public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jan Niehusmann <jan@gondor.com>
To: Linux Kernel Mailinglist <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume
Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 16:18:28 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050411141828.GA26924@gondor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050410201455.GA21568@elf.ucw.cz>

> Andreas is right, his patches are needed.
> 
> Currently, if your laptop is stolen after resume, they can still data
> in swsusp image.

Which shows that swsusp is a security risk if you have sensitive data in
RAM. A thief stealing a running computer can get access to memory
contents much more easy if he can just suspend the system and then
recover all the memory contents from disk. Encrypted swsusp wouldn't
help here if the key is stored on the disk as well.

(This is probably not a real risk in most applications, but one should
keep it in mind and disable swsusp if necessary)

Jan


  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-04-11 14:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-04-10 13:13 [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume Andreas Steinmetz
2005-04-10 18:40 ` Oliver Neukum
2005-04-10 19:29   ` Andreas Steinmetz
2005-04-10 20:03     ` Oliver Neukum
2005-04-10 20:14       ` Pavel Machek
2005-04-11  3:23         ` Elladan
2005-04-11 10:14           ` Pavel Machek
2005-04-11  7:13         ` Stefan Seyfried
2005-04-11 10:37         ` Oliver Neukum
2005-04-11 16:39           ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2005-04-11 17:02             ` Andreas Steinmetz
2005-04-11 21:27               ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2005-04-12 10:08                 ` Andreas Steinmetz
2005-04-11 14:18         ` Jan Niehusmann [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2005-04-10 15:03 Pavel Machek
2005-04-10 15:15 ` [PATCH] " Andreas Steinmetz
2005-04-10 18:18   ` Pavel Machek
2005-04-10 18:45     ` Oliver Neukum
2005-04-10 18:56       ` Pavel Machek
2005-04-10 19:33     ` Andreas Steinmetz

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20050411141828.GA26924@gondor.com \
    --to=jan@gondor.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox