From: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
To: "Richard B. Johnson" <root@chaos.analogic.com>
Cc: Jakob Lell <jlell@JakobLell.de>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2003 17:35:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20031124173527.GA1561@mail.shareable.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.53.0311241205500.18425@chaos>
Richard B. Johnson wrote:
> To prevent this, a user can set his default permissions so that
> neither group nor world can read the files. This is usually done
> by setting the attributes in the user's top directory.
Correct, but the quota problem is genuine: what if I want to create a
lot of files in /home/jamie that are readable by other users, but I
want to be able to delete them at some later time and reuse my quota
for something else?
This is quite a normal scenario on multi-user systems with quotas.
You seem to be suggesting that the only method is to have a separate
partition for each user, which is absurd.
Another method is "tree quotas" which have come up on this list
before. Hopefully they will be included one day; tree quotas seem
like they would solve this problem and some others.
> A setuid binary created with a hard-link will only work as a setuid
> binary if the directory it's in is owned by root.
That isn't true.
> If you have users that can create files or hard-links within such
> directories, you have users who either know the root password
> already or have used some exploit to become root. In any case, it's
> not a hard-link problem
/tmp is owned by root and anyone can create a hard link in /tmp to
other files, on a system where /tmp doesn't have its own filesystem.
> No. Users must be able to create hard links to files that belong
> to somebody else if they are readable. It's a requirement.
I disagree. The ability to create files and declare that someone else
can't hard link to them would be useful in a multi-user environment.
-- Jamie
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2003-11-24 17:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2003-11-24 16:36 hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 17:05 ` Måns Rullgård
2003-11-24 20:42 ` Mike Fedyk
2003-11-24 17:14 ` Richard B. Johnson
2003-11-24 17:35 ` Jamie Lokier [this message]
2003-11-24 18:57 ` aic7xxx loading oops in 2.6.0-test10 Alexander Nyberg
2003-11-24 20:03 ` Ken Witherow
[not found] ` <Pine.LNX.4.58.0311241524310.1245@morpheus>
2003-11-24 20:49 ` Ken Witherow
2003-11-24 23:42 ` Dick Streefland
2003-11-25 3:16 ` hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems Matthias Andree
2003-11-25 14:48 ` Jan Kara
2003-11-25 15:27 ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 17:37 ` Rudo Thomas
2003-11-24 18:10 ` Richard B. Johnson
2003-11-24 18:22 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2003-11-24 22:17 ` [OT] " Rudo Thomas
2003-11-24 17:57 ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 18:08 ` splite
2003-11-24 18:13 ` Richard B. Johnson
2003-11-24 18:24 ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 23:57 ` bill davidsen
2003-11-24 18:18 ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 18:29 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2003-11-24 19:25 ` hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security proble Mathieu Chouquet-Stringer
2003-11-24 20:00 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2003-11-24 20:02 ` Mathieu Chouquet-Stringer
2003-11-24 20:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2003-11-24 18:21 ` hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems Michael Buesch
2003-11-24 18:35 ` Jakob Lell
2003-11-24 18:53 ` Chris Wright
2003-11-25 0:04 ` bill davidsen
2003-11-25 13:54 ` Jesse Pollard
2003-11-24 23:50 ` bill davidsen
2003-11-25 0:22 ` Mike Fedyk
2003-11-25 0:35 ` Chris Wright
2003-11-25 8:15 ` Amon Ott
2003-11-25 16:11 ` Bill Davidsen
2003-11-25 11:26 ` Gianni Tedesco
[not found] <fa.hevpbbs.u5q2r6@ifi.uio.no>
[not found] ` <fa.l1quqni.v405hu@ifi.uio.no>
2003-11-24 20:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2003-11-24 21:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2003-11-24 23:28 ` Ricky Beam
2003-11-24 22:04 ` John Bradford
2003-11-24 22:12 ` Måns Rullgård
2003-11-25 12:10 ` John Bradford
2003-11-25 12:18 ` Måns Rullgård
2003-11-25 13:12 ` John Bradford
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