From: Chris Wright <chris@wirex.com>
To: Grzegorz Jaskiewicz <gj@pointblue.com.pl>
Cc: Chris Wright <chris@wirex.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@transmeta.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@wirex.com,
greg@kroah.com, sds@epoch.ncsc.mil
Subject: Re: [PATCH][LSM] Early init for security modules and various cleanups
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2003 03:09:46 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20030602030946.H27233@figure1.int.wirex.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0306021205520.27640-100000@pointblue.com.pl>; from gj@pointblue.com.pl on Mon, Jun 02, 2003 at 12:08:25PM +0200
* Grzegorz Jaskiewicz (gj@pointblue.com.pl) wrote:
> On Mon, 2 Jun 2003, Chris Wright wrote:
>
> > @@ -91,7 +92,7 @@
> > * Superuser processes are usually more important, so we make it
> > * less likely that we kill those.
> > */
> > - if (cap_t(p->cap_effective) & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> > + if (!security_capable(p,CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> > p->uid == 0 || p->euid == 0)
> > points /= 4;
> ..............
> > - if (cap_t(p->cap_effective) & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> > + if (!security_capable(p,CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> > points /= 4;
>
> Correct me if i am wrong, but I think it is not a good idea to favor
> applications with more
> capabilities, as ussualy those are most wanted target on a system.
security_capable() returns 0 if that capability bit is set. so there is
no functional change here, just allows the security module to see the
capability check that was hand coded.
thanks,
-chris
--
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2003-06-02 9:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2003-06-02 9:49 [BK PATCH][LSM] Early init for security modules and various cleanups Chris Wright
2003-06-02 9:54 ` [PATCH][LSM] " Chris Wright
2003-06-02 9:57 ` Chris Wright
2003-06-02 10:00 ` Chris Wright
2003-06-02 10:01 ` Chris Wright
2003-06-02 10:03 ` Chris Wright
2003-06-02 10:08 ` Grzegorz Jaskiewicz
2003-06-02 10:09 ` Chris Wright [this message]
2003-06-02 10:44 ` Andrew Morton
2003-06-02 12:50 ` Stephen Smalley
2003-06-02 14:40 ` Chris Friesen
2003-06-02 16:33 ` Chris Wright
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20030602030946.H27233@figure1.int.wirex.com \
--to=chris@wirex.com \
--cc=gj@pointblue.com.pl \
--cc=greg@kroah.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@wirex.com \
--cc=sds@epoch.ncsc.mil \
--cc=torvalds@transmeta.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox