[patch 00/26] 2.6.21.7 -stable review

[patch 00/26] 2.6.21.7 -stable review

[Greg KH]

Very sorry for the long delay in getting these out, it should be the
last 2.6.21-stable release, unless there are some patches that people
point out to us that deserve a new .21.y release.

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.21.7 release.
There are 26 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to
this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let
us know.  If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants
to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.

These patches are sent out with a number of different people on the
Cc: line.  If you wish to be a reviewer, please email stable@kernel.org
to add your name to the list.  If you want to be off the reviewer list,
also email us.

Responses should be made by August 2, 2007, 00:00:00 UTC.  Anything
received after that time might be too late.

thanks,

the -stable release team

[patch 01/26] BNX2: Fix netdev watchdog on 5708.

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: bnx2-fix-netdev-watchdog-on-5708.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2111 bytes --]


-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

There's a bug in the driver that only initializes half of the context
memory on the 5708.  Surprisingly, this works most of the time except
for some occasional netdev watchdogs when sending a lot of 64-byte
packets.  This fix is to add the missing code to initialize the 2nd
half of the context memory.

Update version to 1.5.8.2.

Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 drivers/net/bnx2.c |   25 +++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/net/bnx2.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/net/bnx2.c
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@
 
 #define DRV_MODULE_NAME		"bnx2"
 #define PFX DRV_MODULE_NAME	": "
-#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION	"1.5.8.1"
-#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE	"May 7, 2007"
+#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION	"1.5.8.2"
+#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE	"June 5, 2007"
 
 #define RUN_AT(x) (jiffies + (x))
 
@@ -1550,6 +1550,7 @@ bnx2_init_context(struct bnx2 *bp)
 	vcid = 96;
 	while (vcid) {
 		u32 vcid_addr, pcid_addr, offset;
+		int i;
 
 		vcid--;
 
@@ -1570,16 +1571,20 @@ bnx2_init_context(struct bnx2 *bp)
 			pcid_addr = vcid_addr;
 		}
 
-		REG_WR(bp, BNX2_CTX_VIRT_ADDR, 0x00);
-		REG_WR(bp, BNX2_CTX_PAGE_TBL, pcid_addr);
+		for (i = 0; i < (CTX_SIZE / PHY_CTX_SIZE); i++) {
+			vcid_addr += (i << PHY_CTX_SHIFT);
+			pcid_addr += (i << PHY_CTX_SHIFT);
+
+			REG_WR(bp, BNX2_CTX_VIRT_ADDR, 0x00);
+			REG_WR(bp, BNX2_CTX_PAGE_TBL, pcid_addr);
+
+			/* Zero out the context. */
+			for (offset = 0; offset < PHY_CTX_SIZE; offset += 4)
+				CTX_WR(bp, 0x00, offset, 0);
 
-		/* Zero out the context. */
-		for (offset = 0; offset < PHY_CTX_SIZE; offset += 4) {
-			CTX_WR(bp, 0x00, offset, 0);
+			REG_WR(bp, BNX2_CTX_VIRT_ADDR, vcid_addr);
+			REG_WR(bp, BNX2_CTX_PAGE_TBL, pcid_addr);
 		}
-
-		REG_WR(bp, BNX2_CTX_VIRT_ADDR, vcid_addr);
-		REG_WR(bp, BNX2_CTX_PAGE_TBL, pcid_addr);
 	}
 }
 

-- 

[patch 02/26] sparsemem: fix oops in x86_64 show_mem

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: fix-show_mem-x86_64-sparsemem.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1397 bytes --]


-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

We aren't sampling for holes in memory. Thus we encounter a section hole with
empty section map pointer for SPARSEMEM and OOPs for show_mem. This issue
has been seen in 2.6.21, current git and current mm. This patch is for
2.6.21 stable. It was tested against sparsemem.

Previous to commit f0a5a58aa812b31fd9f197c4ba48245942364eae memory_present
was called for node_start_pfn to node_end_pfn. This would cover the hole(s)
with reserved pages and valid sections. Most SPARSEMEM supported arches
do a pfn_valid check in show_mem before computing the page structure address.

This issue was brought to my attention on IRC by Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo at
acme@redhat.com. Thanks to Arnaldo for testing.

Signed-off-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---

 arch/x86_64/mm/init.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/arch/x86_64/mm/init.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/arch/x86_64/mm/init.c
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ void show_mem(void)
 
 	for_each_online_pgdat(pgdat) {
                for (i = 0; i < pgdat->node_spanned_pages; ++i) {
+			if (!pfn_valid(pgdat->node_start_pfn + i))
+				continue;
 			page = pfn_to_page(pgdat->node_start_pfn + i);
 			total++;
 			if (PageReserved(page))

-- 

[patch 03/26] rt-mutex: Fix stale return value

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: rt-mutex-fix-stale-return-value.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1365 bytes --]


-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

Alexey Kuznetsov found some problems in the pi-futex code. 

The major problem is a stale return value in rt_mutex_slowlock():

When the pi chain walk returns -EDEADLK, but the waiter was woken up 
during the phases where the locks were dropped, the rtmutex could be
acquired, but due to the stale return value -EDEADLK returned to the
caller.

Reset the return value in the woken up path.

Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 kernel/rtmutex.c |   11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/rtmutex.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/rtmutex.c
@@ -659,9 +659,16 @@ rt_mutex_slowlock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 			 * all over without going into schedule to try
 			 * to get the lock now:
 			 */
-			if (unlikely(!waiter.task))
+			if (unlikely(!waiter.task)) {
+				/*
+				 * Reset the return value. We might
+				 * have returned with -EDEADLK and the
+				 * owner released the lock while we
+				 * were walking the pi chain.
+				 */
+				ret = 0;
 				continue;
-
+			}
 			if (unlikely(ret))
 				break;
 		}

-- 

[patch 04/26] rt-mutex: Fix chain walk early wakeup bug

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: rt-mutex-fix-chain-walk-early-wakeup-bug.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1325 bytes --]


-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

Alexey Kuznetsov found some problems in the pi-futex code. 

One of the root causes is:

When a wakeup happens, we do not to stop the chain walk so we
we follow a non existing locking chain.

Drop out when this happens.

Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 kernel/rtmutex.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/rtmutex.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/rtmutex.c
@@ -212,6 +212,19 @@ static int rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain(st
 	if (!waiter || !waiter->task)
 		goto out_unlock_pi;
 
+	/*
+	 * Check the orig_waiter state. After we dropped the locks,
+	 * the previous owner of the lock might have released the lock
+	 * and made us the pending owner:
+	 */
+	if (orig_waiter && !orig_waiter->task)
+		goto out_unlock_pi;
+
+	/*
+	 * Drop out, when the task has no waiters. Note,
+	 * top_waiter can be NULL, when we are in the deboosting
+	 * mode!
+	 */
 	if (top_waiter && (!task_has_pi_waiters(task) ||
 			   top_waiter != task_top_pi_waiter(task)))
 		goto out_unlock_pi;

-- 

[patch 05/26] pi-futex: Fix exit races and locking problems

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: pi-futex-fix-exit-races-and-locking-problems.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 13462 bytes --]


-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
1. New entries can be added to tsk->pi_state_list after task completed
   exit_pi_state_list(). The result is memory leakage and deadlocks.

2. handle_mm_fault() is called under spinlock. The result is obvious.

3. results in self-inflicted deadlock inside glibc.
   Sometimes futex_lock_pi returns -ESRCH, when it is not expected
   and glibc enters to for(;;) sleep() to simulate deadlock. This problem
   is quite obvious and I think the patch is right. Though it looks like
   each "if" in futex_lock_pi() got some stupid special case "else if". :-)

4. sometimes futex_lock_pi() returns -EDEADLK,
   when nobody has the lock. The reason is also obvious (see comment
   in the patch), but correct fix is far beyond my comprehension.
   I guess someone already saw this, the chunk:

                        if (rt_mutex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex))
                                ret = 0;

   is obviously from the same opera. But it does not work, because the
   rtmutex is really taken at this point: wake_futex_pi() of previous
   owner reassigned it to us. My fix works. But it looks very stupid.
   I would think about removal of shift of ownership in wake_futex_pi()
   and making all the work in context of process taking lock.

