Re: capabilities patch (v 0.1)

[Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>]

* Bodo Eggert (7eggert@gmx.de) wrote:
> 1) I wouldn't want an exploited service to gain any privileges, even by
>    chaining userspace exploits (e.g. exec sendmail < exploitstring).  For
>    most services, I'd like CAP_EXEC being unset (but it doesn't exist).

Don't let it exec things it shouldn't.  This can be done with namespaces
or for finer-grained, that is what smth like SELinux is made for.

> 2) There are environments (linux-vserver.org) which limit root to a subset
>    of capabilities. I think they might use that feature, too. Off cause a
>    simple "suid bit" == "all capabilities" scheme won't work there.

IIRC, they effectively use the bounded set as per-context.  So it'd not
make any difference there.

thanks,
-chris