From: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
To: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
akpm@osdl.org, torvalds@osdl.org, marcelo.tosatti@cyclades.com,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: security contact draft
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 14:02:05 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050113140205.C24171@build.pdx.osdl.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1105647058.4624.134.camel@localhost.localdomain>; from alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk on Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 08:10:58PM +0000
* Alan Cox (alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk) wrote:
> On Iau, 2005-01-13 at 20:55, Chris Wright wrote:
> > To keep the conversation concrete, here's a pretty rough stab at
> > documenting the policy.
>
> It's not documenting the stuff Linus seems to be talking about which is
> a public list ? Or does Linus want both ?
I got the impression that Linus was in favor of the private one,
despite his own leanings to absolute openness. I think a public one
(lkml notwithstanding) would be great for advisory announcements.
> > It is preferred that mail sent to the security contact is encrypted
> > with $PUBKEY.
>
> https:// and bugs.kernel.org ? You can make bugzilla autoprivate
> security bugs and alert people.
Yeah, I had thought about that too. Not a real bugzilla fan, but I'm
not tied to any particular method here.
> > well-tested or for vendor coordination. However, we expect these delays
> > to be short, measurable in days, not weeks or months. As a basic default
> > policy, we expect report to disclosure to be on the order of $NUMDAYS.
>
> Sounds good. $NUMDAYS is going to require some debate. My gut feeling is
> 14 days is probably the right kind of target for hard stuff remembering
> how long it takes to run QA on an enterprise grade kernel. If it gets
> too short then vendors are going to disclose elsewhere for their own
> findings and only to this list when they are all ready anyway which
> takes us back to square one.
>
> And many are probably a lot less - those nobody is going to rush out and
> build new vendor kernels for, or those that prove to be non serious can
> probably get bumped to the public list by the security officer within a
> day or two.
Yup, I think the severity and ease of exploit are part of the discussion
around disclosure timeframe.
thanks,
-chris
--
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-01-14 0:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-01-13 20:55 security contact draft Chris Wright
2005-01-13 20:10 ` Alan Cox
2005-01-13 21:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-13 19:28 ` Marcelo Tosatti
2005-01-13 22:02 ` Chris Wright [this message]
2005-01-13 21:43 ` Florian Weimer
2005-01-13 22:12 ` Chris Wright
2005-01-15 0:33 ` Alan Cox
2005-01-15 2:43 ` Chris Wright
2005-01-15 4:00 ` Alan Cox
2005-01-18 0:24 ` security contact draft2 (was Re: security contact draft) Chris Wright
2005-01-18 17:39 ` Horst von Brand
2005-02-03 14:28 ` security contact draft Patrick Plattes
2005-02-03 18:08 ` Chris Wright
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