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From: Chris Wright <chris@wirex.com>
To: Grzegorz Jaskiewicz <gj@pointblue.com.pl>
Cc: Chris Wright <chris@wirex.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@transmeta.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@wirex.com,
	greg@kroah.com, sds@epoch.ncsc.mil
Subject: Re: [PATCH][LSM] Early init for security modules and various cleanups
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2003 03:09:46 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20030602030946.H27233@figure1.int.wirex.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0306021205520.27640-100000@pointblue.com.pl>; from gj@pointblue.com.pl on Mon, Jun 02, 2003 at 12:08:25PM +0200

* Grzegorz Jaskiewicz (gj@pointblue.com.pl) wrote:
> On Mon, 2 Jun 2003, Chris Wright wrote:
> 
> > @@ -91,7 +92,7 @@
> >  	 * Superuser processes are usually more important, so we make it
> >  	 * less likely that we kill those.
> >  	 */
> > -	if (cap_t(p->cap_effective) & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> > +	if (!security_capable(p,CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> >  				p->uid == 0 || p->euid == 0)
> >  		points /= 4;
> ..............
> > -	if (cap_t(p->cap_effective) & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> > +	if (!security_capable(p,CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> >  		points /= 4;
> 
> Correct me if i am wrong, but I think it is not a good idea to favor 
> applications with more 
> capabilities, as ussualy those are most wanted target on a system.

security_capable() returns 0 if that capability bit is set.  so there is
no functional change here, just allows the security module to see the
capability check that was hand coded.

thanks,
-chris
-- 
Linux Security Modules     http://lsm.immunix.org     http://lsm.bkbits.net

  reply	other threads:[~2003-06-02  9:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-06-02  9:49 [BK PATCH][LSM] Early init for security modules and various cleanups Chris Wright
2003-06-02  9:54 ` [PATCH][LSM] " Chris Wright
2003-06-02  9:57   ` Chris Wright
2003-06-02 10:00     ` Chris Wright
2003-06-02 10:01       ` Chris Wright
2003-06-02 10:03         ` Chris Wright
2003-06-02 10:08   ` Grzegorz Jaskiewicz
2003-06-02 10:09     ` Chris Wright [this message]
2003-06-02 10:44       ` Andrew Morton
2003-06-02 12:50         ` Stephen Smalley
2003-06-02 14:40           ` Chris Friesen
2003-06-02 16:33         ` Chris Wright

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