From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1750903AbWDYEZt (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2006 00:25:49 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751208AbWDYEZt (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2006 00:25:49 -0400 Received: from web36603.mail.mud.yahoo.com ([209.191.85.20]:36730 "HELO web36603.mail.mud.yahoo.com") by vger.kernel.org with SMTP id S1750926AbWDYEZs (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2006 00:25:48 -0400 Message-ID: <20060425042542.53414.qmail@web36603.mail.mud.yahoo.com> X-RocketYMMF: rancidfat Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 21:25:42 -0700 (PDT) From: Casey Schaufler Reply-To: casey@schaufler-ca.com Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview To: Stephen Smalley , "Theodore Ts'o" Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <1145912876.14804.91.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --- Stephen Smalley wrote: > Seems like a strawman. We aren't claiming that > SELinux is perfect, and > there is plenty of work ongoing on SELinux > usability. But a > fundamentally unsound mechanism is more dangerous > than one that is never > enabled; at least in the latter case, one knows > where one stands. It is > the illusory sense of security that accompanies > path-based access > control that is dangerous. I suggest that this logic be applied to the "strict policy", "targeted policy", and "user written policy" presentations of SELinux. You never know what the policy might be. Casey Schaufler casey@schaufler-ca.com