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From: Michael Buesch <mbuesch@freenet.de>
To: Eric Lammerts <eric@lammerts.org>
Cc: Marc Ballarin <Ballarin.Marc@gmx.de>, Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
	albert@users.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: dynamic /dev security hole?
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2004 15:30:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <200408091530.55244.mbuesch@freenet.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0408090025590.26834@vivaldi.madbase.net>

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Quoting Eric Lammerts <eric@lammerts.org>:
> Just an idea for a fix for this problem: If udev would change the
> permissions to 000 and ownership to root.root just before it unlinks
> the device node, the copy would become useless.

Like this?
Only compile tested against glibc.


===== udev-remove.c 1.31 vs edited =====
- --- 1.31/udev-remove.c	2004-04-01 04:12:56 +02:00
+++ edited/udev-remove.c	2004-08-09 15:23:12 +02:00
@@ -79,6 +79,23 @@
 	strfieldcat(filename, dev->name);
 
 	info("removing device node '%s'", filename);
+	/* first remove all permissions on the device node.
+	 * This fixes a security issue. If the user created
+	 * a hard-link to the device node, he can't use this
+	 * anymore, if we change permissions.
+	 */
+	retval = chmod(filename, 0000);
+	if (retval) {
+		info("chmod(%s, 0000) failed with error '%s'",
+		     filename, strerror(errno));
+		// we continue nevertheless.
+	}
+	retval = chown(filename, 0, 0);
+	if (retval) {
+		info("chown(%s, 0, 0) failed with error '%s'",
+		     filename, strerror(errno));
+		// we continue nevertheless.
+	}
 	retval = unlink(filename);
 	if (errno == ENOENT)
 		retval = 0;

- -- 
Regards Michael Buesch  [ http://www.tuxsoft.de.vu ]


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  reply	other threads:[~2004-08-09 15:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-08-08 12:47 dynamic /dev security hole? Albert Cahalan
2004-08-08 15:58 ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-08 15:04   ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-08 20:42     ` Greg KH
2004-08-08 16:21   ` Greg KH
2004-08-08 21:43     ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-08 22:07     ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-09  4:40       ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 13:30         ` Michael Buesch [this message]
2004-08-09 13:19           ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-09 16:54             ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 17:04               ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 17:14                 ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-10  0:21                   ` Greg KH
2004-08-11 17:12             ` [RFC, PATCH] sys_revoke(), just a try. (was: Re: dynamic /dev security hole?) Michael Buesch
2004-08-12 16:49               ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-12 19:51                 ` Alan Cox
2004-08-12 19:39                   ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-13 12:39                   ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 14:49         ` dynamic /dev security hole? Alan Cox
2004-08-09 16:17           ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 15:33             ` Alan Cox
2004-08-09 16:47               ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 17:54                 ` Alan Cox
2004-08-10  0:21       ` Greg KH

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