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From: "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
To: "陈培鸿(乘鸿)" <chenpeihong.cph@alibaba-inc.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo" <acme@kernel.org>,
	"Namhyung Kim" <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Alexander Shishkin" <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"Jiri Olsa" <jolsa@kernel.org>, "Ian Rogers" <irogers@google.com>,
	"Adrian Hunter" <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, x86 <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-perf-users <linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "郑翔(正翔)" <zx283061@alibaba-inc.com>,
	赵生龙 <shenglong.zsl@alibaba-inc.com>,
	chenpeihong <chenpeihong@linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: 回复:回复:[PATCH] perf/x86/intel/uncore: Enable uncore on vCPUs when using uncore discovery
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2024 09:47:04 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1cf53e52-657b-4b73-bee4-30da208d7321@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bd65cf32-c2f8-42e4-a01d-fcd927000c24.chenpeihong.cph@alibaba-inc.com>



On 2024-09-25 10:07 p.m., 陈培鸿(乘鸿) wrote:
>>>>> With uncore discovery, kvm can choose to expose a subset of
>>>>> uncore related MSRs it wants to guest by emulate the uncore
>>>>> discovery device. 
>>>>
>>>> I don't hear that the KVM has started to support uncore vPMU.
>>>> Can you please point me to patches?
>>> There are no such uncore vPMU related patches so far, which may
>>> be supported some day in future. I’m now working on this.
>>
>> I think the patch should be part of the future KVM patch set.
>> Otherwise, It seems like a security hole because of the lack of
>> underlying support.
> I think this patch and the upcomming kvm patch set address two
> different issues. This patch enables uncore vPMU on hypervisors 
> with uncore discovery emulated, not limited just to QEMU/KVM.
> While it's true that the current QEMU/KVM setup lacks uncore vPMU
> support, it does not represent a security vulnerability. Instead,
> it simply allows guests on platforms utilizing uncore discovery,
> e.g., SPR/EMR/GNR, to access uncore capabilities via the emulated
> uncore discovery device. If there is no such device present, the
> uncore module remains inactive.

That's an ideal case. There is no mechanism to prevent a broken emulated
uncore discovery device is created, right?

You ask to expose some capabilities, but there is no real user for now.
I don't see a reason why we want to do it.

Thanks,
Kan
> Thanks,
> Chen
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Kan
>>
>>>> The default of uncore_no_discover is 0. So it bypasses the HYPERVISOR
>>>> check unless the user specially sets the value. It could be a problem
>>>> for the earlier platforms which don't support discovery
>>>> table. How do you plan to emulate the devices on earlier platforms?
>>>>
>>> U R right, I should make a more strict check here.
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
>>> index 33776df95aa4..ca510c476895 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
>>> @@ -1919,8 +1919,9 @@ static int __init intel_uncore_init(void)
>>> const struct x86_cpu_id *id;
>>> struct intel_uncore_init_fun *uncore_init;
>>> int pret = 0, cret = 0, mret = 0, ret;
>>> + bool in_guest = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR);
>>> - if (uncore_no_discover && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
>>> + if (uncore_no_discover && in_guest)
>>> return -ENODEV;
>>> __uncore_max_dies =
>>> @@ -1936,8 +1937,10 @@ static int __init intel_uncore_init(void)
>>> uncore_init = (struct intel_uncore_init_fun *)id->driver_data;
>>> if (uncore_no_discover && uncore_init->use_discovery)
>>> return -ENODEV;
>>> - if (uncore_init->use_discovery &&
>>> - !intel_uncore_has_discovery_tables(uncore_init->uncore_units_ignore))
>>> + if (!uncore_init->use_discovery) {
>>> + if (in_guest)
>>> + return -ENODEV;
>>> + } else if (!intel_uncore_has_discovery_tables(uncore_init->uncore_units_ignore))
>>> return -ENODEV;
>>> }
>>> For the earlier platforms which don't support discovery table, just
>>> disable uncore for guests. Will there be any issues?
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Kan
>>>>> So we can enable uncore on virtualized CPUs
>>>>> when uncore discovery is using.
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Cheng Hong <chenpeihong.cph@alibaba-inc.com>
>>>>> —
>>>>> arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c | 2 +-
>>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
>>>>> index d98fac567684..33776df95aa4 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
>>>>> @@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ static int __init intel_uncore_init(void)
>>>>> struct intel_uncore_init_fun *uncore_init;
>>>>> int pret = 0, cret = 0, mret = 0, ret;
>>>>> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
>>>>> + if (uncore_no_discover && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
>>>>> return -ENODEV;
>>>>> __uncore_max_dies =
>>> Thanks,
>>> Chen

      parent reply	other threads:[~2024-09-26 13:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <d420bcf0-5651-41f7-81c9-1c8155bd6bcc.chenpeihong.cph@alibaba-inc.com>
2024-09-24 13:51 ` [PATCH] perf/x86/intel/uncore: Enable uncore on vCPUs when using uncore discovery Liang, Kan
     [not found]   ` <b8b078bb-c8d7-428b-8a74-b3977563e6d4.chenpeihong.cph@alibaba-inc.com>
2024-09-25 13:05     ` 回复:[PATCH] " Liang, Kan
     [not found]       ` <bd65cf32-c2f8-42e4-a01d-fcd927000c24.chenpeihong.cph@alibaba-inc.com>
2024-09-26 13:47         ` Liang, Kan [this message]

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