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From: Jean-Luc Cooke <jlcooke@certainkey.com>
To: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PROPOSAL/PATCH] Fortuna PRNG in /dev/random
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2004 15:45:02 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20040927194502.GO28317@certainkey.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <415861C4.4030604@colorfullife.com>

On Mon, Sep 27, 2004 at 08:53:56PM +0200, Manfred Spraul wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 27, 2004 at 10:55:55AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> >
> >While you're at it, please re-read RFC 793 and RFC 1185.  You still
> >don't have TCP sequence generation done right.
> 
> Actually trying to replace the partial MD4 might be worth an attempt: 
> I'm certain that the partial MD4 is not the best/fastest way to generate 
> sequence numbers.

It infact uses two full SHA1 hashs for tcp sequence numbers (endian and
padding issues aside).  my patch aims to do this in 1 AES256 Encrypt or 2
AES256 encrypts for ipv6.

> >The only real way to settle this would be to ask Jamal and some of the
> >other networking hackers to repeat their benchmarks and see if the AES
> >encryption for every TCP SYN is a problem or not.
> >
> It would be unfair: The proposed implementation is not optimized - e.g. 
> the sequence number generation runs under a global spinlock. On large 
> SMP systems this will kill the performance, regardless of the internal 
> implementation.

This would be nice to have in both RNG implementations.

> For the Linux-variant of RFC 1948, the sequence number generation can be 
> described as:
> A hash function that generates 24 bit output from 96 bit input. Some of 
> the input bits can be chosen by the attacker, all of these bits are 
> known to the attacker. The attacker can query the output of the hash for 
> some inputs - realistically less than 2^16 to 2^20 inputs. A successful 
> attack means guessing the output of the hash function for one of the 
> inputs that the attacker can't query.
> 
> Current implementation:
> Set the MD4 initialization vector to the 96 bit input plus 32 secret, 
> random bits.
> Perform an MD4 hash over 256 secret, random bits.
> Take the lowest 24 bits from one of the MD4 state words.
> Every 5 minutes the secret bits are reset.
> 
> For IPV6, the requirements are similiar, except that the input is 288 
> bits long.
> 
> --
>    Manfred

  reply	other threads:[~2004-09-27 19:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-09-27 18:53 [PROPOSAL/PATCH] Fortuna PRNG in /dev/random Manfred Spraul
2004-09-27 19:45 ` Jean-Luc Cooke [this message]
2004-09-28  0:07   ` Theodore Ts'o
2004-09-28  2:24     ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-28 13:46       ` Herbert Poetzl
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2004-09-24  0:59 linux
2004-09-24  2:34 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-24  6:19   ` linux
2004-09-24 21:42   ` linux
2004-09-25 14:54     ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-25 18:43       ` Theodore Ts'o
2004-09-26  1:42         ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-26  5:23           ` Theodore Ts'o
2004-09-27  0:50             ` linux
2004-09-27 13:07               ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-27 14:23               ` Theodore Ts'o
2004-09-27 14:42                 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-26  6:46           ` linux
2004-09-26 16:32             ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-26  2:31       ` linux
2004-09-23 23:43 Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-24  4:38 ` Theodore Ts'o
2004-09-24 12:54   ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-24 17:43     ` Theodore Ts'o
2004-09-24 17:59       ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-24 20:44         ` Scott Robert Ladd
2004-09-24 21:34         ` Theodore Ts'o
2004-09-25 14:51           ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-24 18:43       ` James Morris
2004-09-24 19:09         ` Matt Mackall
2004-09-24 20:03         ` Lee Revell
2004-09-24 13:44   ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2004-09-27  4:58 ` Theodore Ts'o
     [not found]   ` <20040927133203.GF28317@certainkey.com>
2004-09-27 14:55     ` Theodore Ts'o
2004-09-27 15:19       ` Jean-Luc Cooke

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