From: Crutcher Dunnavant <crutcher@datastacks.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Encrypted Swap
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2001 03:49:35 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20010807034935.C2399@mueller.datastacks.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200108070624.f776Ofl21096@www.2ka.mipt.ru> <Pine.LNX.4.33.0108062338130.5491-100000@mackman.net> <200108070705.f7775xl27094@www.2ka.mipt.ru>
In-Reply-To: <200108070705.f7775xl27094@www.2ka.mipt.ru>; from johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru on Tue, Aug 07, 2001 at 11:08:38AM +0400
++ 07/08/01 11:08 +0400 - Evgeny Polyakov:
> Hello.
> RM> accessible for one power cycle. Thus the computer can generate a key at
> No, computer can not do this.
> This will do some program,and this program is not crypted.
> Yes?
> We disassemle this program, get algorithm and regenerate a key in evil machine?
> Am i wrong?
>
> P.S. off-topic What algorithm do you want to use to regenerate a key for once crypted data?
> I don't know anyone, or i can't understand your point of view.
The weakness here is in the seed we use for generating the encryption
key. This is not a fatal weakness. There are several scenarios:
a) the environment is trusted at boot. It has not been compromised, yet.
In this scenario, the random state stored for the RG is pretty
chaotic; and we can read it in to initialize the RG, then immediatly
wipe it from disk. Assuming we are good about clearing the data, it
cannot be recovered; and the RG can be trusted to give us a good key.
In this scenario, you can not recover the key.
b) the environment is not trusted at boot. someone might have a dump of
the harddrive already, and is waiting to take a second dump.
If we wish, we can write algorithms which induce chaos into the RG by
thrashing the page table, the cache, and the harddrives. We could devote
a second or two on boot to doing this, and get a few thousand bytes of
entropy from the /physical/ chaos we'd be playing with.
Alternatively, physical RG devices exist; and are rather easy to
make. We install a device designed to be pyhsically chaotic, and write a
driver for it which constantly seeds the RG. This would give us very
good chaos.
In this scenario, you can not recover the key.
Do not assume that, since random number generation is patently
impossible with an algorithm; that it is impossible with a computer.
Computers /are/ machines, and minute timing differences, or devices
designed for the purpose, can be used to pull chaos out of the physical
world, and into our algorithms. In addition information which was once
predictable, but has been destroyed along with its sources, is still
lost to you.
--
Crutcher <crutcher@datastacks.com>
GCS d--- s+:>+:- a-- C++++$ UL++++$ L+++$>++++ !E PS+++ PE Y+ PGP+>++++
R-(+++) !tv(+++) b+(++++) G+ e>++++ h+>++ r* y+>*$
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2001-08-07 7:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 109+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2001-08-07 2:28 Encrypted Swap David Spreen
2001-08-07 3:56 ` Justin Guyett
2001-08-07 4:01 ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07 4:12 ` Steve VanDevender
2001-08-07 4:23 ` John Polyakov
2001-08-07 4:36 ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07 5:12 ` Garett Spencley
2001-08-07 5:55 ` Ryan Mack
2001-08-07 6:27 ` John Polyakov
2001-08-06 23:28 ` Rob Landley
2001-08-07 10:10 ` Christopher E. Brown
2001-08-07 14:05 ` Joel Jaeggli
2001-08-07 6:41 ` Crutcher Dunnavant
2001-08-07 6:57 ` Evgeny Polyakov
2001-08-07 6:45 ` Ryan Mack
2001-08-07 7:08 ` Evgeny Polyakov
2001-08-07 7:23 ` Sean Hunter
2001-08-07 8:39 ` Ben Ford
2001-08-07 12:28 ` Kevin Krieser
2001-08-07 12:39 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-07 13:39 ` Re[2]: " s0mbre
