From: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
To: "Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro" <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@wirex.com,
narahimi@us.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Enhanced Trusted Path Execution (TPE) Linux Security Module
Date: Wed, 5 Jan 2005 21:26:29 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050105212629.K469@build.pdx.osdl.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1104979908.8060.34.camel@localhost.localdomain>; from lorenzo@gnu.org on Thu, Jan 06, 2005 at 03:51:48AM +0100
* Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro (lorenzo@gnu.org) wrote:
> This patch adds support for an enhanced Trusted Path Execution (TPE)
> subsystem relying in the Linux Security Modules framework.
> It's a rewrite of the IBM's TPE LSM module by Niki A. Rahimi, which
> adds a couple of improvements and feature enhancements.
Thanks for taking interest and working on this.
> The most notable of them are support for per-gid basis access control
> lists in runtime and kernel-configuration time (adds support for trusted
> and untrusted user groups), procfs interface for statistics and runtime
> information and debugging capabilities (for limiting the garbage
> messages).
How does per-gid help in this case (esp. the desktop scenario you
mentioned)? And the /proc/tpe file might as well go under sysfs with
the rest of the other entries instead of cluttering /proc.
> The reasons that give sense for including this, are that standard
> Vanilla kernels have SELinux and LSM (SELinux already supports TPE
> functionalities), but SELinux has less possibilities of being used by
> those desktop or just not experienced users who are not already using
> their distribution-specific SELinux implementation, even if they want
> simple protections for their every-day system use, also, the
> availability of some patch-sets with security enhancements (like
> grsecurity) distracts users of being using the LSM framework or even
> SELinux itself, in addition, this TPE has more features than
> grsecurity's one in terms of per-users and groups acl basis, which make
> easy the management of the TPE protection.
> In short, after a first review you can see that it could worthy to
> include this in the kernel sources.
The two biggest issues are 1) it's trivial to bypass:
$ /lib/ld.so /untrusted/path/to/program
and 2) that there's no (visible/vocal) user base calling for the feature.
So working those issues will help make a better case for mainline
inclusion.
thanks,
-chris
--
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-01-06 5:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-01-06 2:51 [PATCH] Enhanced Trusted Path Execution (TPE) Linux Security Module Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
2005-01-06 5:26 ` Chris Wright [this message]
2005-01-06 14:50 ` Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
2005-01-06 18:00 ` Felipe Alfaro Solana
2005-01-06 18:04 ` Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
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