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From: Tony Jones <tonyj@immunix.com>
To: serue@us.ibm.com
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro
Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2005 22:07:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050730050701.GA22901@immunix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050727181732.GA22483@serge.austin.ibm.com>

On Wed, Jul 27, 2005 at 01:17:32PM -0500, serue@us.ibm.com wrote:

Hi Serge.

A few trivial things I noticed whilst writing some internal documentation
on Stacker.  Nothing deep here, but thought I'd pass them along.

I'll try to actually try out the code next week.

I made these notes as I was going along,  lmk if you need them annotated
to the original patch and I'll go back and redo.

Thanks again

Tony


1) Documentation refers to /security/stacker/list_modules,  code refers to
   "listmodules".  list_modules is more consistent with other file names.

2) symbol_get(ops) still at the end of stacker_register.

3) struct module_entry{
        struct list_head lsm_list;  /* list of active lsms */
        struct list_head all_lsms;  /* list of active lsms */

   fix comments

4) Would it be useful to change the struct elements lsm_list and all_lsms to
   be consistent with their list heads (stacked_modules and all_modules).

5) /*
 * Workarounds for the fact that get and setprocattr are used only by
 * selinux.  (Maybe)
 */

No complaints on selinux getting to avoid the (module), they are intree.
Just a FYI that SubDomain/AppArmor uses these hooks also.

6) stop_responding control file is misnamed, as stacker still continues to work
   it just removes the virtual file system

7) Does the lsm_list really need to be at the top of the struct?  Good style
but not sure it is required (must).

8) security-stack.h
 * If stacker is compiled in, then we use the full functions as
 * defined in security/security.c.  Otherwise we use the #defines
 * here.

I noticed the conditional CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKER code went away, previously
it would look at the value chain head only for the !case. But this comment
still remains.

> Hi,
> 
> The set of patches to follow introduces support for stacking LSMs.  This
> is its third posting to lkml.  I am sending it out in the hopes of
> soliciting more widespread feedback and testing, with the obvious eventual
> goal of mainline adoption.
> 
> Any feedback from people actually using this patch is appreciated.  Even
> better would be posts of (stackable) LSMs for upstream inclusion :)

  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-07-30  5:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-07-27 18:17 [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-27 18:19 ` [patch 1/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce securityfs serue
2005-07-27 18:20   ` [patch 2/15] lsm stacking v0.3: add module * to security_ops serue
2005-07-27 18:21   ` [patch 3/15] lsm stacking v0.3: don't default to dummy_##hook serue
2005-07-27 18:23   ` [patch 4/15] lsm stacking v0.3: swith ->security to hlist serue
2005-07-27 18:24   ` [patch 5/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:24   ` [patch 6/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacker documentation serue
2005-07-27 18:24   ` [patch 7/15] lsm stacking v0.3: actual stacker module serue
2005-07-27 18:25   ` [patch 8/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stackable capabilities lsm serue
2005-07-27 18:26   ` [patch 9/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: update ->security structs serue
2005-07-27 18:26   ` [patch 10/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: use security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:27   ` [patch 11/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: remove secondary support serue
2005-07-27 18:27   ` [patch 12/15] lsm stacking v0.3: hook completeness verification script serue
2005-07-27 18:28   ` [patch 13/15] lsm stacking v0.3: seclvl: update for stacking serue
2005-07-27 18:28   ` [patch 14/15] lsm stacking v0.3: fix security_{del,unlink}_value race serue
2005-07-27 18:28   ` [patch 15/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacking for digsig serue
2005-07-27 19:34 ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro James Morris
2005-07-27 19:37   ` James Morris
2005-08-03 16:45     ` [PATCH] Stacker - single-use static slots serue
2005-08-03 17:57       ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 19:27         ` serue
2005-08-03 19:45           ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 20:31             ` serge
2005-08-05 15:55       ` James Morris
2005-08-05 17:27         ` serue
2005-08-05 17:34           ` serue
2005-08-10 14:45         ` serue
2005-08-11  7:42           ` James Morris
2005-08-11 21:22             ` serue
2005-08-11 23:02               ` James Morris
2005-07-27 19:54   ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-30  5:07 ` Tony Jones [this message]
2005-07-30 19:02   ` serge
2005-07-30 20:18     ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31  3:22       ` Steve Beattie
2005-07-31  3:44         ` serge
2005-07-31  4:13           ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31 13:37             ` serge
2005-07-31  3:53       ` serge

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