From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
To: David Wagner <daw-usenet@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] getsockopt() early argument sanity checking
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2006 12:24:08 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060821082408.GA24442@openwall.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ecb7k6$grh$1@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu>
(I realize that the patch has been rejected and this message is in no
way meant to affect that decision.)
On Mon, Aug 21, 2006 at 03:00:22AM +0000, David Wagner wrote:
> Solar Designer wrote:
> >The patch makes getsockopt(2) sanity-check the value pointed to by
> >the optlen argument early on. This is a security hardening measure
> >intended to prevent exploitation of certain potential vulnerabilities in
> >socket type specific getsockopt() code on UP systems.
>
> This looks broken to me. It has a TOCTTOU (time-of-check-to-time-of-use)
Yes it does, using Matt Bishop's classification.
> vulnerability (i.e., race condition): you read the length value twice,
> and assume that you will get the same value both times. That assumption
> is not valid.
I don't assume that. I realize that there's the race condition on SMP
and, as pointed out by Andi Kleen, in many cases also on UP systems.
That's why I had the XXX comment in there from the very beginning.
This added check is not supposed to be relied upon; rather, it is a
hardening measure in case we miss a bug in underlying *getsockopt()
functions.
> It looks like it will be easy to bypass this check.
It depends. You might have missed this description of a special case
where it does not appear to be possible to bypass the check:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/8/20/148
Yes, the patch is highly controversial and I mostly agree with its
opponents (I had much of the same thoughts myself, except for DaveM's
concern that *optlen might be uninitialized or negative on purpose),
yet I am going to keep it in -ow.
BTW, I had previously submitted a very similar check to do_sysctl(),
also with an XXX comment, which got in a few years back.
I won't be surprised if one of these checks saves a system from a
compromise one day. This world is not perfect - neither the rest of the
Linux kernel code nor vulnerability exploit programs are perfect.
Alexander
P.S. Please CC me on your replies.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-08-21 8:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-08-19 23:05 [PATCH] getsockopt() early argument sanity checking Solar Designer
2006-08-19 23:48 ` Willy Tarreau
2006-08-20 0:05 ` Michael Buesch
2006-08-20 0:43 ` Willy Tarreau
2006-08-20 19:44 ` David Miller
2006-08-20 20:35 ` Willy Tarreau
2006-08-20 21:12 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-08-21 12:09 ` Eugene Teo
2006-08-20 8:34 ` Andi Kleen
2006-08-20 10:15 ` Willy Tarreau
2006-08-20 10:50 ` YOSHIFUJI Hideaki / 吉藤英明
2006-08-20 19:46 ` David Miller
2006-08-20 16:16 ` Solar Designer
2006-08-20 16:30 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-08-20 19:47 ` David Miller
2006-08-20 18:38 ` Andi Kleen
2006-08-20 19:45 ` Solar Designer
2006-08-20 19:45 ` David Miller
2006-08-20 18:15 ` Alan Cox
2006-08-21 3:00 ` David Wagner
2006-08-21 8:24 ` Solar Designer [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-08-20 18:57 Manfred Spraul
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