Re: encrypted hibernation (was Re: Hibernation considerations)

Michael Chang
2007-08-13T02:30:49Z

On 8/11/07, Dr. David Alan Gilbert <linux@treblig.org> wrote:
> * Pavel Machek (pavel@ucw.cz) wrote:
> > Hi!
> >
> > > > > Two things which I think would be nice to consider are:
> > > > > 1) Encryption - I'd actually prefer if my luks device did not
> > > > > remember the key accross a hibernation; I want to be forced to
> > > > > reenter the phrase. However I don't know what the best thing
> > > > > to do to partitions/applications using the luks device is.
> > > >
> > > > Encryption is possible with both the userland hibernation (aka uswsusp) and
> > > > TuxOnIce (formerly known as suspend2). Still, I don't consider it as a "must
> > > > have" feature for a framework to be generally useful (many users don't use it
> > > > anyway).
> > >
> > > If a user uses an encrypted filesystem, then he also needs an encrypted
> > > swap and encrypted hibernation image: Otherwise the fileystem encryption
> > > is not very useful.
> >
> > Actually, we can do most of that stuff already.
> >
> > We can encrypt filesystems, encrypt swaps (LVM), and encrypt hibernation.
>
> But can you do what my original question was; find a way to lose a luks
> encrypted device key and cleanly unmount the filesystem that was
> using it? (and preferably put it all back together after resume).
>

If you lose the device key, how are you going to get luks to find it
again when resuming? Wouldn't it make more sense to have it remember
the key? I can't see it being advisable to allow input or similar
before resume has completed...

--
Michael Chang

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