From: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
To: John Reiser <jreiser@BitWagon.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org
Subject: Re: /dev/urandom uses uninit bytes, leaks user data
Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2007 14:13:05 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20071214201305.GL19691@waste.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4762DAB1.1020807@BitWagon.com>
On Fri, Dec 14, 2007 at 11:34:09AM -0800, John Reiser wrote:
> xfer_secondary_pool() in drivers/char/random.c tells add_entropy_words()
> to use uninitialized tmp[] whenever bytes is not a multiple of 4.
> Besides being unfriendly to automated dynamic checkers, this is a
> potential leak of user data into the output stream. When called from
> extract_entropy_user, then uninit tmp[] can capture leftover data
> from a previous copy_from_user().
Yes, we use uninitialized data. But it's not a leak in any useful
sense. To the extent the previous data is secret, this actually
improves our entropy.
It's getting folded into the random number pool, where it will be
impossible to recover it unless you already know what was in the
pool. And if you know what's in the pool, you've already broken into
the kernel.
But I'm sympathetic to making Valgrind happy.
> --- ./drivers/char/random.c.orig 2007-12-14 11:06:03.000000000 -0800
> +++ ./drivers/char/random.c 2007-12-14 11:06:57.000000000 -0800
> @@ -708,7 +708,19 @@
>
> bytes=extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
> random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8, rsvd);
> - add_entropy_words(r, tmp, (bytes + 3) / 4);
> + /*
> + * 2007-12-13 (valgrind/memcheck) Do not use undefined bytes.
> + * Avoid info leak when called from extract_entropy_user:
> + * uninit tmp[] can have data from previous copy_from_user().
> + * Instead: fill last word using first bytes.
> + */
> + {
> + __u8 *src = (__u8 *)&tmp[0];
> + __u8 *dst = bytes + src;
> + for (; 0!=(3 & bytes); ++bytes)
> + *dst++ = *src++;
> + }
That's hideous. How about a memset instead:
/* clear uninitialized bytes at the end to make valgrind happy */
memset((char *)tmp + bytes, 0, -bytes & 3);
Also, don't bother putting dates or the like in comments. We've got a
version control system for that.
> + add_entropy_words(r, tmp, bytes>>2);
And that change is broken..
> credit_entropy_store(r, bytes*8);
..because it makes this line wrong. We have to add precisely the
number of bytes returned by extract_entropy to keep the books
balanced.
--
Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-12-14 20:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-12-14 19:34 /dev/urandom uses uninit bytes, leaks user data John Reiser
2007-12-14 20:13 ` Matt Mackall [this message]
2007-12-14 20:45 ` John Reiser
2007-12-14 23:23 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-15 0:30 ` John Reiser
2007-12-15 4:32 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-17 16:30 ` John Reiser
2007-12-17 17:36 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-18 0:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2007-12-18 3:05 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-18 3:13 ` David Newall
2007-12-18 3:46 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-18 4:09 ` David Newall
2007-12-18 4:23 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-19 22:43 ` Bill Davidsen
2007-12-19 22:40 ` Bill Davidsen
2007-12-20 4:18 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2007-12-20 20:17 ` Phillip Susi
2007-12-21 16:10 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2007-12-22 1:14 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-26 18:30 ` Phillip Susi
2007-12-20 20:36 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-27 10:44 ` Pavel Machek
2007-12-18 5:12 ` David Schwartz
2007-12-17 20:59 ` David Schwartz
2007-12-15 7:13 ` Herbert Xu
2007-12-15 16:30 ` Matt Mackall
2007-12-17 17:28 ` Signed divides vs shifts (Re: [Security] /dev/urandom uses uninit bytes, leaks user data) Linus Torvalds
2007-12-17 17:48 ` Al Viro
2007-12-17 17:55 ` Eric Dumazet
2007-12-17 18:05 ` Ray Lee
2007-12-17 18:10 ` Eric Dumazet
2007-12-17 18:12 ` Ray Lee
2007-12-17 18:23 ` Al Viro
2007-12-17 18:28 ` [Security] Signed divides vs shifts (Re: " Linus Torvalds
2007-12-17 19:08 ` Al Viro
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2007-12-15 7:20 /dev/urandom uses uninit bytes, leaks user data Matti Linnanvuori
2007-12-15 7:54 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2007-12-15 22:44 linux
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