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From: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 19/22] /dev/random: use sched_clock for timing data
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 17:57:46 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20.524465763@selenic.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19.524465763@selenic.com>


/dev/random  use sched_clock for timing data

Use the sched_clock() source for timing data, to get jiffies or better
resolution on all arches.


 tiny-mpm/drivers/char/random.c |   21 +++++++++------------
 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff -puN drivers/char/random.c~random-sched-clock drivers/char/random.c
--- tiny/drivers/char/random.c~random-sched-clock	2004-03-20 13:38:46.000000000 -0600
+++ tiny-mpm/drivers/char/random.c	2004-03-20 13:38:46.000000000 -0600
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -711,7 +712,8 @@ static struct timer_rand_state *irq_time
  */
 static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
 {
-	__u32		time;
+	long long clock;
+	u32 time;
 	__s32		delta, delta2, delta3;
 	int		entropy = 0;
 
@@ -720,17 +722,8 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct 
 	     (__get_cpu_var(trickle_count)++ & 0xfff))
 		return;
 
-#if defined (__i386__) || defined (__x86_64__)
-	if (cpu_has_tsc) {
-		__u32 high;
-		rdtsc(time, high);
-		num ^= high;
-	} else {
-		time = jiffies;
-	}
-#else
+	/* Use slow clock for conservative entropy estimation */
 	time = jiffies;
-#endif
 
 	/*
 	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
@@ -765,7 +758,11 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct 
 		 */
 		entropy = min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11);
 	}
-	batch_entropy_store(num, time, entropy);
+
+	/* Mix in fast clock for entropy data */
+	clock = sched_clock();
+	num ^= clock >> 32;
+	batch_entropy_store(num, time ^ (u32)clock, entropy);
 }
 
 void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode)

_

  reply	other threads:[~2004-03-26  0:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-03-25 23:57 [PATCH 0/22] /dev/random: Assorted fixes and cleanups Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57 ` [PATCH 1/22] /dev/random: Simplify entropy debugging Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57   ` [PATCH 2/22] /dev/random: Cleanup sleep logic Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57     ` [PATCH 3/22] /dev/random: remove broken resizing sysctl Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57       ` [PATCH 4/22] /dev/random: remove outdated RNDGETPOOL ioctl Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57         ` [PATCH 5/22] /dev/random: pool struct cleanup and rename Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57           ` [PATCH 6/22] /dev/random: simplify pool initialization Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57             ` [PATCH 7/22] /dev/random: simplify reseed logic Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57               ` [PATCH 8/22] /dev/random: BUG on premature random users Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                 ` [PATCH 9/22] /dev/random: more robust catastrophic reseed logic Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                   ` [PATCH 10/22] /dev/random: entropy reserve logic for starvation preve Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                     ` [PATCH 11/22] /dev/random: flag pools that need entropy reserve Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                       ` [PATCH 12/22] /dev/random: add pool for /dev/urandom to prevent starv Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                         ` [PATCH 13/22] /dev/random: kill extract_timer_state Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                           ` [PATCH 14/22] /dev/random: kill unused md5 copy Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                             ` [PATCH 15/22] /dev/random: kill unrolled SHA code Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                               ` [PATCH 16/22] /dev/random: kill 2.2 cruft Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                                 ` [PATCH 17/22] /dev/random: minor shrinkage Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                                   ` [PATCH 18/22] /dev/random: bitop cleanup Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                                     ` Matt Mackall [this message]
2004-03-25 23:57                                       ` [PATCH 20/22] /dev/random: cleanup rol bitop Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                                         ` [PATCH 21/22] /dev/random: kill batching of entropy mixing Matt Mackall
2004-03-25 23:57                                           ` [PATCH 22/22] /dev/random: update credits Matt Mackall
2004-03-27 13:52                                           ` [PATCH 21/22] /dev/random: kill batching of entropy mixing Jamie Lokier
2004-03-27 15:17                                             ` Matt Mackall
2004-03-26  1:43                               ` [PATCH 15/22] /dev/random: kill unrolled SHA code Jeff Garzik
2004-03-26  3:59                                 ` Matt Mackall
2004-03-27 13:49                                   ` Jamie Lokier
2004-03-26  0:15         ` [PATCH 4/22] /dev/random: remove outdated RNDGETPOOL ioctl Andrew Morton
2004-03-26  0:15       ` [PATCH 3/22] /dev/random: remove broken resizing sysctl Andrew Morton
2004-03-26  3:53         ` Matt Mackall
2004-03-26  0:14     ` [PATCH 2/22] /dev/random: Cleanup sleep logic Andrew Morton
2004-03-26  3:49       ` Matt Mackall

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