Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook

Casey Schaufler
2007-05-25T17:43:58Z

--- Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@cmu.edu> wrote:

> Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> writes:
>
> > On Fedora zcat, gzip and gunzip are all links to the same file.
> > I can imagine (although it is a bit of a stretch) allowing a set
> > of users access to gunzip but not gzip (or the other way around).
> > There are probably more sophisticated programs that have different
> > behavior based on the name they're invoked by that would provide
> > a more compelling arguement, assuming of course that you buy into
> > the behavior-based-on-name scheme. What I think I'm suggesting is
> > that AppArmor might be useful in addressing the fact that a file
> > with multiple hard links is necessarily constrained to have the
> > same access control on each of those names. That assumes one
> > believes that such behavior is flawwed, and I'm not going to try
> > to argue that. The question was about an example, and there is one.
>
> This doesn't work. The behavior depends on argv[0], which is not
> necessarily the same as the name of the file.

Sorry, but I don't understand your objection. If AppArmor is configured
to allow everyone access to /bin/gzip but only some people access to
/bin/gunzip and (important detail) the single binary uses argv[0]
as documented and (another important detail) there aren't other links
named gunzip to the binary (ok, that's lots of if's) you should be fine.
I suppose you could make a shell that lies to exec, but the AppArmor
code could certainly check for that in exec by enforcing the argv[0]
convention. It would be perfectly reasonable for a system that is so
dependent on pathnames to require that.

Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com