Re: [PATCH] (0/4) Entropy accounting fixes

[Oliver Xymoron <oxymoron@waste.org>]

On Sat, Aug 17, 2002 at 11:28:08PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
>
> Even so, I would agree with Linus in the thought that being "too
> paranoid" makes it basically useless.  If you have people sniffing
> your network right next to the WAN side of your IPSec firewall with
> GHz network analyzers and crafting packets to corrupt your entropy
> pool, then chances are they could just as easily sniff the LAN side
> of your network and get the unencrypted data directly.  The same
> holds true for keystroke logging (or spy camera) to capture your pass
> phrase instead of trying an incredibly difficult strategy to "influence"
> the generation of this huge key in advance.

Actually, my attack model here assumes a hostile LAN. GHz WAN is
fairly uncommon.

This design comes from an entropy pool I made from scratch for another
system and fixed what I thought the deficits are in the Linux
model. Current Linux a) overestimates entropy b) can't incorporate
untrusted data c) doesn't sample from the network at all.

I think if I'd broken this up this way:

piece 1a: mix in untrusted data without accounting it
piece 1b: start sampling the network as untrusted data
piece 2a: clean up bogosity in entropy accounting
 
..no one would have objected.

> In the end, if you make it so hard to extract your secrets in a stealthy
> manner, they will just start with a few big guys and a rubber hose...

Oddly enough, I came home today from running errands to discover that
someone had tried brute-forcing my front door with a crowbar.

-- 
 "Love the dolphins," she advised him. "Write by W.A.S.T.E.."