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Fix 1) Avoid the tasklist lock variant of the exit race fix by adding
    an additional state transition to the exit code.

    This fixes also the issue, when a task with recursive segfaults
    is not able to release the futexes.

Fix 2) Cleanup the lookup_pi_state() failure path and solve the -ESRCH
    problem finally.

Fix 3) Solve the fixup_pi_state_owner() problem which needs to do the fixup
    in the lock protected section by using the in_atomic userspace access
    functions.
	
    This removes also the ugly lock drop / unqueue inside of fixup_pi_state()

Fix 4) Fix a stale lock in the error path of futex_wake_pi()

Added some error checks for verification.

The -EDEADLK problem is solved by the rtmutex fixups.

Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 include/linux/sched.h |    1 
 kernel/exit.c         |   22 +++++
 kernel/futex.c        |  191 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 3 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/futex.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/futex.c
@@ -396,10 +396,6 @@ static struct task_struct * futex_find_g
 		p = NULL;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
-	if (p->exit_state != 0) {
-		p = NULL;
-		goto out_unlock;
-	}
 	get_task_struct(p);
 out_unlock:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -467,7 +463,7 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_h
 	struct futex_q *this, *next;
 	struct list_head *head;
 	struct task_struct *p;
-	pid_t pid;
+	pid_t pid = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
 
 	head = &hb->chain;
 
@@ -485,6 +481,8 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_h
 				return -EINVAL;
 
 			WARN_ON(!atomic_read(&pi_state->refcount));
+			WARN_ON(pid && pi_state->owner &&
+				pi_state->owner->pid != pid);
 
 			atomic_inc(&pi_state->refcount);
 			me->pi_state = pi_state;
@@ -495,15 +493,33 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_h
 
 	/*
 	 * We are the first waiter - try to look up the real owner and attach
-	 * the new pi_state to it, but bail out when the owner died bit is set
-	 * and TID = 0:
+	 * the new pi_state to it, but bail out when TID = 0
 	 */
-	pid = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
-	if (!pid && (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED))
+	if (!pid)
 		return -ESRCH;
 	p = futex_find_get_task(pid);
-	if (!p)
-		return -ESRCH;
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		return PTR_ERR(p);
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to look at the task state flags to figure out,
+	 * whether the task is exiting. To protect against the do_exit
+	 * change of the task flags, we do this protected by
+	 * p->pi_lock:
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
+	if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
+		/*
+		 * The task is on the way out. When PF_EXITPIDONE is
+		 * set, we know that the task has finished the
+		 * cleanup:
+		 */
+		int ret = (p->flags & PF_EXITPIDONE) ? -ESRCH : -EAGAIN;
+
+		spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
+		put_task_struct(p);
+		return ret;
+	}
 
 	pi_state = alloc_pi_state();
 
@@ -516,7 +532,6 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_h
 	/* Store the key for possible exit cleanups: */
 	pi_state->key = me->key;
 
-	spin_lock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
 	WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pi_state->list));
 	list_add(&pi_state->list, &p->pi_state_list);
 	pi_state->owner = p;
@@ -583,15 +598,22 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uad
 	 * preserve the owner died bit.)
 	 */
 	if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) {
+		int ret = 0;
+
 		newval = FUTEX_WAITERS | new_owner->pid;
 
 		pagefault_disable();
 		curval = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(uaddr, uval, newval);
 		pagefault_enable();
+
 		if (curval == -EFAULT)
-			return -EFAULT;
+			ret = -EFAULT;
 		if (curval != uval)
-			return -EINVAL;
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+		if (ret) {
+			spin_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+			return ret;
+		}
 	}
 
 	spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->owner->pi_lock);
@@ -1149,6 +1171,7 @@ static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uad
 	if (unlikely(ret != 0))
 		goto out_release_sem;
 
+ retry_unlocked:
 	hb = queue_lock(&q, -1, NULL);
 
  retry_locked:
@@ -1200,34 +1223,58 @@ static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uad
 	ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, &q);
 
 	if (unlikely(ret)) {
-		/*
-		 * There were no waiters and the owner task lookup
-		 * failed. When the OWNER_DIED bit is set, then we
-		 * know that this is a robust futex and we actually
-		 * take the lock. This is safe as we are protected by
-		 * the hash bucket lock. We also set the waiters bit
-		 * unconditionally here, to simplify glibc handling of
-		 * multiple tasks racing to acquire the lock and
-		 * cleanup the problems which were left by the dead
-		 * owner.
-		 */
-		if (curval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) {
-			uval = newval;
-			newval = current->pid |
-				FUTEX_OWNER_DIED | FUTEX_WAITERS;
+		switch (ret) {
 
-			pagefault_disable();
-			curval = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(uaddr,
-							       uval, newval);
-			pagefault_enable();
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			/*
+			 * Task is exiting and we just wait for the
+			 * exit to complete.
+			 */
+			queue_unlock(&q, hb);
+			up_read(&curr->mm->mmap_sem);
+			cond_resched();
+			goto retry;
 
-			if (unlikely(curval == -EFAULT))
+		case -ESRCH:
+			/*
+			 * No owner found for this futex. Check if the
+			 * OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether
+			 * this is a robust futex or not.
+			 */
+			if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr))
 				goto uaddr_faulted;
-			if (unlikely(curval != uval))
-				goto retry_locked;
-			ret = 0;
+
+			/*
+			 * There were no waiters and the owner task lookup
+			 * failed. When the OWNER_DIED bit is set, then we
+			 * know that this is a robust futex and we actually
+			 * take the lock. This is safe as we are protected by
+			 * the hash bucket lock. We also set the waiters bit
+			 * unconditionally here, to simplify glibc handling of
+			 * multiple tasks racing to acquire the lock and
+			 * cleanup the problems which were left by the dead
+			 * owner.
+			 */
+			if (curval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) {
+				uval = newval;
+				newval = current->pid |
+					FUTEX_OWNER_DIED | FUTEX_WAITERS;
+
+				pagefault_disable();
+				curval = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(uaddr,
+								       uval,
+								       newval);
+				pagefault_enable();
+
+				if (unlikely(curval == -EFAULT))
+					goto uaddr_faulted;
+				if (unlikely(curval != uval))
+					goto retry_locked;
+				ret = 0;
+			}
+		default:
+			goto out_unlock_release_sem;
 		}
-		goto out_unlock_release_sem;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1279,39 +1326,52 @@ static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uad
 		list_add(&q.pi_state->list, &current->pi_state_list);
 		spin_unlock_irq(&current->pi_lock);
 
-		/* Unqueue and drop the lock */
-		unqueue_me_pi(&q, hb);
-		up_read(&curr->mm->mmap_sem);
 		/*
 		 * We own it, so we have to replace the pending owner
-		 * TID. This must be atomic as we have preserve the
+		 * TID. This must be atomic as we have to preserve the
 		 * owner died bit here.
 		 */
-		ret = get_user(uval, uaddr);
+		ret = get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr);
 		while (!ret) {
 			newval = (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) | newtid;
+
+			pagefault_disable();
 			curval = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(uaddr,
 							       uval, newval);
+			pagefault_enable();
+
 			if (curval == -EFAULT)
 				ret = -EFAULT;
 			if (curval == uval)
 				break;
 			uval = curval;
 		}
-	} else {
+	} else if (ret) {
 		/*
 		 * Catch the rare case, where the lock was released
 		 * when we were on the way back before we locked
 		 * the hash bucket.
 		 */
-		if (ret && q.pi_state->owner == curr) {
-			if (rt_mutex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex))
-				ret = 0;
+		if (q.pi_state->owner == curr &&
+		    rt_mutex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
+			ret = 0;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Paranoia check. If we did not take the lock
+			 * in the trylock above, then we should not be
+			 * the owner of the rtmutex, neither the real
+			 * nor the pending one:
+			 */
+			if (rt_mutex_owner(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex) == curr)
+				printk(KERN_ERR "futex_lock_pi: ret = %d "
+				       "pi-mutex: %p pi-state %p\n", ret,
+				       q.pi_state->pi_mutex.owner,
+				       q.pi_state->owner);
 		}
-		/* Unqueue and drop the lock */
-		unqueue_me_pi(&q, hb);
-		up_read(&curr->mm->mmap_sem);
 	}
+	/* Unqueue and drop the lock */
+	unqueue_me_pi(&q, hb);
+	up_read(&curr->mm->mmap_sem);
 
 	if (!detect && ret == -EDEADLK && 0)
 		force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
@@ -1331,16 +1391,18 @@ static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uad
 	 * non-atomically.  Therefore, if get_user below is not
 	 * enough, we need to handle the fault ourselves, while
 	 * still holding the mmap_sem.
+	 *
+	 * ... and hb->lock. :-) --ANK
 	 */
+	queue_unlock(&q, hb);
+
 	if (attempt++) {
-		if (futex_handle_fault((unsigned long)uaddr, attempt)) {
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-			goto out_unlock_release_sem;
-		}
-		goto retry_locked;
+		ret = futex_handle_fault((unsigned long)uaddr, attempt);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_release_sem;
+		goto retry_unlocked;
 	}
 
