Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 1:26:09 PM
> > Subject: [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces
> > module loading restrictions
> >
> > kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
> > is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes
> > sense to disable kexec in this situation.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/kexec.c | 4 ++++
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
> > index 59f7b55..1a7690f 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kexec.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
> > @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
> > #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> > #include <linux/swap.h>
> > #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
> > +#include <linux/module.h>
> >
> > #include <asm/page.h>
> > #include <asm/uaccess.h>
> > @@ -1645,6 +1646,9 @@ int kernel_kexec(void)
> > goto Unlock;
> > }
> >
> > + if (secure_modules())
> > + return -EPERM;
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
> > if (kexec_image->preserve_context) {
> > lock_system_sleep();
> > --
> > 1.8.3.1
> >
> > --
> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
> >
>
>
> Shouldn't that be:
>
> + if (secure_modules()) {
> + error = -EPERM;
> + goto Unlock;
> + }
>
> -Lenny.
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>
Also, in earlier incarnations you disallowed kexec load in secure mode.
But now you allow the load. You then disallow the transfer of control
to the loaded code via kernel_kexec in secure mode.
Even if there might be no risk by having untrusted code remain loaded, why
not prevent it up front?
-Lenny.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-29 18:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-19 17:26 [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 01/10] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 15:01 ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 02/10] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 03/10] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 04/10] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 05/10] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 06/10] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 07/10] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 15:57 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-29 18:14 ` Lenny Szubowicz [this message]
2013-08-29 18:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 09/10] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 10/10] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 18:37 ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-30 20:46 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-30 23:41 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 10:51 ` joeyli
2013-09-04 12:01 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 13:13 ` joeyli
2013-08-19 17:34 ` [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted Kees Cook
2013-08-28 22:37 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-28 22:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 22:58 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-28 23:05 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 23:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-28 23:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-02 5:22 ` joeyli
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