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From: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de>
To: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Zinx Verituse <zinx@epicsol.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: ide-cd problems
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2004 10:49:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20040809084916.GR10418@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1091887718.18407.51.camel@localhost.localdomain>

On Sat, Aug 07 2004, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Gwe, 2004-08-06 at 15:32, Jens Axboe wrote:
> > That's the case I don't agree with, and why I didn't like the idea
> > originally. That suddenly requires a patching of the kernel because of
> > new commands in new devices. Like when dvd readers became common, you
> > can't just require people to update their kernel because a few new
> > commands are needed to drive them from user space.
> 
> I'm stunning we are even having this argument. You are talking about
> what appes to be a hardware destruction enabling security level bug in
> the 2.6 kernel and arguing about whether it is a feature or not.

Alan, stop putting words into my mouth. I'm not saying it's a feature.

> In essence you are saying read access to any raw device node entitles
> the opener of the file to destroy the attached device (device even not
> just media). You are arguing that its ok that I can use raw scsi I/O to
> subvert the read/write permissions too.

In essence, yes. I'm arguing that it's not easily doable to
differentiate between destructive and non-destructive commands. And that
doing so requires extensive tables because commands are not the same
across devices.

I'm not saying that I think it's a good thing! Or a feature, for that
matter. I'm just arguing the feasibility of doing it, the maintenance
involved, etc.

> In the example code I gave
> 
> >               default:
> >                       if(capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> >                       /* Only administrators get to do arbitary things
> */
> > 
> 
> means there is no need to recompile anything, you just need priviledges
> to do stuff the kernel doesn't *know* is safe. This is the correct
> behaviour for people who don't live in cloud cuckoo land.

I'm well aware of the implications. The argument is only whether it's ok
to policy filter unknown commands. I guess with capability elevating the
app until the kernels are modified it would be ok, at least it enables
the apps to work for root.

-- 
Jens Axboe


  reply	other threads:[~2004-08-09  8:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-07-30 19:36 ide-cd problems Zinx Verituse
2004-07-31 15:36 ` Jens Axboe
2004-07-31 18:27   ` Zinx Verituse
2004-07-31 20:00     ` Jens Axboe
2004-07-31 21:02       ` Zinx Verituse
2004-08-01  4:07         ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2004-08-01 15:57           ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-02  3:20             ` Horst von Brand
2004-08-02 12:25               ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-02 20:44               ` Bill Davidsen
2004-08-02 13:45             ` tabris
2004-08-02 13:56               ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-02 14:26                 ` Andreas Metzler
2004-08-02 14:33                   ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-02 14:38                 ` tabris
2004-08-02 14:50                   ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-02 16:30           ` Bill Davidsen
2004-08-03  7:17             ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-02 17:16         ` Zinx Verituse
2004-08-05  5:40         ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-05 21:06           ` Alan Cox
2004-08-06  5:44             ` Jens Axboe
     [not found]               ` <20040806062331.GE10274@suse.de>
2004-08-06 12:14                 ` Alan Cox
2004-08-06 14:32                   ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-06 15:14                     ` Charles Cazabon
2004-08-06 15:13                       ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-07 14:01                       ` Alan Cox
2004-08-06 17:26                     ` dleonard
2004-08-06 22:47                       ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-07 14:04                         ` Alan Cox
2004-08-07 21:54                           ` Alan Cox
2004-08-07  3:11                     ` Jason L Tibbitts III
2004-08-09  8:39                       ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-07 14:08                     ` Alan Cox
2004-08-09  8:49                       ` Jens Axboe [this message]
2004-08-02 23:54       ` Alan Cox
2004-08-03  5:53         ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-03 16:17           ` Zinx Verituse
2004-08-04  5:01             ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-05 15:52               ` Alan Cox
2004-08-05 17:46                 ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-05 20:58                   ` Alan Cox
2004-08-05 18:53                 ` Bill Davidsen
2004-08-05 18:46           ` Bill Davidsen
2004-08-05 19:35             ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-05 21:02               ` Alan Cox
2004-08-06  5:42                 ` Jens Axboe
2004-08-03 15:28         ` Doug Maxey
2004-08-03 17:28           ` Alan Cox
2004-08-09 20:24       ` Bill Davidsen
2004-08-02 16:41   ` Bill Davidsen
2004-08-03 15:50     ` Horst von Brand

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