From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>, Kurt Garloff <garloff@suse.de>,
linux-security-module@wirex.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] Rework stubs in security.h
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 11:11:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050826181130.GA2747@immunix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1125079256.8692.65.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
On Fri, Aug 26, 2005 at 02:00:56PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>
> That makes capability part of the core kernel again, just like DAC,
> which means that you can never override a capability denial in your
> module. We sometimes want to override the capability implementation,
> not just apply further restrictions after it. cap_inode_setxattr and
> cap_inode_removexattr are examples; they prohibit any access to _all_
Right, the rationale behind cap_stack.c. Good point. I'd forgotten that.
I guess selective internal composition is the way to go.
Tony
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-08-26 18:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-08-25 1:20 [PATCH 0/5] LSM hook updates Chris Wright
2005-08-25 1:20 ` [PATCH 1/5] Use capabilities as default w/ and w/out CONFIG_SECURITY Chris Wright
2005-08-25 1:20 ` [PATCH 2/5] Rework stubs in security.h Chris Wright
2005-08-26 17:31 ` Tony Jones
2005-08-26 17:59 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-26 18:03 ` Tony Jones
2005-08-26 18:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-08-26 18:08 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-26 18:11 ` Tony Jones [this message]
2005-08-25 1:20 ` [PATCH 3/5] Call security hooks conditionally if the security_op is filled out Chris Wright
2005-08-25 8:50 ` Kurt Garloff
2005-08-25 16:24 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-25 1:20 ` [PATCH 4/5] Remove unnecessary default capability callbacks Chris Wright
2005-08-25 1:20 ` [PATCH 5/5] Remove unnecesary capability hooks in rootplug Chris Wright
2005-08-25 14:38 ` serue
2005-08-25 15:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-08-25 16:21 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-25 16:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-08-25 17:06 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-25 21:13 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-25 16:28 ` serue
2005-08-25 21:12 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-31 6:34 ` Greg KH
2005-08-31 15:09 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-25 4:39 ` [PATCH 0/5] LSM hook updates James Morris
2005-08-25 5:32 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-25 19:15 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-26 9:23 ` serue
2005-08-26 13:27 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-08-26 10:30 ` serue
2005-08-26 16:41 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-26 17:35 ` serue
2005-08-26 17:49 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-25 9:52 ` serue
2005-08-25 10:18 ` serue
2005-08-25 16:19 ` Chris Wright
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