-	queue_unlock(&q, hb);
 	up_read(&curr->mm->mmap_sem);
 
 	ret = get_user(uval, uaddr);
@@ -1382,9 +1444,9 @@ retry:
 		goto out;
 
 	hb = hash_futex(&key);
+retry_unlocked:
 	spin_lock(&hb->lock);
 
-retry_locked:
 	/*
 	 * To avoid races, try to do the TID -> 0 atomic transition
 	 * again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking
@@ -1446,16 +1508,17 @@ pi_faulted:
 	 * non-atomically.  Therefore, if get_user below is not
 	 * enough, we need to handle the fault ourselves, while
 	 * still holding the mmap_sem.
+	 *
+	 * ... and hb->lock. :-) --ANK
 	 */
+	spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
+
 	if (attempt++) {
-		if (futex_handle_fault((unsigned long)uaddr, attempt)) {
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-			goto out_unlock;
-		}
-		goto retry_locked;
+		ret = futex_handle_fault((unsigned long)uaddr, attempt);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+		goto retry_unlocked;
 	}
-
-	spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
 	up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 
 	ret = get_user(uval, uaddr);
--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/include/linux/sched.h
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1138,6 +1138,7 @@ static inline void put_task_struct(struc
 					/* Not implemented yet, only for 486*/
 #define PF_STARTING	0x00000002	/* being created */
 #define PF_EXITING	0x00000004	/* getting shut down */
+#define PF_EXITPIDONE	0x00000008	/* pi exit done on shut down */
 #define PF_FORKNOEXEC	0x00000040	/* forked but didn't exec */
 #define PF_SUPERPRIV	0x00000100	/* used super-user privileges */
 #define PF_DUMPCORE	0x00000200	/* dumped core */
--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/exit.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/exit.c
@@ -884,13 +884,29 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long co
 	if (unlikely(tsk->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
 		printk(KERN_ALERT
 			"Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!\n");
+		/*
+		 * We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses
+		 * this flag just to verify whether the pi state
+		 * cleanup has been done or not. In the worst case it
+		 * loops once more. We pretend that the cleanup was
+		 * done as there is no way to return. Either the
+		 * OWNER_DIED bit is set by now or we push the blocked
+		 * task into the wait for ever nirwana as well.
+		 */
+		tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
 		if (tsk->io_context)
 			exit_io_context();
 		set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
 		schedule();
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * tsk->flags are checked in the futex code to protect against
+	 * an exiting task cleaning up the robust pi futexes.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
 	tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING;
+	spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
 
 	if (unlikely(in_atomic()))
 		printk(KERN_INFO "note: %s[%d] exited with preempt_count %d\n",
@@ -957,6 +973,12 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long co
 	 * Make sure we are holding no locks:
 	 */
 	debug_check_no_locks_held(tsk);
+	/*
+	 * We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses this flag
+	 * just to verify whether the pi state cleanup has been done
+	 * or not. In the worst case it loops once more.
+	 */
+	tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
 
 	if (tsk->io_context)
 		exit_io_context();

-- 

[patch 06/26] hpt366: disallow Ultra133 for HPT374

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: hpt366-disallow-ultra133-for-hpt374.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2064 bytes --]


-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

Eliminate UltraATA/133 support for HPT374 -- the chip isn't capable of this mode
according to the manual, and doesn't even seem to tolerate 66 MHz DPLL clock...

Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sshtylyov@ru.mvista.com>
Cc: Geller Sandor <wildy@petra.hos.u-szeged.hu>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
 drivers/ide/pci/hpt366.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/ide/pci/hpt366.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/ide/pci/hpt366.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * linux/drivers/ide/pci/hpt366.c		Version 1.03	May 4, 2007
+ * linux/drivers/ide/pci/hpt366.c		Version 1.04	Jun 4, 2007
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1999-2003		Andre Hedrick <andre@linux-ide.org>
  * Portions Copyright (C) 2001	        Sun Microsystems, Inc.
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@
  *   switch  to calculating  PCI clock frequency based on the chip's base DPLL
  *   frequency
  * - switch to using the  DPLL clock and enable UltraATA/133 mode by default on
- *   anything  newer than HPT370/A
+ *   anything  newer than HPT370/A (except HPT374 that is not capable of this
+ *   mode according to the manual)
  * - fold PCI clock detection and DPLL setup code into init_chipset_hpt366(),
  *   also fixing the interchanged 25/40 MHz PCI clock cases for HPT36x chips;
  *   unify HPT36x/37x timing setup code and the speedproc handlers by joining
@@ -365,7 +366,6 @@ static u32 sixty_six_base_hpt37x[] = {
 };
 
 #define HPT366_DEBUG_DRIVE_INFO		0
-#define HPT374_ALLOW_ATA133_6		1
 #define HPT371_ALLOW_ATA133_6		1
 #define HPT302_ALLOW_ATA133_6		1
 #define HPT372_ALLOW_ATA133_6		1
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static struct hpt_info hpt370a __devinit
 
 static struct hpt_info hpt374 __devinitdata = {
 	.chip_type	= HPT374,
-	.max_mode	= HPT374_ALLOW_ATA133_6 ? 4 : 3,
+	.max_mode	= 3,
 	.dpll_clk	= 48,
 	.settings	= hpt37x_settings
 };

-- 

[patch 07/26] md: Fix two raid10 bugs.

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: md-fix-two-raid10-bugs.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1406 bytes --]


-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

1/ When resyncing a degraded raid10 which has more than 2 copies of each block,
  garbage can get synced on top of good data.

2/ We round the wrong way in part of the device size calculation, which
  can cause confusion.

Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---

 drivers/md/raid10.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff .prev/drivers/md/raid10.c ./drivers/md/raid10.c
--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/md/raid10.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/md/raid10.c
@@ -1867,6 +1867,7 @@ static sector_t sync_request(mddev_t *md
 			int d = r10_bio->devs[i].devnum;
 			bio = r10_bio->devs[i].bio;
 			bio->bi_end_io = NULL;
+			clear_bit(BIO_UPTODATE, &bio->bi_flags);
 			if (conf->mirrors[d].rdev == NULL ||
 			    test_bit(Faulty, &conf->mirrors[d].rdev->flags))
 				continue;
@@ -2037,6 +2038,11 @@ static int run(mddev_t *mddev)
 	/* 'size' is now the number of chunks in the array */
 	/* calculate "used chunks per device" in 'stride' */
 	stride = size * conf->copies;
+
+	/* We need to round up when dividing by raid_disks to
+	 * get the stride size.
+	 */
+	stride += conf->raid_disks - 1;
 	sector_div(stride, conf->raid_disks);
 	mddev->size = stride  << (conf->chunk_shift-1);
 

-- 

[patch 08/26] md: Fix bug in error handling during raid1 repair.

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: md-fix-bug-in-error-handling-during-raid1-repair.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1906 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Mike Accetta <maccetta@laurelnetworks.com>

If raid1/repair (which reads all block and fixes any differences
it finds) hits a read error, it doesn't reset the bio for writing
before writing correct data back, so the read error isn't fixed,
and the device probably gets a zero-length write which it might
complain about.

Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---

 drivers/md/raid1.c |   21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff .prev/drivers/md/raid1.c ./drivers/md/raid1.c
--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/md/raid1.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/md/raid1.c
@@ -1240,17 +1240,24 @@ static void sync_request_write(mddev_t *
 			}
 		r1_bio->read_disk = primary;
 		for (i=0; i<mddev->raid_disks; i++)
-			if (r1_bio->bios[i]->bi_end_io == end_sync_read &&
-			    test_bit(BIO_UPTODATE, &r1_bio->bios[i]->bi_flags)) {
+			if (r1_bio->bios[i]->bi_end_io == end_sync_read) {
 				int j;
 				int vcnt = r1_bio->sectors >> (PAGE_SHIFT- 9);
 				struct bio *pbio = r1_bio->bios[primary];
 				struct bio *sbio = r1_bio->bios[i];
-				for (j = vcnt; j-- ; )
-					if (memcmp(page_address(pbio->bi_io_vec[j].bv_page),
-						   page_address(sbio->bi_io_vec[j].bv_page),
-						   PAGE_SIZE))
-						break;
+
+				if (test_bit(BIO_UPTODATE, &sbio->bi_flags)) {
+					for (j = vcnt; j-- ; ) {
+						struct page *p, *s;
+						p = pbio->bi_io_vec[j].bv_page;
+						s = sbio->bi_io_vec[j].bv_page;
+						if (memcmp(page_address(p),
+							   page_address(s),
+							   PAGE_SIZE))
+							break;
+					}
+				} else
+					j = 0;
 				if (j >= 0)
 					mddev->resync_mismatches += r1_bio->sectors;
 				if (j < 0 || test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_CHECK, &mddev->recovery)) {

-- 

[patch 09/26] dm crypt: disable barriers

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: dm-crypt-disable-barriers.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1235 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Milan Broz <mbroz@redhat.com>

Disable barriers in dm-crypt because of current workqueue processing can
reorder requests.

This must be addresed later but for now disabling barriers is needed to
prevent data corruption.

Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <mbroz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=9c89f8be1a7d14aad9d2c3f7d90d7d88f82c61e2

 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -954,6 +954,9 @@ static int crypt_map(struct dm_target *t
 	struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
 	struct crypt_io *io;
 
+	if (bio_barrier(bio))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	io = mempool_alloc(cc->io_pool, GFP_NOIO);
 	io->target = ti;
 	io->base_bio = bio;

-- 

[patch 10/26] dm crypt: fix call to clone_init

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: dm-crypt-fix-call-to-clone_init.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 3043 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Olaf Kirch <olaf.kirch@oracle.com>

Call clone_init early

We need to call clone_init as early as possible - at least before call
bio_put(clone) in any error path.  Otherwise, the destructor will try to
dereference bi_private, which may still be NULL.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Kirch <olaf.kirch@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=027581f3515b5ec2218847dab578afa439a9d6b9

 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c |   12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ struct crypt_config {
 
 static struct kmem_cache *_crypt_io_pool;
 
+static void clone_init(struct crypt_io *, struct bio *);
+
 /*
  * Different IV generation algorithms:
  *
@@ -379,9 +381,10 @@ static int crypt_convert(struct crypt_co
  * May return a smaller bio when running out of pages
  */
 static struct bio *
-crypt_alloc_buffer(struct crypt_config *cc, unsigned int size,
+crypt_alloc_buffer(struct crypt_io *io, unsigned int size,
                    struct bio *base_bio, unsigned int *bio_vec_idx)
 {
+	struct crypt_config *cc = io->target->private;
 	struct bio *clone;
 	unsigned int nr_iovecs = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	gfp_t gfp_mask = GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGHMEM;
@@ -396,7 +399,7 @@ crypt_alloc_buffer(struct crypt_config *
 	if (!clone)
 		return NULL;
 
-	clone->bi_destructor = dm_crypt_bio_destructor;
+	clone_init(io, clone);
 
 	/* if the last bio was not complete, continue where that one ended */
 	clone->bi_idx = *bio_vec_idx;
@@ -562,6 +565,7 @@ static void clone_init(struct crypt_io *
 	clone->bi_end_io  = crypt_endio;
 	clone->bi_bdev    = cc->dev->bdev;
 	clone->bi_rw      = io->base_bio->bi_rw;
+	clone->bi_destructor = dm_crypt_bio_destructor;
 }
 
 static void process_read(struct crypt_io *io)
@@ -585,7 +589,6 @@ static void process_read(struct crypt_io
 	}
 
 	clone_init(io, clone);
-	clone->bi_destructor = dm_crypt_bio_destructor;
 	clone->bi_idx = 0;
 	clone->bi_vcnt = bio_segments(base_bio);
 	clone->bi_size = base_bio->bi_size;
@@ -615,7 +618,7 @@ static void process_write(struct crypt_i
 	 * so repeat the whole process until all the data can be handled.
 	 */
 	while (remaining) {
-		clone = crypt_alloc_buffer(cc, base_bio->bi_size,
+		clone = crypt_alloc_buffer(io, base_bio->bi_size,
 					   io->first_clone, &bvec_idx);
 		if (unlikely(!clone)) {
 			dec_pending(io, -ENOMEM);
@@ -631,7 +634,6 @@ static void process_write(struct crypt_i
 			return;
 		}
 
-		clone_init(io, clone);
 		clone->bi_sector = cc->start + sector;
 
 		if (!io->first_clone) {

-- 

[patch 11/26] dm crypt: fix avoid cloned bio ref after free

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: dm-crypt-fix-avoid-cloned-bio-ref-after-free.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1282 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Olaf Kirch <olaf.kirch@oracle.com>

Do not access the bio after generic_make_request

We should never access a bio after generic_make_request - there's no guarantee
it still exists.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Kirch <olaf.kirch@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=98221eb757de03d9aa6262b1eded2be708640ccc

 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -655,9 +655,12 @@ static void process_write(struct crypt_i
 
 		generic_make_request(clone);
 
+		/* Do not reference clone after this - it
+		 * may be gone already. */
+
 		/* out of memory -> run queues */
 		if (remaining)
-			congestion_wait(bio_data_dir(clone), HZ/100);
+			congestion_wait(WRITE, HZ/100);
 	}
 }
 

-- 

[patch 12/26] dm crypt: fix remove first_clone

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: dm-crypt-fix-remove-first_clone.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 3799 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Olaf Kirch <olaf.kirch@oracle.com>

Get rid of first_clone in dm-crypt

This gets rid of first_clone, which is not really needed.  Apparently, cloned
bios used to share their bvec some time way in the past - this is no longer
the case.  Contrarily, this even hurts us if we try to create a clone off
first_clone after it has completed, and crypt_endio has destroyed its bvec.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Kirch <olaf.kirch@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=2f9941b6c55d70103c1bc3f2c7676acd9f20bf8a

 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c |   34 ++++++----------------------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
 struct crypt_io {
 	struct dm_target *target;
 	struct bio *base_bio;
-	struct bio *first_clone;
 	struct work_struct work;
 	atomic_t pending;
 	int error;
@@ -380,9 +379,8 @@ static int crypt_convert(struct crypt_co
  * This should never violate the device limitations
  * May return a smaller bio when running out of pages
  */
-static struct bio *
-crypt_alloc_buffer(struct crypt_io *io, unsigned int size,
-                   struct bio *base_bio, unsigned int *bio_vec_idx)
+static struct bio *crypt_alloc_buffer(struct crypt_io *io, unsigned int size,
+				      unsigned int *bio_vec_idx)
 {
 	struct crypt_config *cc = io->target->private;
 	struct bio *clone;
@@ -390,12 +388,7 @@ crypt_alloc_buffer(struct crypt_io *io, 
 	gfp_t gfp_mask = GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGHMEM;
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	if (base_bio) {
-		clone = bio_alloc_bioset(GFP_NOIO, base_bio->bi_max_vecs, cc->bs);
-		__bio_clone(clone, base_bio);
-	} else
-		clone = bio_alloc_bioset(GFP_NOIO, nr_iovecs, cc->bs);
-
+	clone = bio_alloc_bioset(GFP_NOIO, nr_iovecs, cc->bs);
 	if (!clone)
 		return NULL;
 
@@ -498,9 +491,6 @@ static void dec_pending(struct crypt_io 
 	if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&io->pending))
 		return;
 
-	if (io->first_clone)
-		bio_put(io->first_clone);
-
 	bio_endio(io->base_bio, io->base_bio->bi_size, io->error);
 
 	mempool_free(io, cc->io_pool);
@@ -618,8 +608,7 @@ static void process_write(struct crypt_i
 	 * so repeat the whole process until all the data can be handled.
 	 */
 	while (remaining) {
-		clone = crypt_alloc_buffer(io, base_bio->bi_size,
-					   io->first_clone, &bvec_idx);
+		clone = crypt_alloc_buffer(io, base_bio->bi_size, &bvec_idx);
 		if (unlikely(!clone)) {
 			dec_pending(io, -ENOMEM);
 			return;
@@ -635,21 +624,11 @@ static void process_write(struct crypt_i
 		}
 
 		clone->bi_sector = cc->start + sector;
-
-		if (!io->first_clone) {
-			/*
-			 * hold a reference to the first clone, because it
-			 * holds the bio_vec array and that can't be freed
-			 * before all other clones are released
-			 */
-			bio_get(clone);
-			io->first_clone = clone;
-		}
-
 		remaining -= clone->bi_size;
 		sector += bio_sectors(clone);
 
-		/* prevent bio_put of first_clone */
+		/* Grab another reference to the io struct
+		 * before we kick off the request */
 		if (remaining)
 			atomic_inc(&io->pending);
 
@@ -965,7 +944,6 @@ static int crypt_map(struct dm_target *t
 	io = mempool_alloc(cc->io_pool, GFP_NOIO);
 	io->target = ti;
 	io->base_bio = bio;
-	io->first_clone = NULL;
 	io->error = io->post_process = 0;
 	atomic_set(&io->pending, 0);
 	kcryptd_queue_io(io);

-- 

[patch 13/26] hugetlb: fix get_policy for stacked shared memory files

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: hugetlb-fix-get_policy-for-stacked-shared-memory-files.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1636 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Adam Litke <agl@us.ibm.com>

Here's another breakage as a result of shared memory stacked files :(

The NUMA policy for a VMA is determined by checking the following (in the
order given):

1) vma->vm_ops->get_policy() (if defined)
2) vma->vm_policy (if defined)
3) task->mempolicy (if defined)
4) Fall back to default_policy

By switching to stacked files for shared memory, get_policy() is now always
set to shm_get_policy which is a wrapper function.  This causes us to stop
at step 1, which yields NULL for hugetlb instead of task->mempolicy which
was the previous (and correct) result.

This patch modifies the shm_get_policy() wrapper to maintain steps 1-3 for
the wrapped vm_ops.

(akpm: the refcounting of mempolicies is busted and this patch does nothing to
improve it)

Signed-off-by: Adam Litke <agl@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com>
Cc: dean gaudet <dean@arctic.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---

 ipc/shm.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/ipc/shm.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/ipc/shm.c
@@ -254,8 +254,10 @@ struct mempolicy *shm_get_policy(struct 
 
 	if (sfd->vm_ops->get_policy)
 		pol = sfd->vm_ops->get_policy(vma, addr);
-	else
+	else if (vma->vm_policy)
 		pol = vma->vm_policy;
+	else
+		pol = current->mempolicy;
 	return pol;
 }
 #endif

-- 

[patch 14/26] sched: fix next_interval determination in idle_balance()

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: sched-fix-next_interval-determination-in-idle_balance.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2301 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>

Fix massive SMP imbalance on NUMA nodes observed on 2.6.21.5 with CFS. 
(and later on reproduced without CFS as well).

The intervals of domains that do not have SD_BALANCE_NEWIDLE must be 
considered for the calculation of the time of the next balance. 
Otherwise we may defer rebalancing forever and nodes might stay idle for 
very long times.

Siddha also spotted that the conversion of the balance interval to 
jiffies is missing. Fix that to.

From: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

also continue the loop if !(sd->flags & SD_LOAD_BALANCE).

Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

It did in fact trigger under all three of mainline, CFS, and -rt 
including CFS -- see below for a couple of emails from last Friday 
giving results for these three on the AMD box (where it happened) and on 
a single-quad NUMA-Q system (where it did not, at least not with such 
severity).

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
 kernel/sched.c |   22 +++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/sched.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/sched.c
@@ -2831,17 +2831,21 @@ static void idle_balance(int this_cpu, s
 	unsigned long next_balance = jiffies + 60 *  HZ;
 
 	for_each_domain(this_cpu, sd) {
-		if (sd->flags & SD_BALANCE_NEWIDLE) {
+		unsigned long interval;
+
+		if (!(sd->flags & SD_LOAD_BALANCE))
+			continue;
+
+		if (sd->flags & SD_BALANCE_NEWIDLE)
 			/* If we've pulled tasks over stop searching: */
 			pulled_task = load_balance_newidle(this_cpu,
-							this_rq, sd);
-			if (time_after(next_balance,
-				  sd->last_balance + sd->balance_interval))
-				next_balance = sd->last_balance
-						+ sd->balance_interval;
-			if (pulled_task)
-				break;
-		}
+								this_rq, sd);
+
+		interval = msecs_to_jiffies(sd->balance_interval);
+		if (time_after(next_balance, sd->last_balance + interval))
+			next_balance = sd->last_balance + interval;
+		if (pulled_task)
+			break;
 	}
 	if (!pulled_task)
 		/*

-- 

[patch 15/26] posix-timers: Prevent softirq starvation by small intervals and SIG_IGN

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: posix-timers-prevent-softirq-starvation-by-small-intervals-and-sig_ign.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 3783 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

posix-timers which deliver an ignored signal are currently rearmed in
the timer softirq: This is necessary because the timer needs to be
delivered again when SIG_IGN is removed. This is not a problem, when
the interval is reasonable.

With high resolution timers enabled one might arm a posix timer with a
very small interval and ignore the signal. This might lead to a
softirq starvation when the interval is so small that the timer is
requeued onto the softirq pending list right away.

This problem was pointed out by Jan Kiszka. Thanks Jan !

The correct solution would be to stop the timer, when the signal is
ignored and rearm it when SIG_IGN is removed. Unfortunately this
requires modification in sigaction and involves non trivial sighand
locking. It's too late in the release cycle for such a change.

For now we just keep the timer running and enforce that the timer only
fires every jiffie. This does not break anything as we keep the
overrun counter correct. It adds a little inaccuracy to the
timer_gettime() interface, but...

The more complex change is necessary anyway to fix another short
coming of the current implementation, which I discovered while looking
at this problem: A pending signal is discarded when SIG_IGN is set. In
case that a posixtimer signal is pending then it is discarded as well,
but when SIG_IGN is removed later nothing rearms the timer. This is
not new, it's that way since posix timers have been merged. So nothing
to worry about right now.

I have a working solution to fix all of this, but the impact is too
large for both stable and 2.6.22. I'm going to send it out for review
in the next days.

This should go into 2.6.21.stable as well.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 kernel/posix-timers.c |   35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/posix-timers.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/posix-timers.c
@@ -354,9 +354,40 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart posix_timer_
 		 * it should be restarted.
 		 */
 		if (timr->it.real.interval.tv64 != 0) {
+			ktime_t now = hrtimer_cb_get_time(timer);
+
+			/*
+			 * FIXME: What we really want, is to stop this
+			 * timer completely and restart it in case the
+			 * SIG_IGN is removed. This is a non trivial
+			 * change which involves sighand locking
+			 * (sigh !), which we don't want to do late in
+			 * the release cycle.
+			 *
+			 * For now we just let timers with an interval
+			 * less than a jiffie expire every jiffie to
+			 * avoid softirq starvation in case of SIG_IGN
+			 * and a very small interval, which would put
+			 * the timer right back on the softirq pending
+			 * list. By moving now ahead of time we trick
+			 * hrtimer_forward() to expire the timer
+			 * later, while we still maintain the overrun
+			 * accuracy, but have some inconsistency in
+			 * the timer_gettime() case. This is at least
+			 * better than a starved softirq. A more
+			 * complex fix which solves also another related
+			 * inconsistency is already in the pipeline.
+			 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS
+			{
+				ktime_t kj = ktime_set(0, NSEC_PER_SEC / HZ);
+
+				if (timr->it.real.interval.tv64 < kj.tv64)
+					now = ktime_add(now, kj);
+			}
+#endif
 			timr->it_overrun +=
-				hrtimer_forward(timer,
-						hrtimer_cb_get_time(timer),
+				hrtimer_forward(timer, now,
 						timr->it.real.interval);
 			ret = HRTIMER_RESTART;
 			++timr->it_requeue_pending;

-- 

[patch 16/26] FUTEX: Restore the dropped ERSCH fix

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: futex-restore-the-dropped-ersch-fix.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1221 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

The return value of futex_find_get_task() needs to be -ESRCH in case
that the search fails. This was part of the original futex fixes and 
got accidentally dropped, when the futex-tidy-up patch was split out.

