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From: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: claim block dev in file struct rather than inode struct, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (3/8)
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2005 11:24:50 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050208172450.GA3598@halcrow.us> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050207142603.A469@build.pdx.osdl.net>

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On Mon, Feb 07, 2005 at 02:26:03PM -0800, Chris Wright wrote:
> * Michael Halcrow (mhalcrow@us.ibm.com) wrote:
> > This is the third in a series of eight patches to the BSD Secure
> > Levels LSM.  It moves the claim on the block device from the inode
> > struct to the file struct in order to address a potential
> > circumvention of the control via hard links to block devices.  Thanks
> > to Serge Hallyn for pointing this out.
> 
> Hard links still point to same inode, what's the issue that this
> addresses?

Actually, it turns out that hard links have nothing to do with the
vulnerability that this patch addresses:

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main()
{
        int fd1, fd2;
        int rc;
        fd1 = open( "/dev/device", O_RDONLY );
        fd2 = open( "/dev/device", O_RDWR );
        close(fd1);
        getchar();
        rc = write( fd2, "0", 1 );
        printf( "write result: [%d]\n", rc );
        close( fd2 );
        return 0;
}

While the program is waiting for a keystroke, mount the block device.
Enter a keystroke.  The result without the patch is 1, which is a
security violation.  This occurs because the bd_release function will
bd_release(bdev) and set inode->i_security to NULL on the close(fd1).
Hence, we want to place the control at the level of the file struct,
not the inode.

Mike
.___________________________________________________________________.
                         Michael A. Halcrow                          
       Security Software Engineer, IBM Linux Technology Center       
GnuPG Fingerprint: 05B5 08A8 713A 64C1 D35D  2371 2D3C FDDA 3EB6 601D

The hokey pokey... What if that's really what it's all about? 

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-02-08 17:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-02-07 19:21 [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (1/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:30 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: suid/sgid on directories; open/mknod issue, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (2/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:31 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: claim block dev in file struct rather than inode struct, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (3/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 22:26   ` Chris Wright
2005-02-07 22:41     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08  1:48       ` David Wagner
2005-02-08  2:10         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08  2:20           ` Chris Wright
2005-02-08  3:15             ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 14:33           ` David Wagner
2005-02-07 22:42     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 17:24     ` Michael Halcrow [this message]
2005-02-08 17:47       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 20:08         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2005-02-08 23:38       ` Chris Wright
2005-02-07 19:32 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (4/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:34 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on process if root, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (5/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:35 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: nits, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (6/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-08 23:43   ` Chris Wright
2005-02-07 19:36 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: comment cleanups, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (7/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:37 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: remove ptrace, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (8/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-10 21:59 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (1/8) Matt Mackall

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