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From: Greg KH <gregkh@suse.de>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org
Cc: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@linuxtx.org>,
	Zwane Mwaikambo <zwane@arm.linux.org.uk>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
	Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>,
	Chuck Wolber <chuckw@quantumlinux.com>,
	Chris Wedgwood <reviews@ml.cw.f00f.org>,
	Michael Krufky <mkrufky@linuxtv.org>,
	Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>,
	Domenico Andreoli <cavokz@gmail.com>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, bunk@kernel.org,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [patch 11/13] Fix compat futex hangs.
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2007 22:09:52 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20071115060952.GL7602@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20071115060544.GA7602@kroah.com>

[-- Attachment #1: fix-compat-futex-hangs.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 3259 bytes --]

-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------
From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

[FUTEX]: Fix address computation in compat code.

[ Upstream commit: 3c5fd9c77d609b51c0bab682c9d40cbb496ec6f1 ]

compat_exit_robust_list() computes a pointer to the
futex entry in userspace as follows:

	(void __user *)entry + futex_offset

'entry' is a 'struct robust_list __user *', and
'futex_offset' is a 'compat_long_t' (typically a 's32').

Things explode if the 32-bit sign bit is set in futex_offset.

Type promotion sign extends futex_offset to a 64-bit value before
adding it to 'entry'.

This triggered a problem on sparc64 running 32-bit applications which
would lock up a cpu looping forever in the fault handling for the
userspace load in handle_futex_death().

Compat userspace runs with address masking (wherein the cpu zeros out
the top 32-bits of every effective address given to a memory operation
instruction) so the sparc64 fault handler accounts for this by
zero'ing out the top 32-bits of the fault address too.

Since the kernel properly uses the compat_uptr interfaces, kernel side
accesses to compat userspace work too since they will only use
addresses with the top 32-bit clear.

Because of this compat futex layer bug we get into the following loop
when executing the get_user() load near the top of handle_futex_death():

1) load from address '0xfffffffff7f16bd8', FAULT
2) fault handler clears upper 32-bits, processes fault
   for address '0xf7f16bd8' which succeeds
3) goto #1

I want to thank Bernd Zeimetz, Josip Rodin, and Fabio Massimo Di Nitto
for their tireless efforts helping me track down this bug.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 kernel/futex_compat.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c
@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ fetch_robust_entry(compat_uptr_t *uentry
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void __user *futex_uaddr(struct robust_list *entry,
+				compat_long_t futex_offset)
+{
+	compat_uptr_t base = ptr_to_compat(entry);
+	void __user *uaddr = compat_ptr(base + futex_offset);
+
+	return uaddr;
+}
+
 /*
  * Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
  * and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
@@ -75,11 +84,13 @@ void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task
 		 * A pending lock might already be on the list, so
 		 * dont process it twice:
 		 */
-		if (entry != pending)
-			if (handle_futex_death((void __user *)entry + futex_offset,
-						curr, pi))
-				return;
+		if (entry != pending) {
+			void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(entry,
+							 futex_offset);
 
+			if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi))
+				return;
+		}
 		if (rc)
 			return;
 		uentry = next_uentry;
@@ -93,9 +104,11 @@ void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task
 
 		cond_resched();
 	}
-	if (pending)
-		handle_futex_death((void __user *)pending + futex_offset,
-				   curr, pip);
+	if (pending) {
+		void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(pending, futex_offset);
+
+		handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip);
+	}
 }
 
 asmlinkage long

-- 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2007-11-15  6:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20071115042610.731859958@mini.kroah.org>
2007-11-15  6:05 ` [patch 00/13] 2.6.23-stable review, core kernel changes Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 01/13] lockdep: fix mismatched lockdep_depth/curr_chain_hash Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 02/13] locks: fix possible infinite loop in posix deadlock detection Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 03/13] Remove broken ptrace() special-case code from file mapping Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 04/13] param_sysfs_builtin memchr argument fix Greg KH
2007-11-15 16:11     ` Chuck Ebbert
2007-11-15 17:58       ` Greg KH
2007-11-15 20:46         ` Chuck Ebbert
2007-11-15 21:20           ` Jan Kiszka
2007-11-15 23:58             ` Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 05/13] HOWTO: update ja_JP/HOWTO with latest changes Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 06/13] SLUB: Fix memory leak by not reusing cpu_slab Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 07/13] writeback: dont propagate AOP_WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 08/13] splice: fix double kunmap() in vmsplice copy path Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 09/13] fix the softlockup watchdog to actually work Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 10/13] sched: keep utime/stime monotonic Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` Greg KH [this message]
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 12/13] fix tmpfs BUG and AOP_WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE Greg KH
2007-11-15  6:09   ` [patch 13/13] BLOCK: Fix bad sharing of tag busy list on queues with shared tag maps Greg KH

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