Results in a NULL pointer dereference in case the search fails.

Restore it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
 kernel/futex.c |   14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/futex.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/futex.c
@@ -390,14 +390,12 @@ static struct task_struct * futex_find_g
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
-	if (!p)
-		goto out_unlock;
-	if ((current->euid != p->euid) && (current->euid != p->uid)) {
-		p = NULL;
-		goto out_unlock;
-	}
-	get_task_struct(p);
-out_unlock:
+
+	if (!p || ((current->euid != p->euid) && (current->euid != p->uid)))
+		p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
+	else
+		get_task_struct(p);
+
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return p;

-- 

[patch 17/26] audit: fix oops removing watch if audit disabled

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: audit-fix-oops-removing-watch-if-audit-disabled.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1112 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>

Removing a watched file will oops if audit is disabled (auditctl -e 0).

To reproduce:
- auditctl -e 1
- touch /tmp/foo
- auditctl -w /tmp/foo
- auditctl -e 0
- rm /tmp/foo (or mv)

Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---

 kernel/auditfilter.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct au
 
 		/* If the update involves invalidating rules, do the inode-based
 		 * filtering now, so we don't omit records. */
-		if (invalidating &&
+		if (invalidating && current->audit_context &&
 		    audit_filter_inodes(current, current->audit_context) == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
 			audit_set_auditable(current->audit_context);
 

-- 

[patch 18/26] POWERPC: Fix subtle FP state corruption bug in signal return on SMP

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: powerpc-fix-subtle-fp-state-corruption-bug-in-signal-return-on-smp.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2043 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

This fixes a bug which can cause corruption of the floating-point state
on return from a signal handler.  If we have a signal handler that has
used the floating-point registers, and it happens to context-switch to
another task while copying the interrupted floating-point state from the
user stack into the thread struct (e.g. because of a page fault, or
because it gets preempted), the context switch code will think that the
FP registers contain valid FP state that needs to be copied into the
thread_struct, and will thus overwrite the values that the signal return
code has put into the thread_struct.

This can occur because we clear the MSR bits that indicate the presence
of valid FP state after copying the state into the thread_struct.  To fix
this we just move the clearing of the MSR bits to before the copy.  A
similar potential problem also occurs with the Altivec state, and this
fixes that in the same way.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c |   10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -177,6 +177,13 @@ static long restore_sigcontext(struct pt
 	 */
 	discard_lazy_cpu_state();
 
+	/*
+	 * Force reload of FP/VEC.
+	 * This has to be done before copying stuff into current->thread.fpr/vr
+	 * for the reasons explained in the previous comment.
+	 */
+	regs->msr &= ~(MSR_FP | MSR_FE0 | MSR_FE1 | MSR_VEC);
+
 	err |= __copy_from_user(&current->thread.fpr, &sc->fp_regs, FP_REGS_SIZE);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
@@ -198,9 +205,6 @@ static long restore_sigcontext(struct pt
 		current->thread.vrsave = 0;
 #endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
 
-	/* Force reload of FP/VEC */
-	regs->msr &= ~(MSR_FP | MSR_FE0 | MSR_FE1 | MSR_VEC);
-
 	return err;
 }
 

-- 

[patch 19/26] mm: kill validate_anon_vma to avoid mapcount BUG

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: mm-kill-validate_anon_vma-to-avoid-mapcount-bug.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2853 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>

validate_anon_vma gave a useful check on the integrity of the anon_vma list
when Andrea was developing obj rmap; but it was not enabled in SLES9
itself, nor in mainline, until Nick changed commented-out RMAP_DEBUG to
configurable CONFIG_DEBUG_VM in 2.6.17.  Now Petr Vandrovec reports that
its BUG_ON(mapcount > 100000) can easily crash a CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y system.

That limit was just an arbitrary number to protect against an infinite
loop.  We could raise it to something enormous (depending on sizeof struct
vma and size of memory?); but I rather think validate_anon_vma has outlived
its usefulness, and is better just removed - which gives a magnificent
performance boost to anything like Petr's test program ;)

Of course, a very long anon_vma list is bad news for preemption latency,
and I believe there has been one recent report of such: let's not forget
that, but validate_anon_vma only makes it worse not better.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Petr Vandrovec <petr@vmware.com>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---

 mm/rmap.c |   24 +-----------------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 23 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/mm/rmap.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/mm/rmap.c
@@ -53,24 +53,6 @@
 
 struct kmem_cache *anon_vma_cachep;
 
-static inline void validate_anon_vma(struct vm_area_struct *find_vma)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
-	struct anon_vma *anon_vma = find_vma->anon_vma;
-	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
-	unsigned int mapcount = 0;
-	int found = 0;
-
-	list_for_each_entry(vma, &anon_vma->head, anon_vma_node) {
-		mapcount++;
-		BUG_ON(mapcount > 100000);
-		if (vma == find_vma)
-			found = 1;
-	}
-	BUG_ON(!found);
-#endif
-}
-
 /* This must be called under the mmap_sem. */
 int anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
@@ -121,10 +103,8 @@ void __anon_vma_link(struct vm_area_stru
 {
 	struct anon_vma *anon_vma = vma->anon_vma;
 
-	if (anon_vma) {
+	if (anon_vma)
 		list_add_tail(&vma->anon_vma_node, &anon_vma->head);
-		validate_anon_vma(vma);
-	}
 }
 
 void anon_vma_link(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
@@ -134,7 +114,6 @@ void anon_vma_link(struct vm_area_struct
 	if (anon_vma) {
 		spin_lock(&anon_vma->lock);
 		list_add_tail(&vma->anon_vma_node, &anon_vma->head);
-		validate_anon_vma(vma);
 		spin_unlock(&anon_vma->lock);
 	}
 }
@@ -148,7 +127,6 @@ void anon_vma_unlink(struct vm_area_stru
 		return;
 
 	spin_lock(&anon_vma->lock);
-	validate_anon_vma(vma);
 	list_del(&vma->anon_vma_node);
 
 	/* We must garbage collect the anon_vma if it's empty */

-- 

[patch 20/26] saa7134: fix thread shutdown handling

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: saa7134-fix-thread-shutdown-handling.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1558 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>

This patch changes the test for the thread pid from >= 0 to > 0.

When the saa8134 driver initialization fails after a certain point, it goes
through the complete shutdown process for the driver.  Part of shutting it
down includes tearing down the thread for tv audio.

The test for tearing down the thread tests for >= 0.  Since the dev
structure is kzalloc'd, the test will always be true if we haven't tried to
start the thread yet.  We end up waiting on pid 0 to complete, which will
never happen, so we lock up.

This bug was observed in Novell Bugzilla 284718, when request_irq() failed.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---

 drivers/media/video/saa7134/saa7134-tvaudio.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/media/video/saa7134/saa7134-tvaudio.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/media/video/saa7134/saa7134-tvaudio.c
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ int saa7134_tvaudio_init2(struct saa7134
 int saa7134_tvaudio_fini(struct saa7134_dev *dev)
 {
 	/* shutdown tvaudio thread */
-	if (dev->thread.pid >= 0) {
+	if (dev->thread.pid > 0) {
 		dev->thread.shutdown = 1;
 		wake_up_interruptible(&dev->thread.wq);
 		wait_for_completion(&dev->thread.exit);

-- 

[patch 21/26] serial: clear proper MPSC interrupt cause bits

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: serial-clear-proper-mpsc-interrupt-cause-bits.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1288 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Jay Lubomirski <jaylubo@motorola.com>

The interrupt clearing code in mpsc_sdma_intr_ack() mistakenly clears the
interrupt for both controllers instead of just the one its supposed to.
This can result in the other controller appearing to hang because its
interrupt was effectively lost.

