Re: Concurrent access to /dev/urandom

andyliu
2004-12-09T02:46:37Z

hi Ted

i think this is better than use the spin lock.
but i think maybe there should put an #ifdef SMP :)
just like

#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
tmp[0] = 0x67452301 ^ smp_processor_id();
tmp[1] = 0xefcdab89 ^ (__u32) current;
tmp[2] = 0x98badcfe ^ preempt_count();
#endif

is it needed?

On Wed, 8 Dec 2004 20:57:05 -0500, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 08, 2004 at 01:56:14PM -0800, Matt Mackall wrote:
> >
> > Ted, I think this is a bit more straightforward than your patch, and
> > safer as it protects get_random_bytes() and internal extract_entropy()
> > users. And I'd be leery of your get_cpu() trick due to preempt
> > issues.
> >
>
> I'm concerned that turning off interrupts during even a single SHA-1
> transform will put us above the radar with respect to the preempt
> latency statistics again. We could use a separate spinlock that only
> pretects the mix_ptr and mixing access to the pool, so we're at least
> not disabling interrupts, but we still are holding a spinlock across a
> cryptographic operation.
>
> So I've come up with another trick which I think avoids needing to add
> additional locking altogether. What we do is we diddle the initial
> HASH input values with the following values: initial the processor ID,
> the current task pointer, and preempt_count(). On an UP system with
> preemption, it won't matter if we get preempted, since on a UP system
> access to the pool is by definition serialized :-). On a SMP system
> with preemption, while we could theoretically get preempted away and
> then scheduled on another CPU, just in time for another process to
> call extract_entropy(), the task identifier is enough to guarantee a
> unique starting point. The reason for adding preempt_count() is so we
> can deal with the case where a process gets interrupted, and the
> bottom half handler calls get_random_bytes(), and at the same time
> said process gets preempted away to another CPU(). I think this
> covers all of the cases.....
>
> Yeah, it would be simper to reason about things if we were to just put
> it under the spinlock, but everyone seems tp be on a reduce latency at
> all costs kick as of late. :-)
>
> Comments?
>
> - Ted
>
> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
>
> ===== drivers/char/random.c 1.60 vs edited =====
> --- 1.60/drivers/char/random.c 2004-11-18 17:23:14 -05:00
> +++ edited/drivers/char/random.c 2004-12-08 20:51:18 -05:00
> @@ -1402,10 +1402,19 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct en
> sec_random_state->entropy_count);
> }
>
> - /* Hash the pool to get the output */
> - tmp[0] = 0x67452301;
> - tmp[1] = 0xefcdab89;
> - tmp[2] = 0x98badcfe;
> + /*
> + * Hash the pool to get the output.
> + *
> + * We diddle the initial inputs so that if two
> + * processors are executing extract_entropy
> + * concurrently, they will get different results.
> + * Even if we get preempted and moved to another CPU,
> + * the combination of initial CPU, task pointer, and
> + * preempt count is good enough to avoid duplication.
> + */
> + tmp[0] = 0x67452301 ^ smp_processor_id();
> + tmp[1] = 0xefcdab89 ^ (__u32) current;
> + tmp[2] = 0x98badcfe ^ preempt_count();
> tmp[3] = 0x10325476;
> #ifdef USE_SHA
> tmp[4] = 0xc3d2e1f0;
>
>
> -
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--
Yours andyliu