From: Elladan <elladan@eskimo.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@math.psu.edu>
Cc: Elladan <elladan@eskimo.com>,
Jakob ?stergaard <jakob@unthought.net>,
Kasper Dupont <kasperd@daimi.au.dk>,
Linux-Kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] ext2 and ext3 block reservations can be bypassed
Date: Sun, 12 May 2002 11:37:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20020512113730.A24085@eskimo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20020512103432.A24018@eskimo.com> <Pine.GSO.4.21.0205121412160.25791-100000@weyl.math.psu.edu>
On Sun, May 12, 2002 at 02:15:12PM -0400, Alexander Viro wrote:
>
> On Sun, 12 May 2002, Elladan wrote:
> >
> > It just happens that the suid program wasn't the one who chose what file
> > it was going to write stdout to - the shell did.
> >
> > Thus, the security violation.
>
> <shrug> relying on 5% in security-sensitive setup is *dumb*.
> In that case you need properly set quota (better yet, no lusers with write
> access anywhere on that fs)..
>
> There are worse holes problems 5% rule. E.g. you can create a
> file with hole, mmap over that hole, dirty the pages and exit. Guess
> who ends up writing them out? Right, kswapd. Which is run as root.
> No suid applications required...
Regardless of whether it's a good thing to depend on security-wise, it
is a problem to have something that appears to be a security feature
which doesn't actually work.
Reading the documentation, I would expect that if I create an ext3
filesystem, reserve 20% of it for root, and then run a cron job as root
that uses 16% of that filesystem periodically, that cron job will not
actually fail whenever some luser decides they want it to.
I don't recall seeing it plastered in huge letters, "This space reserve
is just a convenience feature, and can easily be circumvented by the
user. You must never rely on it for anything."
Having unsupported security features is typically a bad idea.
-J
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2002-05-12 18:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2002-05-12 16:23 [RFC] ext2 and ext3 block reservations can be bypassed Kasper Dupont
2002-05-12 16:42 ` Jakob Østergaard
2002-05-12 17:34 ` Elladan
2002-05-12 18:15 ` Alexander Viro
2002-05-12 18:37 ` Elladan [this message]
2002-05-12 19:02 ` Jakob Østergaard
2002-05-12 19:04 ` Mark Mielke
2002-05-13 17:09 ` Horst von Brand
2002-05-13 17:52 ` Elladan
2002-05-13 17:57 ` Christoph Hellwig
2002-05-14 16:22 ` Elladan
2002-05-14 16:55 ` Mark Mielke
2002-05-14 17:47 ` Elladan
2002-05-14 18:51 ` Kasper Dupont
2002-05-15 19:48 ` Pavel Machek
2002-05-15 20:29 ` Alan Cox
2002-05-14 15:40 ` Kasper Dupont
2002-05-14 15:56 ` Mark Mielke
2002-05-14 18:25 ` Kasper Dupont
[not found] <791836807@toto.iv>
2002-05-12 22:04 ` Peter Chubb
2002-05-12 22:53 ` Alexander Viro
2002-05-13 4:22 ` Kasper Dupont
2002-05-13 4:51 ` Elladan
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2002-05-14 17:53 Jesse Pollard
2002-05-14 18:23 ` Mark Mielke
2002-05-14 19:11 ` Alexander Viro
2002-05-14 18:00 Jesse Pollard
2002-05-14 18:07 Jesse Pollard
2002-05-14 18:54 Jesse Pollard
2002-05-14 19:04 ` Alexander Viro
2002-05-14 19:55 ` Mark Mielke
2002-05-14 19:29 Jesse Pollard
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