So, don't clear the interrupt cause bits for both MPSC controllers when
clearing the interrupt for one of them.  Just clear the one that is
supposed to be cleared.

Signed-off-by: Jay Lubomirski <jaylubo@motorola.com>
Acked-by: Mark A. Greer <mgreer@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---

 drivers/serial/mpsc.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/serial/mpsc.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/serial/mpsc.c
@@ -502,7 +502,8 @@ mpsc_sdma_intr_ack(struct mpsc_port_info
 
 	if (pi->mirror_regs)
 		pi->shared_regs->SDMA_INTR_CAUSE_m = 0;
-	writel(0, pi->shared_regs->sdma_intr_base + SDMA_INTR_CAUSE);
+	writeb(0x00, pi->shared_regs->sdma_intr_base + SDMA_INTR_CAUSE +
+	       pi->port.line);
 	return;
 }
 

-- 

[patch 22/26] i386: fix infinite loop with singlestep int80 syscalls

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: i386-fix-infinite-loop-with-singlestep-int80-syscalls.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2921 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

The commit 635cf99a80f4ebee59d70eb64bb85ce829e4591f introduced a
regression.  Executing a ptrace single step after certain int80
accesses will infinitely loop and never advance the PC.

The TIF_SINGLESTEP check should be done on the return from the syscall
and not before it.

The new test case is below:

/* Test whether singlestep through an int80 syscall works.
 */
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <asm/user.h>
#include <string.h>

static int child, status;
static struct user_regs_struct regs;

static void do_child()
{
	char str[80] = "child: int80 test\n";

	ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, 0, 0);
	kill(getpid(), SIGUSR1);
	write(fileno(stdout),str,strlen(str));
	asm ("int $0x80" : : "a" (20)); /* getpid */
}
    
static void do_parent()
{
	unsigned long eip, expected = 0;
again:
	waitpid(child, &status, 0);
	if (WIFEXITED(status) || WIFSIGNALED(status))
		return;
    
	if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
		ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, child, 0, &regs);
		eip = regs.eip;
		if (expected)
			fprintf(stderr, "child stop @ %08lx, expected %08lx %s\n",
					eip, expected,
					eip == expected ? "" : " <== ERROR");
    
		if (*(unsigned short *)eip == 0x80cd) {
			fprintf(stderr, "int 0x80 at %08x\n", (unsigned int)eip);
			expected = eip + 2;
		} else
			expected = 0;
    
		ptrace(PTRACE_SINGLESTEP, child, NULL, NULL);
	}
	goto again;
}
    
int main(int argc, char * const argv[])
{
	child = fork();
	if (child)
		do_parent();
	else
		do_child();
	return 0;
}


Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
 arch/i386/kernel/entry.S |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S
@@ -371,10 +371,6 @@ ENTRY(system_call)
 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
 	SAVE_ALL
 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
-	testl $TF_MASK,PT_EFLAGS(%esp)
-	jz no_singlestep
-	orl $_TIF_SINGLESTEP,TI_flags(%ebp)
-no_singlestep:
 					# system call tracing in operation / emulation
 	/* Note, _TIF_SECCOMP is bit number 8, and so it needs testw and not testb */
 	testw $(_TIF_SYSCALL_EMU|_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SECCOMP|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),TI_flags(%ebp)
@@ -389,6 +385,10 @@ syscall_exit:
 					# setting need_resched or sigpending
 					# between sampling and the iret
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
+	testl $TF_MASK,PT_EFLAGS(%esp)	# If tracing set singlestep flag on exit
+	jz no_singlestep
+	orl $_TIF_SINGLESTEP,TI_flags(%ebp)
+no_singlestep:
 	movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx
 	testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx	# current->work
 	jne syscall_exit_work

-- 

[patch 23/26] NTP: remove clock_was_set() call to prevent deadlock

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: ntp-remove-clock_was_set-call-to-prevent-deadlock.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1803 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

The clock_was_set() call in seconds_overflow() which happens only when
leap seconds are inserted / deleted is wrong in two aspects:

1. it results in a call to on_each_cpu() with interrupts disabled
2. it is potential deadlock source vs. call_lock in smp_call_function()

The only possible side effect of the removal might be, that an absolute
CLOCK_REALTIME timer fires 1 second too late, in the rare case of leap
second deletion and an absolute CLOCK_REALTIME timer which expires in
the affected time frame. It will never fire too early.

This was probably observed by the reporter of a June 30th -> July 1st
hang: http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/7/3/

A similar problem was observed by Dave Jones, who provided a screen shot
with a lockdep back trace, which allowed to analyse the problem.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Vincent Fortier <Vincent.Fortier1@EC.GC.CA>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 kernel/time/ntp.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/time/ntp.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/time/ntp.c
@@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ void second_overflow(void)
 			 */
 			time_interpolator_update(-NSEC_PER_SEC);
 			time_state = TIME_OOP;
-			clock_was_set();
 			printk(KERN_NOTICE "Clock: inserting leap second "
 					"23:59:60 UTC\n");
 		}
@@ -135,7 +134,6 @@ void second_overflow(void)
 			 */
 			time_interpolator_update(NSEC_PER_SEC);
 			time_state = TIME_WAIT;
-			clock_was_set();
 			printk(KERN_NOTICE "Clock: deleting leap second "
 					"23:59:59 UTC\n");
 		}

-- 

[patch 24/26] sky2: workaround for lost IRQ

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: sky2-workaround-for-lost-irq.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1526 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

This patch restores a couple of workarounds from 2.6.16:
 * restart transmit moderation timer in case it expires during IRQ routine
 * default to having 10 HZ watchdog timer.
At this point it more important not to hang than to worry about the
power cost.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
 drivers/net/sky2.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/net/sky2.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/net/sky2.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int disable_msi = 0;
 module_param(disable_msi, int, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_msi, "Disable Message Signaled Interrupt (MSI)");
 
-static int idle_timeout = 0;
+static int idle_timeout = 100;
 module_param(idle_timeout, int, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(idle_timeout, "Watchdog timer for lost interrupts (ms)");
 
@@ -2433,6 +2433,13 @@ static int sky2_poll(struct net_device *
 
 	work_done = sky2_status_intr(hw, work_limit);
 	if (work_done < work_limit) {
+		/* Bug/Errata workaround?
+		 * Need to kick the TX irq moderation timer.
+		 */
+		if (sky2_read8(hw, STAT_TX_TIMER_CTRL) == TIM_START) {
+			sky2_write8(hw, STAT_TX_TIMER_CTRL, TIM_STOP);
+			sky2_write8(hw, STAT_TX_TIMER_CTRL, TIM_START);
+		}
 		netif_rx_complete(dev0);
 
 		sky2_read32(hw, B0_Y2_SP_LISR);

-- 

[patch 25/26] V4L: bttv: fix v4l1 api usage breaking the driver

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: v4l-bttv-fix-v4l1-api-usage-breaking-the-driver.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 3301 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Trent Piepho <xyzzy@speakeasy.org>

If one uses a V4L *one* application, such as vlc or mplayer's v4l driver, as
the first user after the driver is loaded, the driver wedges itself and will
never capture properly.  Even if one uses a V4L2 application later, it still
won't work.

If one uses a V4L *two* application first, such as tvtime or mplayer's v4l2
driver, then the driver will be ok.  One can then run a V4L1 application, and
it will work.

It turns out the problem is with norm changing and the crop support that was
added in 2.6.21.  The driver defaults to PAL, and keeps the last norm it was
set too across opens.  If one changes the norm via V4L1, the cropping
parameters are not reset like they should be, and they'll remain broken across
device opens.

This patch removes the direct setting of btv->tvnorm in the V4L1 ioctl
VIDIOCSCHAN handler.  The norm is set via the existing call to set_input(),
which calls set_tvnorm(), which will reset the cropping values now that it is
able to detect the norm change.

