From: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
To: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Syslets, signals, and security
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2007 15:13:49 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20070604191349.GA8903@c2.user-mode-linux.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20070604174542.GD29201@mami.zabbo.net>
On Mon, Jun 04, 2007 at 10:45:42AM -0700, Zach Brown wrote:
> > Second, security. What happens if a well-written server starts life
> > as root, does some (async) I/O, and setuids to a non-root uid? There
> > will be a bunch of async threads still running as root, with the
> > result that async operations (and the main thread) will more than
> > occassionally regain root privs.
> One can imagine all sorts of crazy schemes which let us only shoot down
> waiting async threads which were cloned before state in the submitting
> task_struct was changed. Maybe we could swallow increasing a counter in
> task_struct each time we change one of these sensitive fields (fsuid,
> etc), but I bet the maintenance burden of anything more fine grained
> than that would get pretty excessive.
How about splitting the credentials out of the task_struct and making
them sharable ala ->mm et al? You change uid there and it changes for
everyone. It will make fork slightly more expensive though.
> Yeah, and I'm blissfully ignorant of ptrace. Imagine me skipping
> through a field of daisies with some ptrace wolves hiding in the bushes
> at the edge of the meadow. La la la.
Heh, I'm somewhat less ignorant of ptrace, so I'll see if I can help
out there.
> Each execution context having its own task struct is intentional, very
> much so. Remember, this started with the fibrils patch series which
> indeed shared a single task struct amongst a set of running stacks and
> thread infos, etc. This approach is invasive because it changes the
> sleeping entity in the scheduler from a task struct to some new
> construct which has a many to one mapping to the task struct. It
> touches vast amounts of code. This approach is also risky because it
> introduces concurrent access to the task struct. That's a pretty big
> auditing burden.
Yeah, I realize that, but have no idea how much code that requires
looking at.
> Have you looked at how the fibrils stuff did it? It's a lot more work
> than it seems like it should be, on first glance. You start to modify
> things and every few days you trip across another fundamental kernel
> construct which needs to be modified :/.
>
> http://lwn.net/Articles/219954/
Ah, I somehow missed this. Since you seem to have explored that area
of the solution space already and found it wanting, I agree that it
makes sense to see if syslets can be made to work.
Jeff
--
Work email - jdike at linux dot intel dot com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-06-04 19:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-06-04 16:31 Syslets, signals, and security Jeff Dike
2007-06-04 17:16 ` Ulrich Drepper
2007-06-04 17:45 ` Zach Brown
2007-06-04 19:13 ` Jeff Dike [this message]
2007-06-04 20:57 ` Andi Kleen
2007-06-04 22:44 ` Alan Cox
2007-06-05 11:11 ` Andi Kleen
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