2001-08-08 2:24 ` Re[2]: Encrypted Swap (random off-topic snippet) Dr. Kelsey Hudson
2001-08-08 2:51 ` Michael H. Warfield
2001-08-07 14:21 ` Encrypted Swap Ignacio Vazquez-Abrams
2001-08-07 7:26 ` Ryan Mack
2001-08-07 7:34 ` Jeffrey Considine
2001-08-07 7:49 ` Crutcher Dunnavant [this message]
2001-08-07 9:01 ` Peter Wächtler
2001-08-07 12:37 ` Michael Bacarella
2001-08-17 14:50 ` Holger Lubitz
2001-08-17 15:39 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-17 15:57 ` Holger Lubitz
2001-08-17 16:34 ` Gerhard Mack
2001-08-17 16:50 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-17 17:06 ` Adrian Cox
2001-08-17 17:16 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-17 17:22 ` Jacob Alifrangis
2001-08-17 17:36 ` Adrian Cox
2001-08-17 18:51 ` Nicholas Knight
2001-08-17 19:30 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-18 8:51 ` Adrian Cox
2001-08-18 11:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2001-08-19 8:51 ` Adrian Cox
2001-08-20 1:27 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-20 11:08 ` Helge Hafting
2001-08-20 11:50 ` Ian Stirling
2001-08-21 13:55 ` Andreas Bombe
2001-08-17 20:00 ` Andreas Dilger
2001-08-07 20:09 ` Maciej Zenczykowski
2001-08-07 7:34 ` Steve VanDevender
2001-08-07 7:55 ` Crutcher Dunnavant
2001-08-07 15:17 ` Garett Spencley
2001-08-07 7:49 ` Helge Hafting
2001-08-07 7:58 ` Crutcher Dunnavant
2001-08-07 9:23 ` Helge Hafting
2001-08-07 13:29 ` Wichert Akkerman
2001-08-07 15:56 ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07 16:54 ` Alan Cox
2001-08-07 17:10 ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07 9:52 ` Brian May
2001-08-07 14:48 ` Joel Jaeggli
2001-08-07 15:59 ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07 16:18 ` Joel Jaeggli
2001-08-07 16:24 ` Florian Weimer
2001-08-07 17:14 ` [OT] Cold, Dead Hard drives (was: Encrypted Swap) Stephen Satchell
2001-08-08 2:13 ` Encrypted Swap Dr. Kelsey Hudson
2001-08-07 20:30 ` Ian Stirling
2001-08-07 10:33 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2001-08-13 3:32 ` swap & deadlocks [was Re: Encrypted Swap] Pavel Machek
[not found] <no.id>
2001-08-07 14:17 ` Encrypted Swap Alan Cox
2001-08-07 15:16 ` Crutcher Dunnavant
2001-08-07 16:01 ` Chris Wedgwood
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2001-08-07 14:37 encrypted swap David Maynor
2001-08-07 14:48 ` Billy Harvey
2001-08-07 16:03 ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07 15:06 David Maynor
2001-08-07 15:11 ` Florian Weimer
2001-08-07 15:43 ` Joel Jaeggli
2001-08-07 15:30 ` Garett Spencley
2001-08-07 16:21 ` David Spreen
2001-08-08 8:11 ` Helge Hafting
2001-08-07 15:28 David Maynor
2001-08-07 15:51 ` Florian Weimer
2001-08-07 17:30 Encrypted Swap David Maynor
2001-08-07 17:27 ` Rik van Riel
2001-08-07 18:53 encrypted swap Torrey Hoffman
2001-08-07 19:15 ` Thomas Pornin
2001-08-07 19:23 ` Dan Podeanu
2001-08-07 19:48 ` Andreas Dilger
2001-08-07 20:04 ` Marty Poulin
2001-08-07 21:06 ` David Wagner
2001-08-07 21:56 ` D. Stimits
2001-08-07 21:44 ` Pavel Machek
2001-08-07 19:48 ` Justin Guyett
2001-08-07 20:05 ` Alan Cox
2001-08-07 20:17 ` Bill Rugolsky Jr.
2001-08-07 21:40 David Spreen
2001-08-17 17:10 Encrypted Swap David Christensen
2001-08-17 17:21 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-17 18:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2001-08-17 19:05 ` Dan Hollis
2001-08-18 9:52 ` Eric W. Biederman
2001-08-18 10:24 ` Nicholas Knight
2001-08-18 12:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2001-08-17 19:20 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-18 10:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] <fa.kmbqblv.v3uvig@ifi.uio.no>
2001-08-18 14:53 ` Ted Unangst
2001-08-18 15:17 ` Mr. James W. Laferriere
2001-08-20 11:03 ` Helge Hafting
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