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From: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] Add dynamic context transition support to SELinux
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 11:18:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20041202111859.A2357@build.pdx.osdl.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1102013788.26015.192.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>; from sds@epoch.ncsc.mil on Thu, Dec 02, 2004 at 01:56:28PM -0500

* Stephen Smalley (sds@epoch.ncsc.mil) wrote:
> On Thu, 2004-12-02 at 13:34, Chris Wright wrote:
> > That's heavy handed.  Can't you track this at clone time?  Or at least
> > do this after the AVC check, so it's not always locking task list.
> 
> Hmmm...if the latter is a concern, it seems like there are other cases
> that likewise need fixing, e.g. sys_getpriority or sys_setpriority. 

At least not introducing new paths.

> Earlier version of the patch did a simple check of thread_group_empty()
> but that didn't catch CLONE_VM w/o CLONE_THREAD, and simple check of
> mm_users can produce false positives, e.g. another process reading your
> /proc/pid/<xxx> file and holding a reference to the mm temporarily.

Yes, number of spots that inc mm_users, and CLONE_VM is clearly the
critical bit more so than posix thread.

> We could set a flag in the task security structure upon
> selinux_task_create upon CLONE_VM, I suppose, and inherit it in
> selinux_task_alloc_security.  That would prohibit any use after you've
> ever created a thread, even if none of the other threads are still
> around, which is stronger than we need, but probably not an obstacle. 
> Is that what you had in mind?

No, I was thinking of actually tracking the threads, since you know when
they come and go.  One way would be to share task_security_struct via
refcnt for threads, although this could get sticky.

thanks,
-chris
-- 
Linux Security Modules     http://lsm.immunix.org     http://lsm.bkbits.net

  reply	other threads:[~2004-12-02 19:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-12-02 15:43 [PATCH 4/6] Add dynamic context transition support to SELinux Stephen Smalley
2004-12-02 18:34 ` Chris Wright
2004-12-02 18:56   ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-02 19:18     ` Chris Wright [this message]
2004-12-02 19:50       ` Stephen Smalley
2004-12-02 20:12         ` Chris Wright

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