From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@osdl.org, torvalds@osdl.org
Subject: Re: Patch 2/6 introduce helper infrastructure
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 10:12:28 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050127101228.GC9760@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050127101117.GA9760@infradead.org>
The patch below introduces get_random_int() and randomize_range(), two
helpers used in later patches in the series. get_random_int() shares the
tcp/ip random number stuff so the CONFIG_INET ifdef needs to move slightly,
and to reduce the damange due to that, secure_ip_id() needs to move inside
random.c
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
diff -purN step1/drivers/char/random.c step2/drivers/char/random.c
--- step1/drivers/char/random.c 2005-01-26 18:24:36.000000000 +0100
+++ step2/drivers/char/random.c 2005-01-27 11:03:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -1965,7 +1965,6 @@ static void sysctl_init_random(struct en
*
********************************************************************/
-#ifdef CONFIG_INET
/*
* TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
* generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
@@ -2202,6 +2201,31 @@ __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32
EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
#endif
+/* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
+ * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>.
+ */
+__u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr)
+{
+ struct keydata *keyptr;
+ __u32 hash[4];
+
+ keyptr = get_keyptr();
+
+ /*
+ * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
+ * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
+ * which is then hashed with random data.
+ */
+ hash[0] = daddr;
+ hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
+ hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
+ hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+
+ return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INET
+
__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
__u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{
@@ -2242,28 +2266,7 @@ __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 s
EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcp_sequence_number);
-/* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
- * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>.
- */
-__u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr;
- __u32 hash[4];
-
- keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
- /*
- * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
- * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
- * which is then hashed with random data.
- */
- hash[0] = daddr;
- hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
- hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
- return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
-}
/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral TCP port search */
u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport)
@@ -2383,3 +2386,41 @@ __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie,
}
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
+
+
+/*
+ * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but with the goal
+ * of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random value is not cryptographically
+ * secure but for several uses the cost of depleting entropy is too high
+ */
+unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+{
+ static unsigned int val = 0;
+
+ val += current->pid + jiffies;
+
+ /*
+ * Use IP's RNG. It suits our purpose perfectly: it re-keys itself
+ * every second, from the entropy pool (and thus creates a limited
+ * drain on it), and uses halfMD4Transform within the second. We
+ * also mix it with jiffies and the PID:
+ */
+ return secure_ip_id(val);
+}
+
+/*
+ * randomize_range() returns a start address such that
+ *
+ * [...... <range> .....]
+ * start end
+ *
+ * a <range> with size "len" starting at the return value is inside in the
+ * area defined by [start, end], but is otherwise randomized.
+ */
+unsigned long randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
+{
+ unsigned long range = end - len - start;
+ if (end <= start + len)
+ return 0;
+ return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
+}
diff -purN step1/include/linux/random.h step2/include/linux/random.h
--- step1/include/linux/random.h 2005-01-26 18:24:39.000000000 +0100
+++ step2/include/linux/random.h 2005-01-27 10:52:56.000000000 +0100
@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_numbe
extern struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
#endif
+unsigned int get_random_int(void);
+unsigned long randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len);
+
#endif /* __KERNEL___ */
#endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-01-27 10:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-01-27 10:11 Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:12 ` Patch 1/6 introduce sysctl Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:36 ` Andi Kleen
2005-01-27 11:13 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 18:16 ` Pavel Machek
2005-01-27 19:11 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-27 19:46 ` Dave Jones
2005-01-27 19:53 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-27 19:53 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-02-04 21:27 ` Benoit Boissinot
2005-01-27 10:12 ` Arjan van de Ven [this message]
2005-01-27 10:41 ` Patch 2/6 introduce helper infrastructure Andi Kleen
2005-01-27 11:58 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 12:27 ` Andi Kleen
2005-01-27 12:43 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-02-01 21:14 ` Matt Mackall
2005-01-27 10:12 ` Patch 3/6 per process flag Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:13 ` Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:21 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 17:38 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 17:47 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 18:04 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 18:09 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 18:12 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 18:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 18:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 18:55 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 18:49 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 19:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 19:48 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 19:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 20:04 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:08 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 19:19 ` linux-os
2005-01-27 19:52 ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 20:02 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:13 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 21:33 ` jnf
2005-01-28 17:22 ` Paulo Marques
2005-01-28 17:51 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-28 18:42 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-29 6:04 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 20:37 ` linux-os
2005-01-27 20:45 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 21:39 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 21:53 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 22:34 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 2:50 ` Rik van Riel
2005-01-29 6:31 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 8:10 ` Arjan van de Ven
[not found] ` <41FBB821.3000403@comcast.net>
2005-01-29 16:42 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-29 16:59 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 16:46 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-29 17:04 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 17:37 ` Jakub Jelinek
2005-01-29 17:49 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 17:55 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-29 18:10 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 18:12 ` Rik van Riel
2005-01-29 18:16 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-29 7:46 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 18:40 ` Felipe Alfaro Solana
2005-01-27 22:31 ` Jirka Kosina
2005-01-28 5:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-28 19:02 ` David Lang
2005-01-28 7:33 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 19:43 ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-28 0:10 ` H. Peter Anvin
2005-01-28 0:23 ` Roland Dreier
2005-01-28 1:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2005-01-28 2:03 ` Horst von Brand
2005-01-28 8:45 ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 20:23 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 20:27 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:32 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 20:35 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:40 ` Rik van Riel
2005-01-27 20:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 20:56 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 21:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 10:13 ` Patch 5/6 randomize mmap addresses Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:14 ` Patch 6/6 default enable randomisation for -mm Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 11:45 ` Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 11:57 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 17:42 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 19:34 ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 19:57 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 20:13 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-28 8:45 ` David Weinehall
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