Signed-off-by: Trent Piepho <xyzzy@speakeasy.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Krufky <mkrufky@linuxtv.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
(cherry picked from commit 333408f21590d50397f3004e3f87070fa8f52c51)

 drivers/media/video/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c |   13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/media/video/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/media/video/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c
@@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ set_tvnorm(struct bttv *btv, unsigned in
 
 /* Call with btv->lock down. */
 static void
-set_input(struct bttv *btv, unsigned int input)
+set_input(struct bttv *btv, unsigned int input, unsigned int norm)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ set_input(struct bttv *btv, unsigned int
 	}
 	audio_input(btv,(input == bttv_tvcards[btv->c.type].tuner ?
 		       TVAUDIO_INPUT_TUNER : TVAUDIO_INPUT_EXTERN));
-	set_tvnorm(btv,btv->tvnorm);
+	set_tvnorm(btv, norm);
 	i2c_vidiocschan(btv);
 }
 
@@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ static void bttv_reinit_bt848(struct btt
 
 	init_bt848(btv);
 	btv->pll.pll_current = -1;
-	set_input(btv,btv->input);
+	set_input(btv, btv->input, btv->tvnorm);
 }
 
 static int get_control(struct bttv *btv, struct v4l2_control *c)
@@ -1993,8 +1993,7 @@ static int bttv_common_ioctls(struct btt
 			return 0;
 		}
 
-		btv->tvnorm = v->norm;
-		set_input(btv,v->channel);
+		set_input(btv, v->channel, v->norm);
 		mutex_unlock(&btv->lock);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2130,7 +2129,7 @@ static int bttv_common_ioctls(struct btt
 		if (*i > bttv_tvcards[btv->c.type].video_inputs)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		mutex_lock(&btv->lock);
-		set_input(btv,*i);
+		set_input(btv, *i, btv->tvnorm);
 		mutex_unlock(&btv->lock);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -4762,7 +4761,7 @@ static int __devinit bttv_probe(struct p
 		bt848_hue(btv,32768);
 		bt848_sat(btv,32768);
 		audio_mute(btv, 1);
-		set_input(btv,0);
+		set_input(btv, 0, btv->tvnorm);
 		bttv_crop_reset(&btv->crop[0], btv->tvnorm);
 		btv->crop[1] = btv->crop[0]; /* current = default */
 		disclaim_vbi_lines(btv);

-- 

[patch 26/26] V4L: cx88-blackbird: fix vidioc_g_tuner never ending list of tuners

[Greg KH]

[-- Attachment #1: v4l-cx88-blackbird-fix-vidioc_g_tuner-never-ending-list-of-tuners.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1268 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Jelle Foks <jelle@foks.8m.com>

v4l-info and other programs would loop indefinitely while querying the
tuners for cx88-blackbird cards.

The cause was that vidioc_g_tuner didn't return an error value for
qctrl->id != 0, making the application think there is a never ending
list of tuners...

This patch adds the same index check as done in vidioc_g_tuner() in
cx88-video.

Signed-off-by: Jelle Foks <jelle@foks.8m.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Krufky <mkrufky@linuxtv.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
(cherry picked from commit f057131fb6eb2c45f6023e3da41ccd6e4e71aee9)

 drivers/media/video/cx88/cx88-blackbird.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/drivers/media/video/cx88/cx88-blackbird.c
+++ linux-2.6.21.6/drivers/media/video/cx88/cx88-blackbird.c
@@ -1034,6 +1034,8 @@ static int vidioc_g_tuner (struct file *
 
 	if (unlikely(UNSET == core->tuner_type))
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (0 != t->index)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	strcpy(t->name, "Television");
 	t->type       = V4L2_TUNER_ANALOG_TV;

-- 

Re: [patch 00/26] 2.6.21.7 -stable review

[Greg KH]

On Mon, Jul 30, 2007 at 09:30:47PM -0700, Greg KH wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.21.7 release.
> There are 26 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to
> this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let
> us know.  If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants
> to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.

Rolled up patch is at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-testing/patch-2.6.21.7-rc1.gz

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [patch 20/26] saa7134: fix thread shutdown handling

[Mauro Carvalho Chehab]

Hi Greg,

Em Seg, 2007-07-30 às 21:33 -0700, Greg KH escreveu:
> anexo Documento somente texto
> (saa7134-fix-thread-shutdown-handling.patch)
> -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
> 
> ------------------
> 
> From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
> 
> This patch changes the test for the thread pid from >= 0 to > 0.
> 
> When the saa8134 driver initialization fails after a certain point, it goes
	   ^^^^^^^
The patch is OK. however, the driver name is saa7134.

-- 
Cheers,
Mauro

Re: [patch 20/26] saa7134: fix thread shutdown handling

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Jul 31, 2007 at 02:05:48AM -0300, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
> Hi Greg,
> 
> Em Seg, 2007-07-30 ??s 21:33 -0700, Greg KH escreveu:
> > anexo Documento somente texto
> > (saa7134-fix-thread-shutdown-handling.patch)
> > -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
> > 
> > ------------------
> > 
> > From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
> > 
> > This patch changes the test for the thread pid from >= 0 to > 0.
> > 
> > When the saa8134 driver initialization fails after a certain point, it goes
> 	   ^^^^^^^
> The patch is OK. however, the driver name is saa7134.

Heh, thanks, I've fixed the text of the patch.

greg k-h

Re: [patch 00/26] 2.6.21.7 -stable review

[Stefan Richter]

Greg KH wrote:
> Rolled up patch is at:
> 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-testing/patch-2.6.21.7-rc1.gz
  	                                 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  	                                 stable-review
-- 
Stefan Richter
-=====-=-=== -=== =====
http://arcgraph.de/sr/

Re: [patch 14/26] sched: fix next_interval determination in idle_balance()

[Paul E. McKenney]

On Mon, Jul 30, 2007 at 09:32:54PM -0700, Greg KH wrote:
> -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

Hello, Greg,

No objections here -- on the contrary, very nice not to have to manually
"taskset" my rcutorture runs.  ;-)

						Thanx, Paul

> ------------------
> 
> From: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
> 
> Fix massive SMP imbalance on NUMA nodes observed on 2.6.21.5 with CFS. 
> (and later on reproduced without CFS as well).
> 
> The intervals of domains that do not have SD_BALANCE_NEWIDLE must be 
> considered for the calculation of the time of the next balance. 
> Otherwise we may defer rebalancing forever and nodes might stay idle for 
> very long times.
> 
> Siddha also spotted that the conversion of the balance interval to 
> jiffies is missing. Fix that to.
> 
> From: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> 
> also continue the loop if !(sd->flags & SD_LOAD_BALANCE).
> 
> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> 
> It did in fact trigger under all three of mainline, CFS, and -rt 
> including CFS -- see below for a couple of emails from last Friday 
> giving results for these three on the AMD box (where it happened) and on 
> a single-quad NUMA-Q system (where it did not, at least not with such 
> severity).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
> ---
>  kernel/sched.c |   22 +++++++++++++---------
>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> --- linux-2.6.21.6.orig/kernel/sched.c
> +++ linux-2.6.21.6/kernel/sched.c
> @@ -2831,17 +2831,21 @@ static void idle_balance(int this_cpu, s
>  	unsigned long next_balance = jiffies + 60 *  HZ;
> 
>  	for_each_domain(this_cpu, sd) {
> -		if (sd->flags & SD_BALANCE_NEWIDLE) {
> +		unsigned long interval;
> +
> +		if (!(sd->flags & SD_LOAD_BALANCE))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		if (sd->flags & SD_BALANCE_NEWIDLE)
>  			/* If we've pulled tasks over stop searching: */
>  			pulled_task = load_balance_newidle(this_cpu,
> -							this_rq, sd);
> -			if (time_after(next_balance,
> -				  sd->last_balance + sd->balance_interval))
> -				next_balance = sd->last_balance
> -						+ sd->balance_interval;
> -			if (pulled_task)
> -				break;
> -		}
> +								this_rq, sd);
> +
> +		interval = msecs_to_jiffies(sd->balance_interval);
> +		if (time_after(next_balance, sd->last_balance + interval))
> +			next_balance = sd->last_balance + interval;
> +		if (pulled_task)
> +			break;
>  	}
>  	if (!pulled_task)
>  		/*
> 
> -- 

Re: [patch 00/26] 2.6.21.7 -stable review

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Jul 31, 2007 at 12:50:54PM +0200, Stefan Richter wrote:
> Greg KH wrote:
> > Rolled up patch is at:
> > 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-testing/patch-2.6.21.7-rc1.gz
>   	                                 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>   	                                 stable-review

Oops, thanks, that's what I get for trying to type that from memory :)