From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S263664AbUHGQcR (ORCPT ); Sat, 7 Aug 2004 12:32:17 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S263709AbUHGQcR (ORCPT ); Sat, 7 Aug 2004 12:32:17 -0400 Received: from 104.engsoc.carleton.ca ([134.117.69.104]:29635 "EHLO certainkey.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S263664AbUHGQcQ (ORCPT ); Sat, 7 Aug 2004 12:32:16 -0400 Date: Sat, 7 Aug 2004 12:27:46 -0400 From: Jean-Luc Cooke To: James Morris Cc: David Wagner , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] Delete cryptoloop Message-ID: <20040807162746.GQ23994@certainkey.com> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.6+20040523i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Aug 02, 2004 at 07:16:56PM -0400, James Morris wrote: > On Mon, 2 Aug 2004, David Wagner wrote: > > > The point I was making is that there are other scenarios where Cryptoloop > > falls apart in much more devastating ways. For instance, if the attacker > > can modify the ciphertexts stored on your hard disk and you continue > > using the hard disk afterwards, then really nasty attacks become possible. > > Other attacks become possible if the attacker can observe the ciphertexts > > stored on your hard disk at multiple points in time. The question I was > > asking is this: Does anyone care about these latter types of scenarios? > > I think the common threat scenarios out of the above are: > > 1) Attacker can observe ciphertexts at multiple points in time. > 2) Attacker steals disk/computer and disappears with it. Examples for #1 being: mounting a file system image across NFS (their home directory for example). In this case, and attacker can see almost *all* disk reads and writes. Thanks for your input on this David W., I was @ OLS... silly intermittent WiFi... JLC