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From: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Subject: [2.6 patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2006 21:21:21 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060629192121.GC19712@stusta.de> (raw)

From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

I was profiling the scheduler on x86 and noticed some overhead related 
to SECCOMP, and indeed, SECCOMP runs disable_tsc() at _every_ 
context-switch:

        if (unlikely(prev->io_bitmap_ptr || next->io_bitmap_ptr))
                handle_io_bitmap(next, tss);

        disable_tsc(prev_p, next_p);

        return prev_p;

these are a couple of instructions in the hottest scheduler codepath!

x86_64 already removed disable_tsc() from switch_to(), but i think the 
right solution is to turn SECCOMP off by default.

besides the runtime overhead, there are a couple of other reasons as 
well why this should be done:

 - CONFIG_SECCOMP=y adds 836 bytes of bloat to the kernel:

       text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
    4185360  867112  391012 5443484  530f9c vmlinux-noseccomp
    4185992  867316  391012 5444320  5312e0 vmlinux-seccomp

 - virtually nobody seems to be using it (but cpushare.com, which seems
   pretty inactive)

 - users/distributions can still turn it on if they want it

 - http://www.cpushare.com/legal seems to suggest that it is pursuing a
   software patent to utilize the seccomp concept in a distributed 
   environment, and seems to give a promise that 'end users' will not be
   affected by that patent. How about non-end-users [i.e. server-side]?
   Has the Linux kernel become a vehicle for a propriety server-side
   feature, with every Linux user paying the price of it?

so the patch below just does the minimal common-sense change: turn it 
off by default.

Adrian Bunk:
I've removed the superfluous "default n"'s the original patch introduced.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

----

This patch was already sent on:
- 26 Jun 2006
- 27 Apr 2006
- 19 Apr 2006
- 11 Apr 2006
- 10 Mar 2006
- 29 Jan 2006
- 21 Jan 2006

This patch was sent by Ingo Molnar on:
- 9 Jan 2006

Index: linux/arch/i386/Kconfig
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/arch/i386/Kconfig
+++ linux/arch/i386/Kconfig
@@ -637,7 +637,6 @@ config REGPARM
 config SECCOMP
 	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 	depends on PROC_FS
-	default y
 	help
 	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
 	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
Index: linux/arch/mips/Kconfig
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ linux/arch/mips/Kconfig
@@ -1787,7 +1787,6 @@ config BINFMT_ELF32
 config SECCOMP
 	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 	depends on PROC_FS && BROKEN
-	default y
 	help
 	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
 	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
Index: linux/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ linux/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -666,7 +666,6 @@ endif
 config SECCOMP
 	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 	depends on PROC_FS
-	default y
 	help
 	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
 	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
Index: linux/arch/ppc/Kconfig
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/arch/ppc/Kconfig
+++ linux/arch/ppc/Kconfig
@@ -1127,7 +1127,6 @@ endif
 config SECCOMP
 	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 	depends on PROC_FS
-	default y
 	help
 	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
 	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
Index: linux/arch/sparc64/Kconfig
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/arch/sparc64/Kconfig
+++ linux/arch/sparc64/Kconfig
@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ endchoice
 config SECCOMP
 	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 	depends on PROC_FS
-	default y
 	help
 	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
 	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
Index: linux/arch/x86_64/Kconfig
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/arch/x86_64/Kconfig
+++ linux/arch/x86_64/Kconfig
@@ -466,7 +466,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START
 config SECCOMP
 	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 	depends on PROC_FS
-	default y
 	help
 	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
 	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their


             reply	other threads:[~2006-06-29 19:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-06-29 19:21 Adrian Bunk [this message]
2006-06-30  0:44 ` [2.6 patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n Lee Revell
2006-06-30  1:07   ` Andrew Morton
2006-06-30  1:40     ` Adrian Bunk
2006-06-30  4:52       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-06-30  9:47         ` Ingo Molnar
2006-06-30 14:58           ` andrea
2006-07-11  7:36             ` [patch] " Ingo Molnar
2006-07-11 14:17               ` andrea
2006-07-11 14:32                 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 15:31                   ` andrea
2006-07-11 15:54                     ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 16:13                       ` andrea
2006-07-11 16:23                         ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 16:57                         ` Alan Cox
2006-07-11 16:25                       ` Alan Cox
2006-07-11 16:02                     ` Adrian Bunk
2006-07-11 16:16                       ` andrea
2006-07-11 16:24                     ` Alan Cox
2006-07-12 15:43                       ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 21:07                         ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:06                           ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 22:19                             ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:33                               ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 22:49                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13  3:16                               ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13 11:23                                 ` Jeff Dike
2006-07-13 11:35                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13  3:04                             ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13  3:12                               ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13  4:40                                 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13  4:51                                   ` andrea
2006-07-13  5:12                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13  6:22                                     ` andrea
2006-07-13  1:51                           ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-13  2:00                             ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13  7:44                             ` James Bruce
2006-07-13  8:34                               ` andrea
2006-07-13  9:18                                 ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-14  6:09                                   ` [PATCH] TIF_NOTSC and SECCOMP prctl andrea
2006-07-14  6:27                                     ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-14  6:33                                       ` andrea
2006-07-13 12:13                             ` [patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 21:22                         ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:11                           ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-11 15:54                 ` Pavel Machek
2006-06-30 12:39       ` [2.6 patch] " Alan Cox
2006-06-30  2:35     ` Randy.Dunlap
2006-06-30 15:03       ` Lee Revell
2006-07-08  9:23         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-11  1:59           ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-11  4:16             ` andrea
2006-07-11 20:19               ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-12 21:05                 ` andrea
2006-07-12 22:02                   ` Alan Cox
2006-07-12 23:44                     ` andrea
2006-07-13 21:29                       ` Pavel Machek
2006-07-13 23:11                         ` andrea
2006-07-13 23:20                           ` Pavel Machek
2006-07-14  0:34                             ` andrea
2006-07-15  2:55                           ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-07-16  0:51                             ` andrea
2006-07-16  1:54                               ` Pavel Machek
2006-07-16 15:36                                 ` andrea
2006-07-13  2:56                     ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-12 21:13                 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13  1:16                   ` andrea
2006-07-13  1:37                   ` Andrew James Wade
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-06-26 16:26 Adrian Bunk
2006-04-27 20:33 Adrian Bunk
2006-04-18 22:07 Adrian Bunk

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