public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, cpushare-devel@cpushare.com
Subject: [patch] i386 seccomp fix for auditing/ptrace
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 05:54:32 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050905035432.GG17185@g5.random> (raw)

Hello,

This is the same issue as ppc64 before, when returning to userland we
shouldn't re-compute the seccomp check or the task could be killed
during sigreturn when orig_eax is overwritten by the sigreturn syscall.
This was found by Roland.

This was harmless from a security standpoint, but some i686 users
reported failures with auditing enabled system wide (some distro
surprisingly makes it the default) and I reproduced it too by keeping
the whole workload under strace -f.

Patch is tested and works for me under strace -f.

nobody@athlon:~/cpushare> strace -o /tmp/o -f python seccomp_test.py
make: Nothing to be done for `seccomp_test'.
Starting computing some malicious bytecode
init
load
start
stop
receive_data failure
kill
exit_code 0 signal 9
The malicious bytecode has been killed successfully by seccomp
Starting computing some safe bytecode
init
load
start
stop
174 counts
kill
exit_code 0 signal 0
The seccomp_test.py completed successfully, thank you for testing.

Thanks.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>

diff -r 1df7bfbb783f arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Sep  2 09:01:35 2005
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c	Mon Sep  5 05:30:49 2005
@@ -680,8 +680,9 @@
 __attribute__((regparm(3)))
 void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
 {
-	/* do the secure computing check first */
-	secure_computing(regs->orig_eax);
+	if (!entryexit)
+		/* do the secure computing check first */
+		secure_computing(regs->orig_eax);
 
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && entryexit)
 		audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax), regs->eax);

                 reply	other threads:[~2005-09-05  3:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20050905035432.GG17185@g5.random \
    --to=andrea@cpushare.com \
    --cc=akpm@osdl.org \
    --cc=cpushare-devel@cpushare.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=roland@redhat.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox