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From: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [TOMOYO #6 00/21] TOMOYO Linux - MAC based on process invocation history.
Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2008 18:49:03 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080108094903.484613061@nttdata.co.jp> (raw)

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"TOMOYO Linux" is our work in the field of security enhancement for Linux.
This is the 6th submission of TOMOYO Linux.
(http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/wiki-e/?WhatIs#mainlining)

Changes since previous (November 17th) submission:

* Added security goal document. (Documentation/TOMOYO.txt)
   This document is intended to specify the security goal that TOMOYO
   Linux is trying to achieve. Thread URL:
     http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/12/25/18

* Added environment variable name control functionality.
   Users can restrict the environment variable's names passed to
   execve() for each domain.

* Refreshed patches for the latest -mm tree.
   Patches are for 2.6.24-rc6-mm1

The possibility of AB-BA deadlock has been pointed out and argued in
http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/5/388 .
We believe that LSM functions shouldn't access namespace_sem, so
we chose to write a set of wrapper functions to pass "struct vfsmount" to
LSM functions using "struct task_struct". This method is suggested at
http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg01712.html .

We wish Linux to merge either AppArmor's "Pass struct vfsmount to ..." patches or
our patches marked as [02/21], [03/21], [04/21] into mainline kernel
so that AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux can safely access "struct vfsmount" from LSM.

Patches consist of five types.
 * [TOMOYO 01/21]:    Documentation.
 * [TOMOYO 02-05/21]: Essential modifications against -mm kernel.
 * [TOMOYO 06-19/21]: LSM implementation of TOMOYO Linux.
 * [TOMOYO 20/21]:    Makefile and Kconfig.
 * [TOMOYO 21/21]:    Optional modifications against -mm kernel.

We are trying to make a fair ¡Èsecure Linux¡É comparison table, it should
explain the differences between TOMOYO Linux and AppArmor.
(http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/wiki-e/?WhatIs#comparison)

We would like TOMOYO Linux to be added into -mm tree so that more
people can try. Any kind of feedbacks for the patches and the table
would be appreciated.
-- 

             reply	other threads:[~2008-01-08 10:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-01-08  9:49 Kentaro Takeda [this message]
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 01/21] TOMOYO Linux documentation Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 02/21] Add struct vfsmount to struct task_struct Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08 14:09   ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-01-08 14:39     ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 03/21] Add wrapper functions for VFS helper functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 04/21] Replace VFS with wrapper functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 05/21] Add packet filtering based on processs security context Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 06/21] Data structures and prototype defitions Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 07/21] Memory and pathname management functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 08/21] Utility functions and policy manipulation interface Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 09/21] Domain transition functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 10/21] Auditing interface Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 11/21] File access control functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 12/21] argv0 check functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 13/21] environment variable name " Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 14/21] Network access control functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 15/21] Namespace manipulation " Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 16/21] Signal " Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 17/21] Capability access " Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 18/21] LSM adapter functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 19/21] Conditional permission support Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 20/21] Kconfig and Makefile Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08  9:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 21/21] Add signal hooks at sleepable location Kentaro Takeda
2008-01-08 11:49 ` [TOMOYO #6 00/21] TOMOYO Linux - MAC based on process invocation history Kentaro Takeda

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